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1. Executive summary 
 
Introduction 
This study focuses on the assessment of index tools for agricultural insurances. Index insurances 
basically differ from traditional agricultural insurances in that they do not refer to the actual farm 
losses, but to the losses evaluated from an index. This index can be, for example, some area yield or 
revenue, some meteorological or agro-meteorological parameter or a satellite imagery parameter. The 
analysis considers the coherence with the WTO agreements and the effectiveness to deal with the risk 
of substantial income reduction of farmers. The study evaluates index insurances in EU-27, and 
makes a cross-validation of index insurances based on the loss risk calculated from FADN data. The 
analysis covers all 27 Member States of the EU. However, most aspects of the study are restricted to 
EU-15 because of data availability, in particular for the FADN loss risk assessment, for which long 
time series are not available for the new MS. Income indicators based on FADN data are taken into 
account since 1994, yield indicators from Eurostat data since 1975, meteorological and agro-
meteorological indicators since 1975 and indicators based on coarse resolution satellite images since 
1998. 
 
Review of index insurances 
This chapter starts with a thorough review of index-based risk management tools. Index contracts are 
more properly financial derivatives or options than insurances. However, under certain conditions, 
they can be considered as insurance: “the weather derivative can be brokered as an insurance 
contract or as an over-the-counter traded option”, according to Turvey (2001). Weather derivatives or 
weather options are managed by the private sector, and limited information available about them. The 
financial weather contracts market has been originally in the hands of the energy sector, but from 
2005 to 2007, the Over-The-Counter end users related to the agricultural sector has doubled. In Swiss 
Re’s client database, the majority of the business covering weather risks outside developed countries 
(North America, Europe, Japan and Australia) is with counter parties in the agricultural sector. 
Anyway, as a whole, this market is in the early stages. The pricing of index insurance is a complex 
issue: traditional methods for pricing financial derivatives have been used, but insurance or actuarial 
methods can be more adequate. On the other hand the possible impact of climate change is difficult to 
assess.  
The main advantages over classical insurance is that they avoid moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, which allows higher levels of coverage; it is easy to sell through banks and any financial 
organisations; it is transparent and affordable with very low administrative costs. However, an insured 
event may not always reflect the production losses experienced by the individual farmers, so it is 
better adapted for very homogeneous areas and for reinsurance. 
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There is a wide variety of types of index insurance. We can distinguish two main groups: 
− area yield and revenue insurance (the index is directly an area average yield or income);;  
− indirect index insurance: exogenous and yield tailored. At the same time, they can be based on 
one or several indicators, which can be either: 
  meteorological, (the indices are variables such as rainfall or temperature); 
  agrometeorological (the indices are indicators which include agronomic 
parameters relative to the crop, such as soil moisture or leaf area index); 
 satellite imagery indicators (vegetation indices computed from satellite 
images).  
The literature review includes both studies that analyse area yield insurance and studies that refer to 
indirect insurances based on meteorological indicators. Among these, there are seven examples of 
exogenous index insurance, and five of yield tailored insurances. A particular example which 
combines an exogenous standardised contract and yield-tailoring is the work by Torriani et al. (2007) 
in which the weather derivative which triggers the payment is exogenous but he proposes a yield-
tailored combination of weather derivatives for the farmer.  
The exogenous indexes can either have a fixed payment per unitary index decrease (for example a 
payment of 1€ per 1mm rainfall shortfall), or be proportional (a decrease of the rainfall of 50% would 
trigger a compensation of the 50% of the insured capital). The yield-tailored examples with multiple 
indicators adjust yield with the estimation of a model combining different indicators. Other yield-
tailored indexes have only one indicator. They optimize the index-yield correlation by the application of 
weights for the different agronomic growth stages. The three examples available of them are 
calculated for drought and use the cumulated precipitation. Their results show that a better correlation 
is achieved when the exogenous single indicator is weighted on the agronomic growth stages. 
Globally, most of the studies agree on the fact that the better or worse results from index products 
depend fundamentally on the correlation existing between the real loss of the farmers and the index 
analysed.  
There are several area yield insurance experiences in the world; we have classified the main ones in 
four categories, according to the nature of the indicators used: 
• Area-index insurance has been tested for several years in USA (area yield), Canada, Brazil, 
India (area revenue); Morocco (area yield insurance for drought). 
• The weather or meteorological index insurances are rather new in the market. There is one 
based on rainfall in Ontario (Canada); still in Canada, in Alberta an insurance is available based 
on lack-of-moisture and another one on temperature index for silage maize. Other experiences 
of indirect index insurance based on weather data exist as pilot programs in many developing 
countries: Mongolia, Mexico, India (rainfall for several crops-very developed scheme), Romania 
(rainfall), Nicaragua, Ethiopia (drought and food insecurity), Malawi (crop protection based on 
weather indices against drought).  
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• In Malawi there is an agro-meto index insurance for maize production based on plant water 
availability. 
• Satellite index insurance for fodder exists as pilot programs in Canada (2001). 
In the European Union there are, to our knowledge, only two examples of indirect index insurance: the 
pilot projects in Austria of a weather index insurance based on meteorological data to cover yield from 
the risk of drought, and the satellite index insurance for fodder in Spain  
 
Feasibility of index insurance in the EU 
Some characteristics of index products have to be taken into account in the analysis of feasibility: 
- Index products are useful for systemic risk, at the aggregate level, so they are more adapted to 
reinsurance and catastrophic risks. 
- Index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas, where all farms have correlated 
yields. Given the heterogeneity of climates and geography in many European countries, the efficiency 
of index products will be probably lower than in the large homogeneous areas of the USA (for 
example, the corn belt). 
- Insurance can be properly designed when there are yield time-series available (or losses time 
series). In Europe time series are only available for relatively large regions. Some of these regions are 
quite heterogeneous in cropping conditions, climate, topography and soils. This creates difficulties for 
the efficiency of index insurance for all farmers in the region. 
Besides, insurances have to comply with European and international regulations. If insurance was to 
be considered within the CAP framework, the subsidies should comply with WTO green box criteria. 
Subsidies to index insurance could be considered as payments (made either directly or by way of 
government financial participation in crop insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters 
(Paragraph 8 of Annex 2 of WTO Agreement on Agriculture), because indexes are intended to 
reproduce yield or production risks. However, it is not clear whether an index insurance by its nature 
can be considered under the Green Box, given that its nature is not to compensate the actual loss of 
an individual, but the loss indicated by a parameter (a farmer that did not suffer from a loss could 
potentially benefit from compensations). Practical difficulties would also arise from the requirement of 
a formal recognition by the Governmental authorities of natural disaster, as it would have to be linked 
to a certain threshold for the indexes used. Other technical characteristics of the insurance and its 
compliance with the Green Box criteria are also analysed. 
 
Regional (FADN region) yield index 
We have analysed the potential of a hypothetical Regional Yield Insurance (RYI) from Eurostat-
REGIO data applied at the level of FADN region. We have estimated the premiums rates and the 
maximum total premium amounts. The calculation of the risk that is covered by the insurance 
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company results in a risk rate which is known in technical terms as “actuarially fair premium” rate (also 
risk premium or fair premium). We have expressed it as a percentage of the total insured amount. 
From this fair premium, the commercial premium is then estimated by adding the management and 
administrative costs and the profit of the insurance company, reinsurance, etc. The fair premium rates 
for wheat with a trigger of 30% and no deductible ranges from 0 to 14%, with average of 1.1%. The 
average seems quite affordable, but the maximums are very high. This highlights the large variation of 
yield risks between different regions. The premium with a 30% deductible was also calculated. In this 
case, the maximum would reach 6.48% and the average 0.25%. We should underline here that the 
risk of fall by 30% of a regional average is much lower than the risk of fall by 30% for an individual 
farm. This explains why the average fair premium of 0.25% is low. With a 15% trigger wheat premiums 
reaches the 15.7% in Spain. On the whole, these results show that premium rates are very sensitive 
to the deductibles and trigger levels. The total premium amount can be multiplied by 2 or even up to 6 
when reducing the trigger from 30% to 15%.  
The commercial premiums of Regional Yield Insurance (RYI) with a 30% trigger and a 50% market 
penetration (and assuming there is no adverse selection) and assuming a load on the fair premium of 
42%, could be around EUR 77.6 million for potato, EUR 79.5 million for barley and EUR 69.8 million 
for wheat, of which EUR 54.67 million, EUR 56 million and EUR 49.1 million respectively are the pure 
premiums. The country average fair premiums per hectare oscillate between EUR 4.17 and EUR 9.17 
for most arable crops, but reach EUR 30.70/ha for potato.  
 
Meteorological parameters or weather indexes 
Some meteorological indicators were analysed following the model of the area yield-tailored insurance 
from several indicators. An insurance product could be thus designed for each region on the most 
relevant parameter or combination of parameters according to the results. However, these 
combinations of indicators do not explain yields optimally, as the Multiple R-Square is only 30%. 
Perhaps other indicators should be explored. Besides, it is also possible that there is too much 
heterogeneity within each NUTS2 region and a meteorological yield-tailored index could only have a 
good explanation capacity at a more disaggregated level. The meteorological indices analysis is 
useful to underline that the index risk can differ very much from one European region to another. The 
example shown in Chapter 4.3 aims to explain the level of vulnerability of the same crop, at the same 
development stage can vary in function of climatic conditions. The results of the late frost study 
expresses the need of analyse the climatic risk under many points of view, accounting with many 
physiological aspects related to the crop and more expertise is needed to aggregate data in order to 
reach robust outputs. 
 
Parameters computed from an agro-meteorological model 
Agrometoerological parameters are built by modelling the crop growth, based on the Crop Yield 
Forecasting System (MARS). Three parameters were selected to study their potential to explain yield 
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variability: Relative Soil Moisture (RSM), Total Water Consumption (TWC) and the Water Limited 
Storage Organ Weight (WLSOW). 
Assuming that the Eurostat-REGIO yield is a good indicator of the yields to be insured (or reinsured, 
since we are working at regional level), the parameters which have been analysed reach sometimes 
high correlations. Some examples regards the relative soil moisture, which reaches in Baden-
Wurttemberg (Germany) a 0.96 correlation on 10 years, or TWC which reaches 0.74 on 29 years in 
Bretagne (France), both for grain maize. Unfortunately this high level of correlation is far from being 
achieved in general.  
The analysis of the agro-meteorological indices is made on a large scale (EU 27); this factor certainly 
limits the quality of the results, because the domain of observations is very wide. We have to take into 
account is the climatic differences in Europe: Certain areas suffer lack of water, while others face 
problems due to excessive rain; this means that it is sometimes problematic to analyse the same 
index on areas with different meteorological problematic. The idea to divide Europe into climatic zones 
could represent an improvement for the analysis; this could help to refine the outputs and to determine 
which index can better represent the yield variability for each zone and for each crop.  
At present, the results raise major doubts on the opportunity to apply index insurances based on agro-
meteorological indicators in the EU. The study suggests several directions that could be taken to 
comprehend how far an index can serve to assess losses due to climatic event or to prevent income 
losses through an insurance scheme based on agro-meteorological indices. 
 
Parameters from satellite images 
Analyses for NDVI (Normalised Difference Vegetation Index) computed on SPOT4-VEGETATION 
images show that the maximum NDVI appears as a poor indicator of crop yield risk in the European 
conditions. While a good spatial correlation can be observed between maxNDVI and yield, the time 
correlations in each FADN region are low. A factor influencing negatively these correlations is the 
small number of years available (only 7). However, correlation results improved when taking into 
account only those maximum NDVI which fall in the period when the crop is more sensitive to 
nutrients and water stresses. This means that the capacity of NDVI for explaining yields could be 
improved by exploring other NDVI-based indicators, such as the maxNDVI of this sensitivity period. 
On the other hand, ongoing activities within the Agriculture Unit of the JRC have proved that the 
correlation between the indicators derived from NDVI and yield is dependent on the regions. A study 
in Spain showed that the max NDVI but also cumulated NDVI values for different periods of the 
growing season are significant. Further analysis could include indicators such as the start NDVI or the 
end NDVI of the growing season; the cumulated NDVI during the length of growing season; and 
cumulated NDVI between start and max NDVI, or between max NDVI and end NDVI of the season. 
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Quantitative assessment of the loss risk on the basis of FADN data 
The individual farm income and yield risk have been analysed in order to compare them with the risk 
from the index insurance analysis. We use the data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN). FADN is the best available source of data at single farm level. The use of FADN data allows 
setting up the link between the index-based triggers and the risk of loss of yield or income at farm 
level. 
The concept of risk is the expectation of the loss compared to the “normal” yield or income. It can be 
calculated as the loss averaged on time, after applying a trigger or deductible, if necessary. This is 
often labelled in the academic literature as “fair premium”, although in practice the premium is higher 
because of the management costs (including loss expertise) and the profit of the insurance company. 
The WTO agreements define the normal income or yield as the average of the “preceding three-year 
period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the 
lowest entry”. An alternative option is to consider as “normal” the value of the long term trend for the 
yield or the income at the farm level. Limiting the sample to the farms for which data are recorded for 
more that 4 consecutive years reduces the sample size to less than 30% of the total sample. 
Moreover, if we only consider farms with data on 6 consecutive years, the sample will then be too 
scarce in many regions for any calculation. On the other hand the application of this rule requires an 
individual record of yearly production for each farm, but such system does not exist in most European 
countries. Therefore we need to find an alternative criterion that can be seen as equivalent. A 
common definition of normal yield is the long-term trend for the farm, but again we seem to be in a cul-
de-sac: unfortunately no data are available to estimate long term trends for each farm of the FADN 
sample. We have developed a procedure to indirectly estimate the variation compared to the trend 
without estimating the trend for the farm: it is what we call the “2-year constant sample” method. The 
procedure is model-based and consequently its validity depends on the acceptation of the model, but 
we consider it is reasonable enough and it allows to exploit the data of a farm whenever data are 
available for that farm on two consecutive years. The results obtained with this method are compared 
with those from the 3-year moving averages as defined in the WTO agreements.  
The analysis of yield reduction risk is carried out for EU-15 countries and for wheat, barley, grain 
maize, sunflower and soybean. The analyses are restricted to EU-15 because long time series are not 
available for the new MS. Both approaches give results that are consistent with each other, but the 
two-year constant sample method gives in general slightly lower values for the risk than the 3-year 
moving average method for winter cereals. A possible explanation for this fact is that the WTO criteria 
do not take into account the long term trend, which is often increasing. We point out that the practical 
application of the WTO rule would require a farm-level register of yields going at least 3-5 years 
backwards; this does not seem to be available in most EU countries.  
A spin-off of the study is the characterization of the regional yield trends with different functional 
shapes (linear, quadratic and logarithmic). This is a product that has a value as a tool to improve the 
current procedures of yield forecasting. However some additional work is necessary to collect time 
series of yields longer and more complete than the data available in the REGIO database. 
  7
The analysis of the income reduction risk is made by farm type instead of by crop. The application of 
the same methods to the income level measured through FNVA (Farm Net Value Added) is more 
problematic. We find a conceptual challenge in the application of the “30% deductible” when the 
average income in the previous year(s) is very low or even negative: What does it mean “a loss of 
more than 30% of the average income of the previous three years” when this average is negative? 
This inconvenient has been skipped by eliminating “awkward” ratios, but we have to warn that this 
may have a strong impact on the results, probably reducing the computed levels of risk. Even with this 
data cleaning implying a reduction of apparent risk, the risk levels computed for the income reduction 
are much higher than the risk of yield reduction. The reason for that is easy to understand: assuming 
relatively stable prices, a yield reduction of 30% correspond to an income reduction of much more 
than 30%, because the cost of production does not decrease with the yield. An additional analysis has 
been carried out on the value of production, or revenue, for which the estimated risk is much closer to 
the risk of yield reduction. 
 
Cross validation of indirect index insurance with FADN data 
We have made a cross-validation of the RYI (FADN region and yields from Eurostat-REGIO data) with 
the farm revenue from the crop. In order to attain this objective we have proceeded in the following 
way. We have applied to each FADN farm revenue (assuming a unitary price) the indemnities and the 
premiums from the RYI. By thus simulating the effects of RYI on the farms, we have obtained new 
values for the farm revenues with insurance. The risk was calculated with the “moving averages” 
method both for the original sample with no insurance and for the new sample with insurance. The 
comparison of both results allows to quantify the potential effects of the insurance on the average risk 
of the farms. 
As could be expected, given that area yield indexes are more adequate for homogeneous regions, the 
risk reduction capacity of RYI is not very high for the example analysed. We can expect that the 
results do not depend from the crop type, but on the scale of the analysis. Besides, we have to take 
into account that it was underestimated due to the data constraints (the percentage indemnities were 
multiplied by actual farm yields and not by average or expected farm yields). However, there are some 
regions where the risk can be reduced up to a 68%. These results have to be considered cautiously, 
given that the quality of the data is not optimal. The correlations between Eurostat yields and FADN 
yield averages are often weak.   
 
General conclusions 
As collected from the literature review, index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas, 
where all farms have correlated yields. Given the heterogeneity of climates and geography in many 
European countries, and that analysis had to be performed at NUTS2 or FADN region level, which is 
at large scale, index products efficiency results to be relatively low. It could be expected to be more 
useful for reinsurance, at the aggregate level, than at the farm level. 
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Premiums have been evaluated for a Regional Yield Insurance (RYI) for FADN regions and a number 
of arable crops. Results show that fair premium rates are very sensitive to the deductibles and trigger 
levels. Some meteorological indicators were analysed following the model of the area yield-tailored 
insurance from several indicators. The combinations of indicators analysed do not explain yields 
optimally. Perhaps other indicators could be explored, but there seems to be too much heterogeneity 
within each NUTS2 region and a meteorological yield-tailored index could only have a good 
explanation capacity at a more disaggregate level. Similar conclusions were derived from the 
agrometeorological indicators tests. The meteo- and agromoteorological indices analysis is useful to 
underline that the index risk can differ very much from one European region to another. The results 
suggest many directions that could be taken to comprehend how far an index can serve to assess 
losses due to climatic events. Analyses for NDVI show that the maximum NDVI appears as a poor 
indicator of crop yield risk. However, the capacity of NDVI for explaining yields could be improved by 
using the cumulated NDVI between the more sensitive crop development stages. 
FADN data are used to compute and map the level of risk of yield reduction for major field crops at the 
level of the farm. Preliminary results confirm that the risk level at the scale of the individual farm is 
much higher than the risk level using regional yields. The analysis of the income reduction risk is 
made by farm type instead of by crop. The income risk reduction computed is much higher than the 
risk of yield reduction. The reason is that assuming relatively stable prices, a yield reduction of 30% 
corresponds to an income reduction of much more than 30%, because the cost of production does not 
decrease with the yield. An alternative concept has been analysed: the value of production, or 
revenue, for which the estimated risk is much closer to the risk of yield reduction. 
The cross validation of area yield insurance with FADN data shows, as could be expected, that the 
risk reduction capacity of yield area index is not very high for the case analysed, even though it was 
underestimated. However, there are some regions where the risk can be reduced up to a 68%. The 
test for risk reduction capacity of other indexes could be done, however, it would be expected to be 
lower than the one from yield area index, given that theoretically regional yield area should describe 
the behaviour of farm yield better that other indexes at a regional scale. 
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2. General Introduction  
 
2.1. Background and objectives 
The Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG Agri) 
commissioned this pilot study, following a request by the European Parliament (EP) for a pilot project 
to conduct a study on “new means of providing farmers with support when a disaster occurs”. The 
general aim of the study is to improve the knowledge about climatic risks in EU agriculture and to 
examine the role and the functioning of agricultural insurance as a risk management tool. The study 
will be published by DG Agri and transmitted to the European Parliament. 
This pilot study is a continuation of the study on “Agricultural Insurance Schemes” (Agrinsur-I) 
conducted under the Administrative Arrangement n° AGRI-2005-0321 by the IPSC-Agrifish unit of 
Joint Research Centre. The study Agrinsur-I (Bielza et al. 2006) analysed the current situation of 
agricultural insurances and made a first assessment of some scenarios for a hypothetical EU-wide 
agricultural insurance system. The aspects analysed in the AGRINSUR-I report are summarised in the 
Annex 2A, section 9.1. The current study will be used by DG Agri to further assess the potential of 
insurance systems as a tool for risk and crisis management in agriculture. 
Contemporaneously to the study Agrinsur-I, a consortium of European Research centres, Universities 
and others has carried out another study on the topic of risk management: it is known as “Income 
Stabilization” project. It was developed under the 6th Framework Program and a short explanation 
about the study and its main conclusions is presented in the Annex 2B (section 9.2). The project was 
concluded in March 2008, and it provided the Commission with an analysis of risk, risk perception and 
economic analysis of different policy scenarios and risk management tools, including 
recommendations for the design and implementation of such instruments. 
This study focuses on the assessment of index tools for agricultural insurances. The analysis 
considers its effectiveness to deal with the risk of substantial yield reduction of farmers. The report 
starts with a literature survey on index insurance and derivatives. The core of the study is organised in 
two main parts. The first part evaluates the feasibility of area index and indirect index insurances in 
EU-27. The second part makes a validation of index insurance with loss risk computed from FADN 
data.  
The analyses cover all 27 Member States of the EU. However, certain aspects of the study are 
restricted to EU-15 because of data availability, in particular for the FADN loss risk assessment, for 
which long time series are not available for the new MS. Income indicators based on FADN data are 
analysed since 1994, meteorological and agro-meteorological indicators since 1975 and indicators 
based on coarse resolution satellite images since 1998. 
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2.2. CAP context 
This pilot study is inscribed in the context of the ongoing discussion on risk management tools in 
agriculture. The Commission communication on risk and crisis management in agriculture (COM 
(2005) 74 final) presented three options of supporting risk management tools, one of them being the 
co-financing of farmer’s insurance premiums against natural disasters.  
The Council conclusions of 17 December 2003 on risk management in agriculture further defined the 
essential conditions for the implementation of any new instrument:  
– The introduction of new tools, and the related financing rules, must not undermine the 
operation of the instruments already existing at national level, e.g. insurance against natural disasters.  
– The new measures must comply fully with the "green box" criteria as defined by the WTO1. 
– Although public financing may be essential, especially for the establishment and smooth start-
up of new tools, joint responsibility and therefore a financial contribution from agricultural producers is 
also essential. 
In the CAP Health Check proposal the Commission has offered a possibility of using a part of the 
Member States' direct payment funds to grant specific support, among others, in the form of 
contributions to premiums for crop insurance against losses caused by adverse climatic events (article 
68 and 69 of the proposed Council Regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes 
for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for 
farmers). The specific conditions include the rate of co-financing, definition of "adverse climatic 
events" and the requirement of its formal recognition as such by the competent authority of the 
Member State. These have been set up as to comply with WTO Green box regulation, in line with the 
abovementioned Council conclusions. 
 
2.3. Risk and losses 
We define the loss of income (or production) as the difference between the income (or production) 
under normal conditions and the actual income (or production) for a particular year. We use the word 
“loss” only when the actual income is lower than the expected (although theoretically the expression 
“negative loss” could be used for an income higher than the expected). The loss can be defined or 
estimated at farm level or for a category of farms, for example cereal specialists in a given region or 
country. The income under normal conditions is most often estimated through a long-term trend 
adjusted to available data as a smooth-behaving curve. We tackle more explicitly this problem later.  
                                                     
1 See Annex 2C, section 9.3 
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The risk is defined as the expectation of loss when no information is available on the behaviour of a 
particular year. The loss has a different value for each year, while the risk is approximately constant, 
although there may be an evolution of risk under a climate change scenario. The risk can be intuitively 
understood as the probability of a loss, it is in fact the mathematical expectation of a loss, that is, the 
average of possible losses weighted on their probabilities. For measure terms, it can be understood as 
an average loss, so it can be quantified in monetary terms, production units or, most often, as a 
percentage. So, for example, a yield risk of 20% would mean that the average probability of loss is the 
20% of the “normal” or average yield. If the average yield was 5 T/ha, then this risk would be 
equivalent to 1T/ha.  
An important concept to stress for this study is that of the “actuarially fair premium” of insurance. The 
fair premium corresponds to the expectation of the indemnities that would be given by the insurance 
company to the insured. So, for a situation with no deductibles (they are explained next), the fair 
premium corresponds exactly to what we have defined as the risk (in fact it is also called “risk 
premium”). Insurance companies, once they have quantified this risk or fair premium, add some 
loadings to it to account for their costs, and this results in a final or “commercial premium” at which 
they sell the insurance. The fair premium is often expressed in percentage of the insured capital, but it 
can also be expressed in production or monetary units (the same as the risk). For example, a 0% fair 
premium would mean that the probability of an indemnity is zero. In other words, that the yield is never 
lower than what is guaranteed by the insurance.  
Deductibles and triggers can be applied to compute loss and risk. Even if a trigger can be considered 
a type of deductible, we will identify here a deductible with a straight deductible, in contrast with the 
concept of trigger.  
We consider synonyms the straight deductible, absolute deductible and indirectly, level of coverage. 
The coverage level refers to the proportion of the insured value that is effectively covered by 
insurance. Or, in a symmetric way, the straight deductible is the fixed amount of the loss as a 
percentage of the sum insured that will always be assumed by the insured. For example if we consider 
a 30% straight deductible (or 70% coverage level), the loss will refer only to the differences beyond 
30%, and the risk is the expectation of the loss after applying the deductible. Deductibles reduce 
moral hazard because whenever there is a loss the insured will have to assume at least a part of it. In 
this way, there are fewer incentives for increasing the risk exposure due to insurance.  
We consider synonyms trigger or trigger level, threshold and franchise. The threshold is the 
percentage of the insured value the losses must exceed in order to trigger the payment. Once this 
value is exceeded, the payment of the indemnity can take place for the entire loss or only for a part of 
it. In other words, a threshold or trigger can be associated to a deductible or not. An example is shown 
in Table 1. For example, if there is a trigger of 30% and no deductible, with a loss of 25% there would 
not be any compensation. On the contrary, if the loss is 35%, then the total loss would be 
compensated. On the last row, if the insurance has a 30% deductible and trigger, in case of a 25% 
loss there would be no indemnity, and in the case of a 35% loss, the indemnity would be of 5%.    
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Table 1. Example of indemnities due at different levels of triggers and straight deductibles 
  
Examples of possible losses 
(in percentage of expected production or income) 
Trigger or threshold Deductible 25% 35% 
30% 0% 0 35% 
30% 15% 0 20% 
30% 30% 0 5% 
Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
2.4. Methods for the measure of risk 
There are a few tools used to measure risk and to compare risky situations. According to Turvey 
(1991), many academics work with mean-variance optimization and with stochastic dominance 
models, while some extension offices provide publications that include risk measures such as the 
coefficient of variation. 
Turvey recalls that there is another approach to measuring risk in agriculture, which may prove fruitful 
for both academics and farm managers or extension agents: the single-index model (SIM). The single-
index model by Sharpe (1963) has been used to derive optimal mean-variance-efficient portfolios, to 
examine the relative riskiness of farm enterprises, and to estimate the marginal costs of diversification. 
The single-index model is not an equilibrium-type model such as the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). While the underlying mathematics are the same, SIM can be applied to any portfolio using 
any index, whereas CAPM requires knowledge of a specific market portfolio. 
The single-index model assumes that revenues associated with various farm enterprises are related 
only through their covariance with some basic underlying factor or index. The risk correlated with this 
index is called non-diversifiable, or systematic, risk. Specifically, systematic risk measures the 
proportionate contribution of an individual enterprise’s risk to the variance of the underlying index. The 
second risk component, called nonsystematic risk, is the portion of enterprise returns uncorrelated 
with the index. That is, nonsystematic risk is the commodity’s specific risk. Diversification can 
potentially reduce nonsystematic risk (Turvey, 1991). This index can be, for example, the regional 
yield.   
Another commonly used measure of risk is the Value at Risk. According to the definition in 
Investopedia (www.investopedia.com) the Value at Risk (VaR) is a technique used to estimate the 
probability of portfolio losses based on the statistical analysis of historical price trends and volatilities. 
VaR is commonly used by banks, security firms and companies that are involved in trading energy 
and other commodities. VaR is able to measure risk while it happens and is an important 
consideration when firms make trading or hedging decisions.    
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According to Lonsmeier and Pearson (1996), VaR is a single, summary, statistical measure of 
possible portfolio losses. Specifically, VaR is a measure of losses due to “normal” market movement. 
Losses greater than the VaR are suffered only with a specific small probability. Dowd and Blake 
(2006) review the quantile-based risk measures, and define the VaR of the portfolio at the α 
confidence level simply as the qα quantile of the loss distribution, i.e.: VaRα = qα. Benninga and 
Wiener (1998) say that VaR measures the worst expected loss under normal market conditions over a 
specific time interval at a given confidence level. VaR is the lowest quantile of the potential losses that 
can occur within a given portfolio during a specified time period. The basic time period T and the 
confidence level (the quantile) q are the two major parameters that should be chosen in a way 
appropriate to the overall goal of risk measurement. The time horizon can differ from a few hours for 
an active trading desk to a year for a pension fund. For an internal risk management model used by a 
company to control the risk exposure the typical number is around 5%. In the jargon of VaR, suppose 
that a portfolio manager has a daily VaR equal to $1 million at 1%. This means that there is only one 
chance in 100 that a daily loss bigger than $1 million occurs under normal market conditions. 
(Benninga and Wiener, 1998). So, a way to compare two risky situations, or the effects of a risk 
management tool, is to compare the VaR of both situations for the same confidence level. 
Benninga and Wiener (1998) in a really interesting article describe how to implement VaR. They also 
propose a simple example. Suppose portfolio manager manages a portfolio which consists of a single 
asset. The return of the asset is normally distributed with annual mean return 10% and annual 
standard deviation 30%. The value of the portfolio today is $100 million. We want to answer various 
simple questions about the end-of-year distribution of portfolio value: 
1. What is the distribution of the end-of-year portfolio value? 
2. What is the probability of a loss of more than $20 million dollars by year end (i.e., what is the 
probability that the end-of-year value is less than $80 million)? 
3. With 1% probability what is the maximum loss at the end of the year? This is the VaR at 1%. 
We first want to know the distribution of the end-ofyear portfolio value. It will be given by the probability 
of a PDF[NormalDistribution[110,30].  
The probability that the end-of-year portfolio value is less than $80 is about 15.9%. 
CDF[NormalDistribution[110.,30],80]= 0.158655 
With a probability of 1% the end-of-year portfolio value will be less than 40.2096:  
Quantile[NormalDistribution[110.,30],0.01]= 40.2096. This means that the VaR of the distribution is 
100 - 40.2096 = 59.7904. 
We can formalize this by defining a VaR function which takes as its parameters the mean mu and 
standard deviation sigma of the distribution as well as the VaR level x. 
VaR[mu_,sigma_,x_]:= 100-Quantile[NormalDistribution[mu,sigma],x] 
So, VaR[110,30,0.01]= 59.7904 
 14 
Linsmeier and Pearson (1996) describe in detail three methods for computing VaR: historical 
simulation; the variance-covariance method; and Monte-Carlo of stochastic simulation. They discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of the three methos for computing VaR.  
Spaulding et al. (2003) use VaR for their study on weather derivative contracts in Romania. Instead, in 
their work on weather risk management, Woodard and Garcia (2007) prefer to use the expected 
shortfall measure rather than the Value-at-Risk (VaR). The VaR provides an estimate of the worst loss 
that one might expect given a tail event does not occur, while the expected shortfall measure is 
subadditive making it less likely to produce puzzling and inconsistent findings in hedging applications 
(Dowd and Blake 2006). 
The VaR model does allow managers to limit the likelihood of incurring losses caused by certain types 
of risk - but not all risks. The problem with relying solely on the VaR model is that the scope of risk 
assessed is limited, since the tail end of the distribution of loss is not typically assessed. Therefore, if 
losses are incurred, the amount of the losses will be substantial in value. To overcome this problem, 
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)was created to be an extension of Value at Risk (VaR). It is a risk 
assessment technique often used to reduce the probability a portfolio will incur large losses. This is 
performed by assessing the likelihood (at a specific confidence level) that a specific loss will exceed 
the value at risk. Mathematically speaking, CVaR is derived by taking a weighted average between 
the value at risk and losses exceeding the value at risk. This term is also known as "Mean Excess 
Loss", "Mean Shortfall" and "Tail VaR". (www.investopedia.com)  
Is has been applied to crop insurance, for example by Liu et al. (2006), who study the application of 
the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) model to the crop insurance industry under climate variability.  
The measure of downward risk if often calculated as a premium. The actuarially fair premium 
measures the probability below a certain threshold. This is similar to the option pricing in financial 
mathematics. The threshold or trigger is often the average of the distribution function. In a time series, 
this can be the temporal trend. In insurance, very often the expected value (average or trend) is 
multiplied by a coverage rate factor lower than one. We will call this factor the coverage level. In this 
way, if the coverage is 30%, means that the fair premium quantifies the probability of the outcomes 
being below the 70% of the expected value. This is equivalent to saying that the insurance has a 
straight deductible of 30%, in the sense that the 30% of the expected value of the parameter is not 
quantified in the risk and thus, is not eligible for indemnities.  
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3. Review on index insurances 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Producers can try to compensate the negative economic consequences of bad weather events by 
buying insurance, and also, since the mid-nineties a new class of instruments, namely weather 
derivatives. Generally spoken, weather derivatives, also called index-based weather insurance are 
financial instruments that allow to trade weather related risks.  
Index insurances differ from the other type of insurances in that the indemnities are not computed 
from the individual farmer loss but from a parameter or index external to the farm. The types of 
indexes most often used in the insurance sector and in general in hedging agricultural risks, are 
described in section 3.2.2.  
Skees and Hartell (2004) give a clear overview on what an index insurance scheme is and how it 
works. Index insurance products represent innovation offering better pricing for sharing catastrophic 
risk. There are lower cost approaches to providing crop insurance that also mitigate the traditional 
problems associated with multiple-peril crop insurance. Index insurance provides an effective policy 
alternative as it seeks to protect the agricultural production sector from widespread, positively 
correlated, crop-yield losses (e.g., drought). When index insurance is used to shift the risk of 
widespread crop losses to financial and reinsurance markets, the residual personal risk often has 
characteristics that make it more likely that rural banks can work to smooth consumption shortfalls 
with loans. 
 
3.2. Description of index insurance 
 
3.2.1. Insurance or derivatives? 
As stated by Mr. Eckhardt Wilkens in the Income Stabilization seminar from the European Association 
of Agricultural Economists (Warsaw, February 2007), according to the definition of insurance, it is not 
correct to denominate insurance to indirect index-based products, given that they do not compensate 
for the actual individual loss. So, they should be rather called index financial contracts or index 
financial products.  
In order to better understand the difference between insurance and derivatives, we can refer to the 
explanation by Martin et al. (2001): “Changnon and Changnon describe the process by which they 
established premium rate tables for short-term (1-72 hours) precipitation insurance. The policies were 
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designed to provide protection against precipitation affecting outdoor events such as fairs or concerts. 
Data from 211 weather stations were used to calculate empirical hourly cumulative frequencies, 
averaged over calendar months, for six levels of precipitation (0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 
inches). The continental United States was divided into 17 rating regions, and the historical 
frequencies were then averaged across all the weather stations within each rating region. Patrick 
presents estimated premium costs for a proposed rainfall insurance contract in the Mallee wheat-
producing region of Australia. Though Patrick indicates premiums are derived from "reasonable 
[parametric] distributions of rainfall," no specifics are provided about distributional forms or 
parameters. Sakurai and Reardon estimate the demand for a hypothetical "rainfall lottery" in Burkina 
Faso. The lottery, which is assumed to be administered by an insurance company, would make a 
lump-sum payment to lottery ticket-holders whenever annual rainfall, measured at a given weather 
station, is below some predetermined level. 
The instruments described by Changnon and Changnon; Patrick; and Sakurai and Reardon are 
similar in that each uses weather station data to calculate premium rates. However, Changnon and 
Changnon set premium rates for a traditional precipitation insurance policy where loss adjustment 
would be based on realized precipitation at the event site. In contrast, Patrick, and Sakurai and 
Reardon, consider insurance policies which are effectively weather derivatives. Specifically, their 
studies describe put options with loss adjustment based on realized values of an underlying index of 
precipitation measured at a given weather station. Nevertheless, both Patrick, and Sakurai and 
Reardon characterize their proposed precipitation derivatives as insurance, because they 
assume the derivatives would be sold to farmers through retail insurance channels”. 
However, given that they have been referred to as insurance since many years and by a most wide 
literature (see the literature review in this chapter), we assume that this name, even if not the most 
appropriate, is accepted even by the scientific community. Turvey (2001) states: “the weather 
derivative can be brokered as an insurance contract or as an over-the-counter traded option”. In fact, 
this characteristic of index insurance does not remain in the semantic field, but it also has tangible 
consequences. The fact that compensations are not paid on real losses that need to be checked by 
experts on the field, involves that these products can be sold more easily from different actors, even 
from financial entities and banks, so they do not need to be in the hands of the insurance sector, but 
are potentially subjects to a strong competence. This may also be a possible reason for the insurance 
companies being less interested in this type of products. 
 
3.2.2. Types of indexes used for hedging agricultural risks 
The types of indexes upon which agricultural risk hedging can be based (insurance or derivatives) are 
summarised in Table 2. Two main types of index insurance products can be considered: (1) those that 
are based on area direct measure, where the area is some unit of geographical aggregation larger 
than the farm, and where the measure can be the yield or the revenue (so, these area index, include 
area yield insurance, and area revenue insurance, in which the area yield of the crop is multiplied by 
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the crop’s price in order to obtain the area revenue); and (2) those that are not based in a direct yield 
measure but on another parameter, which we will call indirect index insurance. In this group are 
included the insurances known as index-based weather insurance or climatic index insurance. Indirect 
index insurance can be considered as a type of area insurance, so, it shares many of the advantages 
and disadvantages of area insurance. In subsection 3.2.3 (Advantages and disadvantages of index 
insurance), we will first review the advantages and disadvantages of index insurance in general over 
traditional insurance; then, the advantages and disadvantages of the indirect indexes over the direct 
(area) ones will be analysed. 
 
Table 2. Most common types of indexes used for hedging agricultural risks 
Area Yield   (1) Area index Area Revenue   
    
Exogenous One indicator Meteorological  
  Agrometeorological 
 Several indicators Satellite imagery 
   
Yield-tailored One indicator Meteorological 
(2) Indirect index 
(Farm yield tailored or 
area yield tailored) 
 Agrometeorological 
    
  Several indicators Meteorological 
   Agrometeorological 
Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
Following Breustedt et al. (2008), we can classify the indices for weather insurance or derivative (put 
options) products in exogenous and yield-tailored. The simplest manner of constructing a weather 
index is to use exogenous indices which are not adjusted to farm yields, i.e. exogenous 
‘meteorological indices’ (for example, Skees et al., 2001 and Turvey, 2001 use either cumulative 
rainfall or temperature). The other manner is to use regressions of crop yield to be insured on weather 
indicators in different specifications and construct ‘yield-tailored weather indices’ from these 
regressions. In the case of exogenous indices, the problem is a presumably higher level of basis risk 
compared with weather insurance based on yield-tailored indices. The yield-tailored indices, instead, 
represent the historical yields as well as possible. Therefore risk reduction from crop insurance based 
on such indices is, in general, higher than risk mitigation from insurance schemes based on non-
tailored weather indices. On the other hand, due to estimation uncertainty, the yield regressions add 
uncertainty to predictions that must be used for calculating future insurance payments. 
The yield-tailored indices are built either from one but more often from several weather indicators. For 
example, Vedenov and Barnett (2004) as well as Karuaihe et al. (2006) analyse the efficiency of 
weather derivatives and insurance products based on a combination of several weather indicators. To 
specify an index, i.e. to determine the weights of the various (transformed) weather indicators defining 
an index value, two different approaches are possible.  One is to use the individual yield to be insured, 
another option is to use an area yield. In fact, average risk reduction among farms depends upon the 
variable used for tailoring. Using farm yield for tailoring implies maximum average risk reduction 
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because the resultant index value has the greatest correlation with farm yield. Crop insurance based 
on farm yield-tailored weather indices thus serves as a benchmark for crop yield risk reduction from 
weather index insurance. From a practical point of view, additional transaction costs arise for the 
insurance company, because weather insurance must be adjusted for each farm. However, for large 
farms these additional costs are small per hectare insured. Tailoring the weather index on regional 
yields rather than farm yields would reduce transactions costs. Problems of moral hazard or adverse 
selection do not arise because of yield tailoring because actual indemnity payments are only based on 
the actual weather variables, which cannot be influenced by a farmer. Yield tailoring only means 
transforming both premiums and indemnity payments equivalently. (Breustedt et al. 2008) 
Last, regarding the type of indicator used for the index, we can subdivide indirect-index in three types 
of products: those based on weather variables (meteorological or weather index insurance), those 
based on agro-meteorological parameters (agro-meteorological index insurance), and those based on 
satellite imagery parameters (satellite imagery index insurance). 
 
3.2.3. Advantages and disadvantages of index insurance 
3.2.3.1. Advantages and disadvantages of index insurance over traditional crop insurance 
Index contracts offer numerous advantages over more traditional forms of farm-level multiple-peril 
crop insurance, but also some disadvantages. Mainly, they have low risk of moral hazard and adverse 
selection and it is easy to adjust the losses but if the area is not very homogeneous, the basis risk can 
be big enough as to make the insurance no interesting for farmers. 
More specifically, the advantages include: 
1. No moral hazard: Moral hazard arises with traditional insurance when insured parties can vary their 
behaviour so as to increase the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss. This is not possible with 
index insurance because the indemnity does not depend on the yield of an individual producer. 
2. No adverse selection: Adverse selection is a misclassification problem caused by asymmetric 
information. If the potential insured has better information than the insurer about the potential 
probability or magnitude of a loss, the insured can use that information to self-select whether or not to 
purchase insurance. Index insurance on the other hand is based on widely available information, so 
there are no informational asymmetries to be exploited.  
3. Higher coverage levels.  In some situations, index insurance offers superior risk protection when 
compared to traditional multiple-peril crop insurance that pays indemnities based on individual farm 
yields. This happens when the provider of traditional insurance must impose large deductibles2. 
Deductibles and co-payments (or partial payment for losses) are commonly used to combat adverse 
                                                     
2 The portion of an insured loss to be borne by the insured before he is entitled to recovery from the insurer. 
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selection and moral hazard3 problems. Since these problems are not present with index insurance, 
there is less need for deductibles and co-payments. (Skees and Hartell, 2004).  
4. Low administrative costs: Dissimilar from the farm-level multiple-peril crop insurance policies, index 
insurance products do not require underwriting and inspections of individual farms. Indemnities are 
paid exclusively on the realised value of the underlying index as measured by government agencies or 
other third parties. 
5. Standardized and transparent structure: Index insurance policies can be sold in various 
denominations as simple certificates with a structure that is uniform across essential indices. 
6. Availability and negotiability: Since they are standardised and transparent, index insurance policies 
can easily be traded in secondary (future) markets. Such markets would create liquidity and allow 
policies to flow where they are most highly valued. 
Individuals could buy or sell policies as the realisation of the underlying index begins to unfold. 
Moreover, the contracts could be made available to a wide variety of parties, including farmers, 
agricultural lenders, traders, processors, input suppliers, shopkeepers, consumers, and agricultural 
workers (Skees, 1997). 
7. Reinsurance function: Index insurance can be used to transfer the risk of widespread correlated 
agricultural production losses. Thus, it can be used as a mechanism to reinsure insurance company 
portfolios of farm-level insurance policies. Index insurance instruments allow farm-level insurers to 
transfer their exposure to undiversifiable correlated loss risk while retaining the residual risk that is 
diversifiable (Black, Barnett, and Hu, 1999- mentioned by Stoppa 2004). 
Disadvantages of Index Insurance 
1. Basis Risk: The occurrence of basis risk depends on the extent to which the insured losses are 
positively correlated with the index. Without sufficient correlation, “basis risk” becomes too severe, and 
index insurance is not an effective risk management tool. A careful design of the index insurance 
policy and using in a correct way the parameters (coverage period, trigger, measurement site, etc.) 
can help to reduce basis risk. Another way of reducing basis risk can be to sell the index insurance to 
a collective group. The index insurance will cover the systemic part of the risk, and the basis risk will 
be assumed by the group, that can develop mutual insurance at some level to protect from it. Such a 
group is in the best position to know their neighbours and determine how to allocate index insurance 
payments within the group to cope with risks differences. 
2. Security and diffusion of measurements: The feasibility of index insurance depends critically on the 
index being objectively and accurately measured. 
                                                     
3 Adverse selection occurs in a situation in which the insured has more information about his or her risk of loss 
than does the insurance provider and is better able to determine the soundness of premium rates. As a 
consequence, the level of risk in the insured population is higher than in the total population. 
Moral hazard refers to an individual’s change in behaviour after having taken out an insurance policy. The 
change in behaviour results in an increase in the potential magnitude and/or probability of a loss. 
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The index measurements must then be made broadly available in a well-timed way. 
Whether provided by governments or other third party sources, index measurements must be widely 
disseminated and secure from altering. 
3. Precision in modelling: Insurers will not sell index insurance products unless they can be sure about 
the statistical properties of the index. This requires sufficient historical data on the index and good 
models that use these data to predict the probability of various index measures. Climate change can 
represent a difficulty for the design, as it happens also in traditional crop insurance. 
6. Reinsurance: In most of the cases, insurance companies do not have the financial resources to 
offer index insurance without adequate and affordable reinsurance. Effective arrangements must 
therefore be established between local insurers, international reinsurers, national governments, and 
possibly international development organizations. 
 
Index insurance is a different approach to insuring crop yields. Unlike most insurance where 
independent risk is a precondition, the precondition for index insurance to work best for the individual 
farmer is correlated risk. 
It is possible to offer index contracts to anyone at risk when there is an area wide (correlated) crop 
failure. Furthermore, another difference from traditional insurance is that there is no reason to place 
the same limits on the amount of responsibility purchases by an individual. As long as the single 
farmer cannot influence the outcome that results in payments, then placing limits on liability is not 
necessary as it is with individual insurance contracts. 
Finally, the real advantage of merging index insurance into banking is that the banking entity can use 
such contracts to manage correlated risk. Consecutively, the bank should be able to work with the 
individual to help them in managing the residual risk or basis risk. In simple terms, if the individual has 
an independent loss when the index insurance does not pay, they should be able to borrow money 
from the bank to smooth that shock. This could effectively remove the principal concern associated 
with index insurance contracts that someone can have a loss and not be paid. 
As more sophisticated systems are developed to measure events that cause widespread problems it 
is possible that indexing major events will be easier and accepted by international capital markets.  
Under these conditions, it may become possible to offer insurance to countries where traditional re-
insurers and main providers would previously have never considered. Insurance is about trust. If the 
system to index a major event is reliable and trustworthy, there are truly new opportunities in the world 
to offer a wide array of index insurance products (Skees and Hartell, 2004).  
3.2.3.2. Advantages and disadvantages specific to indirect index insurance 
Advantages of indirect index insurance over area index insurance 
1- Because there is only the need to follow the evolution of the index, the control of the insurance 
and loss adjustment is even easier and in some cases, cheaper. 
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2- When the quality of area yield data is not good (for example in developing countries), the 
quality of historical series of meteorological data is usually better. In order to determine the 
actuarial structure and premium rates of the insurance contracts, the quality level of the data 
need to be high. 
3- Scarcity or excess of rainfall are among the main causes of yield decrease in many regions 
(also important in developing countries). (Martin et al. 2001) 
 
Disadvantages of indirect index insurance over area index insurance 
1- The errors of reproducing the real individual farmer’s risks can be multiplied. 
 
3.2.4. Characteristics of an index for weather insurance in agriculture 
Before entering into the design of an index insurance for agriculture, some pre-requisites need to be 
analyzed and taken into account in the design process. According to Chavula and Gommes (2006), an 
index used for crop insurance should have the following characteristics: 
1· Tamper-resistance or reliability: potential beneficiaries of the insurance should not be in a position 
to directly or indirectly manipulate the index. 
2· Objectivity: once the methodology has been defined in precise enough terms, the index value 
should be independent on who carries out the calculations. 
3· Publicity: the methodology has to be made available to potential subscribers of the insurance. Crop 
insurance indices should be published regularly in national agro-meteorological bulletins and other 
channels as well as on the web. 
4· Measurability: Historical records must be adequate and available (Stoppa and Hess, 2003) 
5. Insensitivity to missing data: the best way to circumvent the occurrence of missing spatial data is to 
use gridded information that is not too sensitive to individual missing stations, provided sufficient data 
points are available and the interpolation process takes into account topography and climatic 
gradients. 
6· “Good” correlation with crop yield.  
 
The last point on correlation requires further discussion. Chavula and Gommes (2006) declare that 
rather than the statistical strength of the correlation between yield and crop weather index, it is the 
number of false positives (good year assessed to be poor) and false negatives (poor year assessed 
as good) that constitutes the most important criteria.  
Stoppa and Hess (2003) explain that for FWs for agriculture, more than for other FWs, the existence 
of a complex relationship between the product and the weather factor must be carefully explored (see 
Vedenov and Barnett, 2003, for a related discussion on a sample of US crop districts). For many 
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Weather Derivates (WDs) traded in the energy sector, e.g. derivatives on Heating Degree Day (HDD) 
(H index, the relationship between temperature and demand for heating is simple and direct: the lower 
the HDD index the lower the demand for energy. For agricultural production the relationship is not 
always as straightforward since differences in products, crop growth phases, soil textures etc. have 
different responses to the same weather factor. The crucial issue for the application of FWs at the 
agricultural production level lies in the actual presence of a clear and satisfying relationship between 
the weather factor and the production variable. In order to be successful, the WD must be able to 
explain a very high portion of the variability in production, loosing otherwise its attractiveness as a 
hedging device.  
Stoppa and Hess (2003) admit that this constraint is not as binding for the use of FWCs at the 
reinsurance level, since FWCs can be used to retrocede the specific layers of the overall aggregate 
risk exposure that are triggered by the weather event. In addition, the smoothing effects generated in 
a portfolio of agricultural risk underwriters makes often easier to diversify the impact of a weather 
variable. Woodard and Garcia (2007) arrive to the same conclusions. They observe that previous 
studies identify limited potential efficacy of weather derivatives in hedging agricultural exposures. In 
contrast to earlier studies which investigate the problem at low levels of aggregation, they find using 
straight forward temperature contracts that better weather hedging opportunities exist at higher levels 
of spatial aggregation. Aggregating production exposures reduces idiosyncratic (i.e. localized or 
region specific) risk, leaving a greater proportion of the total risk in the form of systemic weather risk 
which can be effectively hedged using weather derivatives. The aggregation effect suggests that the 
potential for weather derivatives in agriculture may be greater than previously thought, particularly for 
aggregators of risk such as re/insurers. 
 
3.2.5. Pricing weather insurance  
3.2.5.1. Pricing insurance 
When establishing a price for a weather risk management instrument, according to BRYLA AND 
SYROKA (2007), providers will take into consideration their own risk appetite, business imperatives, 
and operational costs. While there are a variety of methodologies for pricing, in general the pricing for 
all contracts will contain an element of expected loss, plus some loading or risk margin that 
corresponds to a capital reserve charge required to underwrite the risk at a target level for the 
business, as well as administrative costs. Therefore in general the premium charge for a contract can 
be broken down as follows:  
Premium = Expected Loss + Risk Margin + Administrative Costs 
Expected loss is the average payout of the contract in any given season. It is also known as 
(actuarially) fair premium.  
The risk margin is charged by the providers because in some years, when extreme events happen, 
payouts in excess of this average can occur and the risk-taker must be compensated for this 
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uncertainty. The values of the expected loss and the risk margin must be established from historical 
weather data. These values include an adjustment to compensate for uncertainties in the data such as 
trends or missing values. The approach for determining the loading over the expected loss differs from 
insurer to insurer and many use a combination of methods to determine the risk margin included. A 
sensible pricing methodology uses a risk measure such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the contract to 
determine the risk margin. A VaR calculation is aimed at determining the loss that will not be 
exceeded at some specified level of confidence, often set at 99%.  
Administrative costs are essentially the costs for the provider to run the business including charges for 
data, office costs, taxes and reinsurance and brokerage charges if necessary. 
The WB (2005) calculates the market premium as the actuarial fair premium or pure premium plus a 
number of loadings to account for other insurance costs: 
• Loading Based on Standard Deviation: Market standards 20 to 40 percent.  
• Loading Based on the Uncertainty due to Gaps in the Historical Weather Data  
• Loading for Administrative Expenses: A margin of 15 percent was added. 
The Loading based on the standard deviation of the payout series is a common loading procedure. 
According to Skees (2002), “generally, a loaded of 33% of the standard deviation is added to the pure 
premium insurance”. 
3.2.5.2. Pricing derivatives 
Hirschauer and Musshoff (2008) address the problem of pricing a weather derivative. According to 
them, as the seller’s future results will be negative, even after abstracting from transaction costs, a 
weather derivative as well as weather insurance cannot be offered free of charge. The price should 
take into account: (i) the expectation value of the derivative’s future payoff resulting from the design of 
the derivative and the stochastic development of the weather variable, (ii) the interest rate to be used 
to discount the future payoff, and (iii) the transaction costs associated with this contract. 
If the underlying “weather index” was traded on a perfect market, one could resort to the pricing 
procedures for financial derivatives. Turvey (2001) examines in detail the pricing of insurance 
contracts at a given location and across space. He prices the European-type options using the “burn-
rate” approach.  
3.2.5.3. Pricing index insurance 
Weather indices, however, are non-traded assets. This is why pricing procedures like the Black-
Scholes model for financial derivatives cannot be applied. Trying to solve the problem Turvey (2002), 
with reference to the Capital Asset Pricing model, reverts to the blanket assumption that the 
correlation between weather indices and capital market risk is negligible. So, he assumes that the 
“market price for the weather risk” is zero and that the value of weather derivatives can simply be 
determined as a fair premium (actuarially fair price). “Fair premium” means that the value of the 
 24 
weather derivative is calculated by discounting the expected value of the future payoff with the risk-
free interest rate. As a zero-correlation between weather risk and capital market risk is a questionable 
assumption, the fair premium (plus the transaction costs) only defines the minimum sales price for 
weather derivatives from the underwriter’s point of view. (Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2008) 
The same reasoning is done by Martin et al. (2001), who declare that even if precipitation insurance is 
in essence an option, pricing based on standard options valuation models is problematic. Standard 
options valuation models require that one be able to construct (at least conceptually) a riskless 
portfolio consisting of both the option and the asset which forms the underlying index. Yet, there is no 
actively traded forward market for precipitation. So, expected loss cost is the standard basis for 
establishing insurance premium rates (Skees and Barnett, 1999). Loss cost is equal to indemnities 
divided by liability. Insurance actuaries calculate an expectation on future loss cost based on historical 
experience with the insurance product. Expected loss cost can be considered as an expected 
breakeven premium rate. Using extended time series of weather data, historical loss costs can be 
simulated for stylized weather insurance instruments. An expected loss cost can then be estimated 
from the simulated historical loss costs. 
Martin et al. (2001) is a reference for precipitation insurance design and pricing (Stoppa & Hess 2003, 
Spaulding et al. 2003, Torriani et al. 2007). They make a comprehensive review on indemnity designs. 
We collect these indemnities formulations in Table 3 
 
Table 3. Indemnity designs (option designs) used in index insurance 
Author Index i Equation for Indemnity 
Type 1 – Stylized European puts and calls 
 
Turvey (1999) 
CDD, Precipitation puts 0                                                         if i > strike 
(strike- i)*p                                         if i ≤ strike 
 HDD call 0                                                          if i < strike 
(i - strike)*p                                        if i ≥ strike 
Type 2 – Percentage European put  
Skees and Zeuli 
(1999) 
Precipitation put 0                                                            if i > strike 
strike
istrike −
*liability                                if i ≤ strike 
Type 3 – Limited percentage call 
Martin et al. (2001) Precipitation call 0                                                             if i > strike 
strikeit
strikei
−
−
lim
*liability                         if limit > i ≥ strike 
1*liability                                                 if i ≥ limit 
Source: Made by authors from information in Martin et al. 2001 
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Notes:  
- i is the cumulative realized value of the underlying index  
- p is a unitary payment, that is, some predetermined dollar value per unit of the index 
 
For precipitation, i has a natural lower bound of zero. Thus, for puts, the maximum indemnity is 
p*strike for the precipitation put of type 1, and liability for type 2 puts. But as there is no natural upper 
bound on i, there is no cap on the maximum indemnity for calls. This is the reason why Martin et al. 
2001 propose Type 3 calls.  
3.2.5.4. Pricing reinsurance 
According to the study by Hou et al. (2004), rainfall insurance in Romania, can be reinsured through a 
stop loss contract. Reinsurance plans are often provided by the international institutional such as 
World Bank, which shares the local risk by pooling the reinsurance risks worldwide. They calculate the 
reinsurance cost in the following way: 
They calculate the total indemnities for all regions or aggregated indemnities in each year t (AIt) and 
the aggregated liabilities or total liabilities (AL), assuming that liabilities are constant in time. Last, we 
call the aggregated final premiums (market premiums) in all regions AP Then, the risk exposure for 
the reinsurance part in year t (REt) is calculated as: 
REt =(AI t-2*AP) if AI t -2AP>0  
REt = 0   if AI t -2AP≤0  
So, the reinsurance uptakes the losses above the double of the premium values. If we calculate the 
mean and the standard error of REt (REm and REsd), then, the reinsurance costs will be: 
RC = REm + 33% * REsd 
The expected profit of the reinsurance company will be: 
E(Profit)=Total premium – Reinsurance cost-Expected Indemnity=AP-RC-EI 
 
3.2.6. Weather derivatives and weather markets 
A financial weather contract (FWC) can be defined as a “weather contingent contract whose payoff will 
be in an amount of cash determined by future weather events. The settlement value of these weather 
events is determined from a weather index, expressed as values of a weather variable measured at a 
stated location” (Dischel and Barrieu 2002). Once the index is determined, a variety of FWCs can be 
issued on it. FWCs can be binary if the payment is in one lump sum, depending on the occurrence or 
not of one specific state of nature (e.g. sunshine or not), or continuous if the payment follows a 
specific progression for all values of a predefined range (e.g., a specified amount for every mm of 
rain). 
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A financial weather contract (FWCs) can take the form of a weather derivative (WD) or of a 
weather index insurance contract (WI). While the differences between the two types of contracts 
might be important from regulatory and legal viewpoints, from an economic perspective both 
instruments share the common feature of being triggered by an underlying weather index.  
3.2.6.1. Weather derivatives 
Recent innovations in energy markets suggest the possibility of addressing agricultural risk factors by 
issuing derivatives on weather elements. These schemes could be used in production risk 
management but also in reinsurance transactions, as they are by nature particularly effective in 
addressing the “systemic” portions of weather risks (Stoppa & Hess, 2003).  
The most common types of WD contracts are: swaps, call options (or weather caps), put options 
(weather floors) and, among derivatives’ combinations, collars. In a swap, counterparts agree to 
exchange payments conditional on the outcome of the agreed weather event with no fixed premium. 
Payments are triggered when the actual weather index is different from the strike level, and are based 
on the unit payment. In comparison to the swap format, the cap format permits the purchaser of the 
weather derivative to buy protection at a fixed premium. Caps provide protection against adverse 
upside weather conditions whilst allowing the buyer to retain the full upside potential of unusually 
favourable weather conditions (such as a warm winter for a greenhouse grower). Floors are similar to 
caps but provide protection against adverse downside weather conditions whilst allowing the holder to 
retain the full upside potential of unusually favourable conditions. If the climatic variable remains within 
the normally expected specified range, as defined by a zero-cost collar, no payments occur. However, 
if the climatic variable falls outside the collar’s upper limit, an indemnification is provided in return for a 
non-fixed premium that is paid if the climatic variable falls outside the collar’s lower limit. For the three 
types of contracts, a maximum indemnity can be agreed upon by setting an upper bound. (Asseldonk 
and Oude Lansink, 2003) 
WDs have important differences with respect to traditional commodity price derivatives. The 
fundamental difference is that the underlying of a WD is not a traded good. Without trades in the 
underlying asset there is clearly no possibility of developing weather futures contracts. For all other 
derivatives, options in particular, the traditional Black-Scholes algorithms seem not to be an 
appropriate solution for pricing the products (Dischel 1998, Martin et al. 2001). Pricing of WDs is 
therefore usually based on actuarial calculations. The absence of a universal pricing method 
generates lack of market transparency and increases transaction costs (Stoppa and Hess 2003).  
3.2.6.2. Weather markets 
Weather contracts can be used to hedge business exposition to weather variables. Weather has 
always been a source of risk for many economic activities, but it was not until the late ’90s that firms 
explored the possibility of hedging against weather related variability through WDs. The impetus for 
developing weather markets was given by the deregulation of the US energy sector, when local 
monopolies had to start competing on broader markets and find measures to stabilize fluctuating 
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revenues. Ordinary insurance and reinsurance tools were traditionally designed to target catastrophic 
events, and were probably too expensive and not sufficiently flexible for ordinary risk management 
practices that focus on fluctuations closer to the mean of the distribution (Element RE). Faced with 
these challenges, energy traders started developing objective and reliable indices that could capture 
weather fluctuations in ways appropriate for hedging their economic exposure. One of the first indexes 
developed, and still the most popular one, is the Heating Degree Day (HDD) index (see Stoppa and 
Hess, 2003). 
Weather markets have grown at a rapid pace in the USA since their introduction in 1997. Weather 
markets are dominated by the energy generation industry. However, later, large banks with better 
credit ratings than the US energy traders entered the market and helped to expand the market out of 
the US and the power industry. The reinsurer Swiss RE, and the insurers ACE, AXA and XL entered 
the market along with smaller insurers. According to the Weather Risk Management Association 2001 
Survey, the new market share were of 37% for energy operators, 37% for insurers/reinsurers, 21% for 
banks and 5% for commodity traders (Element Re). US deals are still predominantly energy-driven, 
European deals cover all weather exposed sectors. First emerging market transactions were 
published in South Africa and Mexico. From 2002/03, weather products (mainly swaps and options 
which use Cooling and Heating Degree Days as underlying indexes) have been traded in the Chicago 
Mercantile exchange, which has resulted in a decrease of Over-The-Counter4 business, but in an 
increase in total business (Roth et al. 2007)   
Banks and re-insurers have introduced the concept of FWCs to other industry sectors, such as 
agriculture, construction or tourism. (Roth et al. 2007). Weather markets makers are looking for new 
end users, and agriculture is the unexploited industry offering the most significant growth potential for 
weather markets. From 2005 to 2007, the Over-The-Counter end users related to the agricultural 
sector has doubled. In Swiss Re’s client database, the majority of the business covering weather risks 
outside developed countries (North America, Europe, Japan and Australia) is with counter parties in 
the agricultural sector. Anyway, as a whole, this market is in the early stages. A study from Swiss Re 
compares the growth in the weather risk transfer market of the agricultural sector with that of the 
energy sector. According to this study, the growth of the WDs business for the agricultural sector is 
being impeded by: the lack of exchange-based instruments in this field; the relatively high basis risk 
between weather indexes and agricultural yield; the fact that agricultural markets are still highly 
regulated; and inadequate information and training (Roth et al. 2007). Success for weather markets in 
agriculture may involve a number of uniquely designed products that do not involve farmers directly 
(Skees, 2003). 
                                                     
4 Over-The-Counter business refers to contracts directly closed between two counter parties. Business recorded 
in this category can either be in from of derivative or insurance and reinsurance contracts. Disadvantages of 
Over-The-Counter business compared to an Exchange are: more difficult execution, lower price transparency, 
and no availability of a clearing house eliminating counter party credit risks  
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Indexes for agriculture 
The following information on indexes for agriculture is from Roth et al. (2007, p.8), from Swiss Re. 
Given the high interest for our discussion, we reproduce it below: 
“Whilst the first products were simply based on the aggregate amount of precipitation during a certain 
period, the market has since become increasingly sophisticated. Today, index definitions typically 
feature:  
- a variable inception date defined as a function of the amount of rainfall during about 10 days 
prior to inception of cover against dry conditions during planting 
- a combination of precipitation and temperature measurements used as input variables for 
the index definition during sub-periods related to the various growth phases(establishment, vegetative, 
flowering, yield formation, ripening) to cover weather risks specific to each growth stage, 
- an index calculation defined as the weighted sum of index contributions during the above 
mentioned sub-periods. 
Despite these rather complicated index definitions, the typical correlation between such an index and 
agricultural yield is around 60-80%. Additionally, as the geographic distribution of rainfall is more 
complicated than the distribution of temperature, the correlation of weather indexes tends to 
deteriorate quickly the further they are from weather stations.(…) 
There are several developments to overcome these limitations. For example, market participants rely 
on a combination of temperature, rainfall and soil information to calculate the amount of water 
available to a plant. Moreover, remote sensing data is being increasingly used to compensate for the 
lack of a coarse network of weather stations.  
In contrast to the above situation for the agricultural sector, the weather risk transfer instruments used 
for the energy sector typically profit from a high correlation between temperature-based indexes and 
retail energy consumption: often above 90% for gas and about 80-90% for power.  
We therefore have strong reason to believe that the basis risk related to the use of weather risk 
transfer instruments for the agricultural sector is one of the main obstacles for end users to enter into 
weather risk transfer instruments.”   
 
3.3. Some examples of index insurance in the literature 
Asseldonk and Oude Lansink (2003) study weather index insurance to hedge temperature exposure 
of Dutch greenhouse horticultural firms. They present a framework for analysing the viability of a 
weather derivative contract to hedge heating energy demand in greenhouse horticultural firms. This 
weather derivative can be a risk management tool enabling farmers to cope with adverse weather 
conditions (i.e., extreme cold winters). A normalized quadratic profit function was used, which includes 
among the firm inputs a weather indicator: heating degree-days (HDD). HDD are calculated as the 
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absolute difference between a reference or base temperature (Tref) and the daily average temperature 
(Tavg), defined as the average of the maximum and minimum temperatures for each day. If the daily 
average temperature exceeds the reference temperature, HDD is zero. Subsequently the daily (t) 
HDD values are summed over the specified period to be hedged (n):  
 { }∑
=
−=
n
t
tavgref TTHDD
1
,;0max   
The reference temperature and the time horizon, in the current application, are 18ºC and a whole year 
respectively. The sample temperature data originate from a principal meteorology station that is located in 
centre of the Netherlands and is often regarded as representing the average temperature for the whole 
country. Monte Carlo simulation was used to estimate the effectiveness of a non-linear weather 
derivative contract. It is revealed that the derivative contract reduces profit volatility, but a substantial 
heterogeneity among firms exists. 
The study by Breustedt et al. (2008) analyses the potential of index insurances for the Kazakhstan’s 
arid region. It compares several types of insurances: traditional yield insurance; area yield insurance; 
three exogenous meteorological insurances (rainfall and drought insurances developed for 
Kazakhstan in the literature); and three farm-yield-tailored indexes (see section 3.2.2) from the same 
rainfall and drought indicators used in the exogenous meteorological insurances. The indemnities and 
premiums are calculated assuming the index insurance work as a Stylized European put option (Type 
1 in Table 3). Their results show that none of the analysed insurance schemes provides statistically 
significant risk reduction for every single farm. Weather-based index insurance is found to provide less 
risk reduction than area yield insurance based on the rayon (county) yield. In addition, rayon yield 
index insurance can reduce yield risk more effectively for Kazakhstan’s wheat producers than farm 
yield insurance with a low (75%) strike yield. 
Hao et al. (2004) provide a theoretical analysis for the optimal portfolio of weather index and individual 
crop insurance. The analysis is performed at the farm level under the mean-variance framework and 
stresses the impacts of risk aversion level, transaction cost, and basis risk. It is applied to corn farms 
in Todd county of Kentucky. The design of the weather index follows the European precipitation put 
options of Type 1 proposed by Skees and Zeuli (1999). The study utilizes rainfall data from 1985 to 
1994 in nearest Bowling Green Weather Station. The rainfall is first aggregated in four different critical 
growth periods based on climate and plant physiology. Weights for these four periods are then 
assigned through a mathematical programming procedure that maximizes correlation between county 
yields and rainfall index. The vector of weights is then checked in order to make it consistent with 
agronomic information. The final value of the index is calculated by summing the values obtained by 
multiplying rainfall levels in each period by the specific weights assigned to a particular period. The 
strike level used corresponds to the average index value. 
Hirschauer and Musshoff (2008) calculate through a risk-programming model, the willingness-to-pay 
for risk management in general and in particular for weather derivatives. They make an application to 
a Brandenburg multi-crop farm of a cumulated rainfall contract that protects from drought. It is a put 
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option based on the accumulated rainfall between April 1st and June 30th. The payment corresponds to 
1€ per mm shortfall of the average three-monthly rainfall from 1980 to 2005. This application reveals 
that even a highly standardised contract based on accumulated rainfall generates a relevant 
willingness-to-pay. They find that the underwriter could even add a loading (on the actuarially fair 
price) which exceeds the level of traditional insurances. Since transaction costs are low compared to 
insurances, this indicates a relevant trading potential. 
Mahul (2003) examines the optimal hedging strategy with an individual insurance policy, sold at an 
unfair price, and a fair contract based on an index, which is imperfectly correlated with the individual 
loss. The index used in the example is the area yield. The trade-off between transaction costs and 
basis risk is first analyzed in the expected utility framework in order to highlight the role of the agent’s 
attitude toward risk, and then in the linear mean-variance model to stress the importance of the 
degree of correlation between the individual loss and the index. As expected, results show that these 
two hedging contracts are substitutes: the introduction of index insurance contracts into the hedging 
strategy decreases the demand for individual insurance. The hedge depends, critically, on the 
correlation between the individual loss and the index. 
Skees et al.’s (2001) study for the World Bank proposes drought rainfall index insurance for Morocco. 
This index insurance is based in a 21 years data series. The Pearson correlations between revenue 
(calculated from cereals yields) and cumulated rainfall vary from -18 % to 90%. Insurance is advised 
in those provinces which show an average correlation of 69% in the 21 year period, and 77% in the 
last ten years. The design of the insurance is quite simple. It is a proportional contract. The proportion 
is calculated from the cumulated rainfalls (from November to March, period which shows best 
correlation) and then multiplied by the liability in order to obtain the indemnity. Premiums are 
calculated from the 21 year period data. In fact, premiums are set for all provinces at 5% and at 10%, 
and threshold or trigger rainfall levels are calculated accordingly for both levels of premiums. The 
resulting coverage level (reported to the median rainfall) are around 85% for 10% premium and 67% 
for 5% premium. On a second step, the study proposes to combine this rainfall insurance with an area 
yield coverage, so that losses that are not due to drought can also be covered. The threshold of this 
area index coverage is set so that the total premium becomes 12%, so a 2% increase above the 10% 
premium of rainfall insurance.  
The study by Skees et al. (2001) is improved in 2003 by Stoppa and Hess, in the sense that they try to 
capture the rainfall-yield relationship in the most accurate way possible. For this, they assign specific 
weights to the different growth phases. They also included a “capping” procedure taking into account 
the fact that water in excess of storage capacity is lost and does not contribute to plant growth. The 
correlation increases from 67% to 92%. 
Skees and Hartell (2004) point out that index insurance is suitable for covering systemic risks and 
risks causing extreme events. But this type of insurance should be combined with saving and credit to 
provide a good coverage to the farmers. The relationship with the credit world would allow producers 
to manage the “basis risk” associated to index insurance.  
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Torriani et al. (2007) have studied an index derivative for maize in Switzerland. It is a rainfall index, 
defined as the integration of the daily precipitation along the rainfall-sensitive production period. The 
index itself is extremely simple, in the sense that the payout function of the put option is a linear 
function of the strike minus the index. However, in order to hedge a farmer corn production, the farmer 
should buy a combination of these put options, based on the rainfall index but with different strikes. 
The exact combination of puts was calculated for Swiss corn, so that it reproduces the corn loses. 
These losses were not calculated from observed yields, but from a crop model, where yield is a 
function of the radiation use efficiency, global radiation, water stress and vapour pressure deficit 
limitation. Profits and risks with and without hedging were compared for the current climate situation 
and for a climate change scenario. The actuarially fair premium charged with the costs of capital was 
calculated. However, from the Value at Risk calculations, it could be deduced that farmers would be 
willing to pay more than 90 % above the fair premium for the risk protection. Thus, the conclusion is 
that hedging might provide a valid risk transfer. 
Turvey (2001) examines the economics and pricing of weather derivatives in Ontario. The products 
presented represent actual products offered by insurance companies and brokerages, but which have 
not been widely used in agriculture. Using historical data, the relationship between crop productivity 
and weather is examined. A variety of put and call options (including multiple-event) for rain- and heat-
based weather risk are discussed and numerically evaluated. The index indemnities work as a 
Stylized European put option (Type 1 in Table 3) 
The study by Vedenov and Barnett (2004) analyzes efficiency of weather derivatives as primary 
insurance instruments for six crop reporting districts that are among the largest producers of corn, 
cotton, and soybeans in the United States. Specific weather derivatives are constructed for each crop-
district combination based on analysis of several econometric models. The different models explain 
detrended district yields in function of weather variables often used in the literature: cumulative rainfall; 
monthly rainfall; cumulative cooling degree days; average monthly temperatures; all for the period 
from June 1st to august 31st. The models used are quadratic in absolute values, quadratic in deviations 
and log-log. The performance of the designed weather derivatives is then analyzed both in- and out-
of-sample. The primary findings suggest that the optimal structure of weather derivatives varies widely 
across crops and regions, as does the risk-reducing performance of the optimally designed weather 
derivatives. Further, optimal weather derivatives required rather complicated combinations of weather 
variables to achieve reasonable fits between weather and yield. 
Romania rainfall insurance 
The study by Spaulding et al. (2003) employs a precipitation contract in the lines of a weather 
derivative contract as an alternative to traditional crop insurance to combat risks due to drought in 
Romania. The preliminary structure of the contract is designed and tested for seven judets in south-
eastern Romania. The precipitation contract is designed to trigger payments to the insured when 
monthly rainfall falls below a set trigger amount. The calculation of the pure premium is based on the 
pure loss cost history and does not cover for the transaction costs or risk preference of partners. 
Reinsurance firms usually load the pure premium based on the variance of the loss costs. For the 
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purposes of this study, a 33% reinsurance load was imposed on the standard deviations of indemnity 
payments per liability.  
The above procedure was slightly modified for establishing the contract design for the farm level 
model. This was done considering the unique agronomic growth stages for crops produced as well as 
knowledge of the value at risk for the representative farm. Corn and Wheat, which represent major 
crops in Romania, are included in the farm model. Corn is planted in the spring (April-May) and 
harvested in September-October and Wheat cropping period spans from October and July. Adequate 
rainfall during the critical periods of crop growth is a crucial factor in determining yields of the above 
crops. Based on the above fact the precipitation contract was designed to cover only for critical 
periods of crop growth. Specifically, the contract was designed to trigger a payment when the monthly 
rainfall in a critical month fell short of a set strike for that crop. The critical months for corn spanned 
from April to August and for Wheat from October to November in the fall and by May and April in 
spring. The strike was set as 85% of the average rainfall during critical months for the above crops. 
For example, the average rainfall during critical months for corn and wheat were 46 mm and 36 mm 
respectively. Accordingly a strike of 39 mm for corn and 31 mm for wheat were established. It is again 
important to recall that the precipitation contract was designed to consider only the critical periods of 
crop growth and not the whole cropping season. It is defined as a “proportional” contract, so it has a 
“disappearing deductible” of Type 2 in Table 3: 
Indemnity = (Strike-X/Strike) * liability whenever X < strike 
Where, X is the actual rainfall, Strike is the trigger rainfall amount, Liability establishes the maximum 
possible indemnity. The liabilities are usually set based on the total value at risk of the produce. The 
average farm yield in the selected “judet” was considered as a good proxy for the value at risk and 
used to establish liability estimate by crop. Once the strike and liability are given, indemnity payments 
and premiums can be formulated. 
The impact of such contract on the risk management strategy of producers across risk preference 
levels is also investigated. Based on the analyses some broad policy implications for Romania are 
drawn. The study uses a combination of insurance design methods along with expected mean 
variance model to accomplish its objectives. Preliminary results suggest that if sufficient partnerships 
are forged to share risk, such contracts can prove useful in Romania. Across levels of risk preference, 
the contracts were found to increase mean profits and reduce coefficient of variance in net returns 
when compared to a base scenario with no contract. Further research is needed to corroborate these 
findings. Market based insurance with minimal government intervention is the key to the development 
and the success of weather derivative contracts. Risk sharing among farmers, government, private 
insurance companies, and global reinsurance markets needs to be established. There is also a need 
for finding ways of trading risk among agro-climatic regions within the nation. Education of groups 
including farmers, government officials and private insurance companies and marketing of such 
instruments are essential to have a successful implementation and broad adaptation of these 
contracts by the buyers and the suppliers (Spaulding et al. 2003). 
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Hou, et al. (2004) provide prospects of rainfall-indexed insurance in Romania considering the trade-off 
between moral hazard and basis risks. The article analyzes the rainfall risks’ effect on the corn outputs 
in five judets of southern Romania. Diversely from Spaulding et al. (2003), indemnities are not 
calculated as Type 2 but as Type 1 contracts. So, the indemnity amount (AI) is given by: AI ij = Max [0, 
MIN [(strike - AR ij )*tick, liability]] where tick is the indemnity amount per unit of rainfall, which is the 
ratio of liability to the strike, and where AR ij is the actual rainfall in key period j for each judet i. They 
also calculate the reinsurance cost. To deal with the risk, two types of indexes are analysed: one 
based on Key Season’s Rainfall and another based on Rainfall along the Crop Growth Cycle. They 
determine the basic parameters and measure the effectiveness. Results show that indexed insurance 
based on key season’s rainfall has less power to reduce output risk though it is specialized for the 
most risky season in each judet. Indexed insurance based on rainfall along the crop growth cycle does 
a better job in reducing the output risk. Finally, they propose microfinance programs combined with 
indexed insurance to deal with the basis risk problems. 
 
3.4. Examples of index insurance in the world 
This section briefly presents the experiences on index insurances around the world. However, each 
type of insurance mentioned here is further explained in Annex 3A (Section 9.4). Index insurances 
have been classified into three groups or categories: (a) area-index insurance (the index is directly an 
area average yield or income); (b) weather and agro-meteorological index insurances (the indices are 
weather or agro-meteorological variables such as rainfall, temperature or soil moisture); and (c) 
satellite imagery index insurance (vegetation indices computed from satellite images). Even if all of 
them have a short history, the area-index insurances have been experienced for some years in some 
countries (USA, Canada, Brazil or India), while the indirect indices are brand new and exist only as 
pilot programs or are under study in most countries. Table 4 summarizes the types of insurances 
available or under study for each country.  
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Table 4. Agricultural index insurance systems in the world 
Country 
Area index 
insurance (1) 
Weather & agro-
met index insurance 
Satellite imagery 
index insurance 
Date of most recent 
info available 
Argentina - # - 2002-04 
Austria - ## - 2006 
Brazil PS - - 2002-04 
Canada GS # # 2005 
Colombia - ## - 2002-04 
Ethiopia - G# (WB) - 2005 
France - ## - 2006 
India GS P# (WB) - 2005 
Kenya - ## (WB) -  
Malawi - # (WB) - 2008 
Mexico - R (WB) - 2005 
Mongolia ## (WB) - - 2005 
Morocco PS - - 2005 
Nicaragua - ## (WB) - 2005 
Peru - ## (WB) - 2005 
Spain - - PS 2005 
Thailand - ## (WB) - 2005 
United Kingdom § - - 2006 
Ukraine - P# (WB) - 2005 
USA PS - - 2005 
Source: Prepared from information Bielza et al. (2006), Alasa (1992), ENESA (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), 
Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003), World Bank 
(2005), Osgood et al. (2008) 
 
Legend: 
- : Not existing (empty space means that there was no information about it) 
S : Subsidized 
P : Private non-subsidized 
PS : Private partially subsidized 
G : Public non-subsidized 
GS : Public partially subsidized 
R: Reinsurance from the international reinsurance market or derivative market 
# : Pilot experience 
## : On project 
(WB): Studied, supported or with a credit line by the World Bank 
§: Failed experience 
(1) The area index includes area yield and, in the USA, also area revenue insurance  
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3.4.1. Examples of area index insurances5  
Area-index insurance is most often based on the yields of an homogeneous area, so that if the area 
yield decreases below a given value, all the insured farmers in that area get an indemnity with 
independence of their having a loss or not. In fact, the idea of index insurance is not so new. In the 
50’s, Sweden was managing an insurance program based on the yield and revenue of geographic 
areas (Skees and Hartell, 2004). Experiences of area yield index insurance have also been carried out 
in the United Kingdom, Quebec (Canada), the USA, India and Morocco. A particular type of insurance 
for animals has been developed in Mongolia.  
 
3.4.2. Examples of meteorological or weather index insurances6 
Regarding the indirect indices based on meteorological or weather indicators, some essays have 
been made in Canada: index insurance based on rainfall (Ontario); lack-of-moisture insurance 
(Alberta); temperature index for silage (Alberta). In the European Union, even if agricultural insurance 
in general is quite developed, meteorological index insurance exists only in Austria for the coverage of 
drought as a part of the yield insurance scheme. It was used for the first time in 2007. Besides, as 
mentioned in section 3.2.6.2, weather index derivatives are used in Europe by the re-insurance sector. 
Indirect index insurance or weather-indexed insurance has been applied in several countries with the 
help of the World Bank. It is sometimes applied for the individual farmers (micro-level), other times for 
the Governments (macro-level), so that they get funds to give aid to the rural population when there is 
a catastrophe. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), from the World Bank Group, has interest 
in funding such innovations, so that these countries can participate in the upcoming technological 
derivatives markets. The World Bank has worked on the evaluation of feasibility of this type of 
insurances in Nicaragua, Morocco, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Mexico, Peru, Ukraine, Turkey and Argentina. 
The main application has been for drought risk at Micro level. However, research is being carried out 
to expand coverage to other risks: flood, ENSO (El Nino-Southern Oscillation), cyclone. The main 
experiences on less developed countries are indicated in Table 5: 
 
                                                     
5 Please refer to Annex 3A for further details 
6 Please refer to Annex 3A for further details 
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Table 5. Applications and experiences of weather-indexed insurance 
Micro-level Weather-indexed insurance for smallholder farmers, 
intermediated through institutions with rural outreach 
Ex. India 
Malawi 
Nicaragua 
Ukraine 
Meso-level Weather-indexed portfolio hedge for rural financial institutions  
that lend to poor farmers 
Ex. India 
Malawi 
Macro-level Weather insurance or weather-indexed contingent credit line for 
governments or international organizations that provide 
safety nets for the poor 
Ex. Ethiopia 
Malawi 
Mexico 
Source: Dick (2007) 
 
A procedure for designing standardized deficit-rainfall insurance contracts for smallholder grain crop 
farmers is being developed by the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) in 
conjunction with IRI Earth Institute at Columbia University (BRYLA AND SYROKA, 2007). The simple 
contracts have the following features: 
1. A dynamic start date that mimics the decision a farmer would take as to when to sow his crop; 
2. Three or more phases depending on the length of the crop growing period, during which cumulative 
rainfall is measured, with a trigger and exit levels in each phase. The trigger level determines the level 
at which compensation would begin for the farmer, i.e. if the cumulative rainfall measured during the 
phase dropped below this trigger the farmer would begin to receive a fixed payout per mm, for every 
mm that the cumulative rainfall recorded was below the trigger level. These trigger levels correspond 
to rainfall levels at which the crop would begin to feel water-deficit stress. The exit level determines 
the level at which the farmer would receive a maximum payout, i.e. if the cumulative rainfall measured 
during the phase dropped below this exit level the farmer would receive the entire limit (sum insured) 
for that phase as it is assumed his crop would have failed or would have been permanently damaged. 
Hence the cumulative rainfall totals per phase are the underlying indices for these contracts. 
3. A payout rate per phase, i.e. the payout rate per mm if the recorded cumulative rainfall in each 
phase falls in between the trigger and exit levels. 
The three-phase weather insurance contract design was pioneered by Indian insurance company 
ICICI Lombard and sold to farmers for the first time in 2004. The design proved to be popular with 
groundnut and castor farmers in Andhra Pradesh and farmers of other crops, and hence was chosen 
as the prototype structure for the first Malawi pilot and subsequent African pilots. Currently this 
methodology to design deficit-rainfall contracts is being used by CRMG for a second year in Malawi, 
Tanzania and Kenya.  
In India, a big number of index insurance products have been developed, mainly dedicated to deficit 
rainfall or drought, and to excessive rainfall for different crops (see Table 23 in Annex 3A).  
In Morocco, a rainfall index insurance contract was proposed but its implementation did not take 
place.  
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To address the drought and food-insecurity situation in Ethiopia, two agricultural risk management 
structures were being considered in 2005, one at the farmer or microlevel and the other at the 
government or macrolevel.  
Mexico is the first developing country in stipulating a reinsurance agreement based on a bunch of 
weather indexes. In fact, the reinsurance corresponds, according to the classification of Table 2, to a 
yield-tailored index based on several meteorological indicators. In fact, it is not yield-tailored but 
liability-tailored, because liabilities (indemnities) are estimated with a linear least squares regression in 
function of a climatic index: FCDD (Factores Climaticos Dañinos Diarios). The FCDD term for each 
crop represents the weather index or indices (usually rainfall and temperature indexes) that best 
capture the weather risk for that crop. The FCDD calculation methodologies using daily weather data 
are presented in Table 24 of Annex 3A. Besides using weather indexes for reinsurance, other uses of 
index insurances (mutual insurance funds, water resources markets, Government catastrophic 
weather exposure) are being explored in Mexico.  
In Peru agricultural weather insurance is under study. (WB, 2005). In the case of Nicaragua, a pilot 
project is already available and it covers groundnut from deficit and excess rainfall during growth 
period and from excess rainfall during harvesting.  
Regarding Ukraine, a pilot project of a drought index insurance based on rainfall and temperature was 
developed by the World Bank, for winter wheat producers in the south of Ukraine. 
 
3.4.3. Examples of agro-meteorological index insurances 
FAO proposed an effective weather-based maize yield index (WYX, Weather Yield index) that could 
be used for crop insurance purposes in Malawi. It corresponds to a yield-tailored index based on 
several agrometeorological indicators. See Annex 5.A for further details. 
 
3.4.4. Examples of satellite imagery index insurances 
Satellite imagery (SI) indexes have been applied mainly to insurance of pastures or grasslands. The 
characteristics of these productions (difficulty to evaluate yields and losses, mainly if animals are 
directly grazing) make of this technology a potential solution for permitting insurance. Some details on 
the characteristics of satellite imagery information are presented in Annex 3A, section 9.4.4. We 
present also two examples: Canada and Spain. According to Garrido and Bielza (2008), index 
insurance based on vegetation indices to cover against drought episodes also exists in the Unites 
States, and experimentally in France, South Africa and Ukraine. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
Index contracts are more properly financial derivatives or options than insurance. However, under 
certain conditions, they can be considered as insurance: “the weather derivative can be brokered as 
an insurance contract or as an over-the-counter traded option”, according to Turvey (2001). The 
pricing of index insurance is a complex issue: traditional methods for pricing financial derivatives have 
been used, but insurance or actuarial methods can be more adequate. Weather derivatives or weather 
options are managed by the private sector, so there is not so much information available about them. 
The financial weather contracts market has been originally in the hands of the energy sector, but from 
2005 to 2007, the Over-The-Counter end users related to the agricultural sector has doubled. In Swiss 
Re’s client database, the majority of the business covering weather risks outside developed countries 
(North America, Europe, Japan and Australia) is with counter parties in the agricultural sector. 
Anyway, as a whole, this market is in the early stages. 
The main advantages over classical insurance is that they avoid moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, which allows higher levels of coverage; it is easy to sell through banks and any financial 
organisations; it is transparent and affordable with very low administrative costs. However, an insured 
event may not always reflect the production losses experienced by the individual farmers, so it is 
better adapted for very homogeneous areas and for reinsurance. 
There is a wide variety of types of index insurance, but we can distinguish two main groups: 
− area yield and revenue insurance;  
− indirect index insurance: exogenous and yield tailored. At the same time, they can be 
based on one or several indicators, which can be either meteorological, 
agrometeorological or satellite imagery indicators.  
The literature review includes three studies that analyse area yield insurance, while all the rest refer to 
indirect insurances based on meteorological indicators. Among these, there are seven examples of 
exogenous index insurance, and five of yield tailored insurances. A particular example which 
combines an exogenous standardised contract and yield-tailoring is the work by Torriani et al. (2007) 
in which the weather derivative which triggers the payment is exogenous but he proposes a yield-
tailored combination of weather derivatives for the farmer.  
The exogenous indexes can either have a fixed payment per unitary index decrease (for example a 
payment of 1€ per 1mm rainfall shortfall), or be proportional (a decrease of the rainfall of 50% would 
trigger a compensation of the 50% of the insured capital). The yield-tailored examples with multiple 
indicators adjust yield with the estimation of a model combining different indicators. Other yield-
tailored indexes have only one indicator. They optimize the index-yield correlation by the application of 
weights for the different agronomic growth stages. The three examples available of them are 
calculated for drought and use the cumulated precipitation. Their results show that a better correlation 
is achieved when the exogenous single indicator is weighted on the agronomic growth stages. 
Globally, most of the studies agree on the fact that the better or worse results from index products 
  
 39 
 
depend fundamentally on the correlation existing between the real loss of the farmers and the index 
analysed.  
There are several area yield insurance experiences in the world; we have classified the main ones in 
four categories, according to the nature of the indicators used: 
• Area-index insurance has been experienced for several years in USA (area yield), Canada, 
Brazil, India (area revenue); Morocco (area yield insurance for drought). 
• The weather or meteorological index insurances are pretty new in the market. There is one 
based on rainfall in Ontario (Canada); still in Canada, in Alberta is available an insurance based 
on lack-of-moisture and another one on temperature index for silage. 
• Other experiences of indirect index insurance based on weather data exist as pilot programs in 
many developing countries: Mongolia, Mexico, India (rainfall for several crops-very developed 
scheme), Romania (rainfall), Nicaragua, Ethiopia (drought and food insecurity), Malawi (crop 
protection based on weather indices against drought).  
• In Malawi there is an agro-meteorological index for maize production based on plant water 
availability. 
• Satellite index insurance for fodder exists as pilot programs in Canada (2001). 
In the European Union there are only two examples of indirect index insurance: the pilot projects in 
Austria of a weather index insurance based on meteorological data to cover yield from the risk of 
drought, and the satellite index insurance for fodder in Spain.  
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4. Feasibility of index insurance in the EU 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the peculiarities of Europe relative to potential index insurance products and the 
limitations imposed by WTO agreements are discussed. Afterwards, we analyse the potential of 
different indexes for insurance in the EU. The index insurance assessment is organised in four main 
parts: a first part deals with area yield insurance, the second part analyses the use of meteorological 
parameters in order to create weather indexes, a third part deals with different types of agro-
meteorological parameters, and a last part considering an index from satellite images (NDVI).  
First, an area yield insurance based on regional yields (Regional Yield Insurance RYI) is designed and 
the possible costs of the premiums are quantified. The other indices will be calibrated or evaluated 
(analysis of correlation) with regional yield data and not with FADN farm data because the latter does 
not provide time series. Consequently, the good performance of the regional yields showed by the RYI 
would be determinant for the good performance of the other indices.  
Meteorological indicators from the literature are calibrated with Eurostat-REGIO NUTS2 data. A model 
combining several of these indicators is applied in a way similar to the “area yield-tailored index 
insurances with several parameters” (see section 3.2.2)  
The parameters analysed for the agro-meteorological part come from the Crop Growth Monitoring 
System (CGMS). This system is presented in Annex 4A (section9.5), which explains its methodology 
and its outputs.  
The Satellite imagery parameter analysed is the NDVI, which is the same used for the Canadian and 
Spanish insurance products for pastures. We explore the possibilities of using this indicator for arable 
crops yield risk.  
The analyses cover all 27 Member States of the EU. However, when enough data are not available, 
the analysis has to be restricted to EU-15. Meteorological and agro-meteorological indicators are 
analysed since 1975, but for a few new MS and Eastern Germany data are only available since 1990, 
and for all new MS data are only available since 1995. Indicators based on coarse resolution satellite 
images are analysed since 1998. 
 
4.1.1. General discussion on the technical application of index insurance in EU 
In the design of an index insurance, there are some general characteristics that are required by this 
type o products and that must be taken into account for its design. They can be found in section 3.2.4 
(Characteristics of an index for weather insurance in agriculture)  
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- Index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas, where all farms have correlated 
yields. Given the heterogeneity of climates and geography in many European countries, index 
products efficiency will be probably lower than in the large homogeneous areas of the USA (for 
example, the corn belt). 
- As has been insistently repeated in the literature, index products are useful for systemic risk, at the 
aggregated level. So, they can be very useful for reinsurance. Less correlated risks at a more 
disaggregated level (farm, or areas smaller than a region) can be easily pooled by private insurance 
companies or by mutualities.  
- Due to the reason above, index products can address more easily catastrophic risks, while normal 
farm risks could be covered by existing insurance companies.  
- Yield time series are only available at NUTS2 (region) level. Some regions, like Andalucia or Castilla 
y Leon in Spain have no homogeneity. This makes difficult to create an index for the region that can 
be useful for all farmers in the region. Thus, the coverage provided by and index product in this type of 
large regions is expected to be quite low.  
 
4.1.2. Insurance design: accommodation of insurances design to WTO constraints 
If index insurance was to benefit from a CAP subsidy, according to the Council conclusions from 2003 
(see section 2.2), it must comply fully with the "green box" criteria as defined by the WTO agreement. 
Assuming the just mentioned restrictions, these would be the consequences for a potential index 
insurance: 
1- Index insurance under Paragraph 8 of WTO Uruguay Round Agreement. Aids given to 
insurance could potentially be given under either Paragraph 7 (Income risk programs) or 
Paragraph 8 (Production risk programs). As Paragraph 7 refers to programs addressing 
directly income losses, index insurance seems to fit better in Paragraph 8, because indexes 
are intended to reproduce yield or production risks. However, it is not clear that index 
insurance by its nature can be considered under the Green Box, given that its nature is not to 
compensate by the actual loss of an individual, but by the loss indicated by a parameter (a 
farmer that did not suffer from a loss could potentially benefit from compensations).  
2- Formal recognition by government authorities of natural or like disaster. Assuming that 
index insurance could fall under Paragraph 8, there should be a formal recognition by the 
Governmental authorities that when the index is below a certain threshold, it corresponds to a 
situation of natural or like disaster. However, as mentioned above, it can not always be 
ascertained for all those who benefit from the compensations.  
3- The trigger or threshold. Both for income programs as well as for production programs, 
there is a minimum loss or trigger that must be exceeded, and there is a maximum payment 
from public money. Paragraph 8 states that the trigger is 30% of a reference production, and 
the maximum payment is 100% of the production loss.  
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4- Individual vs. area yield data. In the insurance design, we need to define the expected yield 
which is the reference yield needed to calculate the loss. The WTO agreement defines the 
reference production mentioned above as: “the average in the preceding three-year period or 
a three average based on the preceding five year period, excluding the highest and the lowest 
entry”. This means that the reference yield for WTO compliance should be calculated from 
individual farm data. This poses a practical problem, as registers of individual farm data are 
not available for many productions in many countries. This raises the question on how these 
reference parameters should be estimated: based on area data? As averages tend to smooth 
the variations, individual losses can differ a lot from area losses, and thus, a trigger applied to 
individual yields can be very different from a trigger applied to area yields. In Annex 4B 
(section 9.4) we show that a 30% deductible on individual yields can be similar to a 15% 
deductible on area yields. A similar result can be expected for a trigger. 
5- Trend vs. moving averages. The calculation of the reference parameter also rises a second 
question: is it advisable an insurance product that takes as insured amount one of these 
moving averages, or would it be better to guarantee an expected production based on other 
parameters, for example a detrended average over a longer period of time? What effects 
could have taking one or the other? This is analysed in Annex 4C (section 9.4). From the 
analysis we can see that moving averages oscillate a lot compared to the trend, as could be 
expected, and so are less advisable for insurance purposes. It can also be observed that the 
moving averages sometimes are more restrictive than the trend, and sometimes less. 
However, if the detrended average and not the WTO moving averages are to be used for 
establishing the insurance coverage, then when the trend is increasing (which corresponds to 
most of the cases), the probability of not complying with WTO rule is higher. In these cases, it 
would be useful to have some additional margins in the deductibles or in the rate of 
subsidization of insurance, so that insurance subsidies could be notified under the green box. 
6- Trend vs. moving averages in area vs. individual data. The losses have also been 
calculated at individual farm level for FADN data in section 5.2.1 (from a trend in section 
5.2.1.1 and from the WTO moving averages in section 5.2.1.2). Results show that, on 
average, for winter cereals, the risk is bigger when referred to the WTO 3-year moving 
average than when the trend is taken as a reference. This might be due to the fact that 
oscillations in individual yields are larger than oscillations in regional yields, so that the 3-year 
moving average are still more instable than the detrended average (presenting more 
differences from one year to another), thus, increasing the risk globally. This observation and 
the one in the preceding point could indicate that, in certain cases, the WTO restrictions would 
be less restrictive for individual farm losses than for regional losses.  
 
4.2. Regional yield index insurance (RYI) 
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4.2.1. The insurance 
The proposed design of this insurance scheme is a simple one. It is similar to the USA GRP (see 
Section 9.4.1.5), however, it is non-proportional insurance, in the sense that the deductibles do not 
decrease as the loss increases. 
The indemnities are calculated as follows: 
( ) ueinsuredvalindexyieldyieldGuaranteedIndemnity ×−= ,0max  
 where the “index yield” is the effective yield of the region where the farm is located, and the 
“guaranteed yield” is the region’s expected unitary yield (average of the detrended yield series) 
reduced by the deductible (Guaranteedyield=Averageyield x(1-deductible)). As problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection are low in index insurance, we have set the deductible to zero, but 
instead we have used a trigger. WTO criteria require a trigger of 30%, but taking into account that the 
variability of regional yields is much lower than the variability of farm yields, and that in Annex 5B 
(section 9.6) we have shown that an individual deductible or trigger of 30% can be equivalent to an 
area trigger or deductible of 15%, we have simulated the RYI with both trigger levels (30% and 15%). 
The “insured value” is the product of the estimate of the price (average of national Eurostat prices 
from 2002 to 2006), the scale and the crop surface in the farm. The scale is also chosen by the 
producer, depending on how is his/her individual expected yield in relation with the regional yield, and 
it can vary from 50% to 150% 7. For our insurance design, considering that it is a fist attempt for the 
calculation of the premiums, we make the assumption that the scale is 100%. For the area, we will 
calculate the total cost of the premium for the total area of the crop in the region. 
 
4.2.2. Data used 
The index is to be based in regional yields. In order to be able to calculate the premium, historical 
statistical yields are needed. They should be obtained at the more disaggregate geographical level 
possible. Because FADN data do not offer individual farm yield records for a consistent series of years 
(usually only one, two or three years for a same farm), we prefer to use the next level of data 
available. For most countries data are available at NUTS 2 (regional) level in the Eurostat REGIO 
database. Given the size of the NUTS2 regions, we can consider its use acceptable for the countries 
where they are relatively small and homogeneous: The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, 
Austria and Czech Republic.  
However, we have found a constraint in the length of the data series. The information at NUTS2 level, 
for some countries is not available for more than ten years. This is the case, for example, for the small 
NUTS2 regions in Germany. Considering that a shorter time series does not give an adequate idea of 
the risk, we have opted for working at FADN region level. This has three main advantages. On the one 
                                                     
7 The GRP allows a scale from 90% to 150%, these values being constrained politically (Skees et al. 1997). 
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hand, it solves the problem mentioned above, because it means that Eurostat data in some cases are 
applied at NUTS2 level, in other at NUTS1 (it permits to have data series of an adequate length for 
some countries such as Germany) and in the small countries at NUTS0. Second, it achieves a more 
homogeneous geographic distribution. Last, it has the further advantage that it will facilitate 
comparison with FADN data (section 5.2). So, we have used Eurostat data, but aggregating it at 
FADN-region level.  
 
4.2.3. Methodology 
The data have been detrended with logarithmic, quadratic or linear regressions adjusted for each 
region and each crop. If the yield for a year t is yt and the trend yield for the same year is trty , then the 
detrended yield detty for year t has been calculated as: 
 
tr
t
tr
tt y
yyy 2005det = , as we assume that the expected yield for our insurance is the trend yield of the last 
year for which there is data available try2005 . Also for the crops and regions for which there is no data 
for 2005, the estimated trend yield of 2005 has been used. 
For the calculation of the fair premium, we have simulated for every year from the historical detrended 
yields, the indemnity of the insurance described in section 4.2.1, with the two deductibles. Then, we 
have calculated the premium as the mean of the indemnities, and the premium rate as the mean 
indemnity divided by the insured capital. The insured capital is given by the product of the average 
yield (so, the expected yield of 2005); the crop price and the region crop surface, assuming thus a 
hypothetical 100% market penetration. The crop price for all calculations is the Eurostat average price 
of the years 2002-2006 in all EU-27 countries available (Italy was not available for any crop).  
 
Table 6. Crop prices used for the premium calculations 
Crop Price €/T Crop Price €/T 
Barley 104.7 Rapeseed 306.1 
Wheat 113.2 Soybean 209.9 
Grain maize 115 Sunflower 206.1 
Rice 212.1 Potato 188.1 
  Sugarbeet 39.9 
Source: Calculated by authors from Eurostat data (2002-2006) 
 
Last, we have not taken into account those pairs region-crop for which the average cultivated area 
was less than 5 hectares, considering that it is a very marginal crop and that the yield information is 
not representative of the yield potential variability in the region. 
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4.2.4. Results 
In this section we present first the premium rates results and later, the estimation of the maximum total 
premium amounts. The results are shown for wheat in this section and for the other crops in the 
Annex 4E (section 9.9).  
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 1. Premium rates for RYI for wheat (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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Table 7. RYI premium rates (%) for wheat (calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average8 Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36% 
BE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CY 3.48% 3.48% 3.48% 5.29% 5.29% 5.29% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
DE 0.17% 2.34% 0.00% 1.06% 4.29% 0.00% 
DK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.65% 0.65% 0.65% 
EE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.68% 1.68% 1.68% 
ES 4.39% 13.98% 0.00% 7.64% 15.73% 1.20% 
FI 2.01% 2.01% 2.01% 5.64% 5.64% 5.64% 
FR 0.47% 6.85% 0.00% 1.67% 9.10% 0.00% 
GR 0.37% 1.48% 0.00% 1.99% 3.82% 1.27% 
HU 2.38% 3.84% 0.00% 4.81% 6.51% 3.42% 
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.24% 1.24% 1.24% 
IT 2.08% 9.85% 0.00% 3.64% 13.03% 0.00% 
LT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.23% 3.23% 3.23% 
LU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 
LV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.22% 1.22% 1.22% 
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PT 5.38% 5.38% 5.38% 9.33% 9.33% 9.33% 
SE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.74% 3.48% 0.00% 
SI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.54% 3.54% 3.54% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.75% 4.75% 4.75% 
UK 0.35% 2.10% 0.00% 1.20% 3.39% 0.00% 
Europe 1.09% 13.98% 0.00% 3.33% 15.73% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
The former premiums correspond to a RYI with trigger but no deductible. Theoretically, the elimination 
of the trigger would mean an increase of the premium rates. Similarly, the addition of a deductible 
would mean a decrease of the premium rates. In order to appraise the magnitude of this decrease, we 
have also calculated the premium rates for wheat with a 30% deductible and a 15% deductible. They 
are shown in Table 8. On comparing Table 7 and Table 8 we can see that with a 30% deductible, the 
maximum premium is reduced by 50%, and deductible, the average to one quarter. With a 15% 
deductible, the reduction is much lower but not negligible: from 15.7% to 11.6% the maximum and 
from 3.3% to 1.38% the average.  
 
                                                     
8 Those cases with a unique value for average, maximum and minimum correspond to countries with only one 
FADN region.  
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Table 8. RYI premium rates (%) for wheat with deductible (calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Deductible 30% Deductible 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 
BE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CY 1.33% 1.33% 1.33% 3.14% 3.14% 3.14% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
DE 0.01% 0.20% 0.00% 0.34% 2.14% 0.00% 
DK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 
EE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.18% 0.18% 0.18% 
ES 1.59% 6.48% 0.00% 4.20% 11.56% 0.13% 
FI 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 2.31% 2.31% 2.31% 
FR 0.07% 0.85% 0.00% 0.56% 4.10% 0.00% 
GR 0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.78% 1.67% 0.39% 
HU 0.38% 0.84% 0.00% 2.06% 3.51% 0.82% 
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 
IT 0.47% 3.43% 0.00% 1.70% 7.67% 0.00% 
LT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.09% 1.09% 1.09% 
LU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 
LV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PT 1.38% 1.38% 1.38% 4.83% 4.83% 4.83% 
SE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.59% 1.17% 0.00% 
SI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 
UK 0.18% 1.07% 0.00% 0.42% 1.84% 0.00% 
Europe 0.25% 6.48% 0.00% 1.38% 11.56% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Table 9. Total fair premium (€/ha) for area yield insurance with 30% trigger (premiums 
calculated at FADN region level) 
 Barley Grain Maize Potato Rape Rice 
Soybea
n 
Sugar 
beet 
Sun-
flower Wheat 
AT 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
BE 0 0 103.73 17.30   0  0 
CY 30.13  0      8.43 
CZ 0 0 0 25.41  0 0 0 0 
DE 0.95 5.48 2.107    0 6.35 0.61 
DK 5.99  0 0   0  0 
EE 7.70  0 22.31     0 
ES 19.41 8.54 86.21 20.23 9.51  40.44 11.54 17.41 
FI 5.85  79.82 0   29.12  8.15 
FR 0.61 4.01 83.86 3.65 17.41 13.18 0.07 4.54 0.31 
GR 1.03 0 0 12.83 0  6.81 0.41 0.77 
HU 8.13 6.35 45.20 4.40 0 13.87 11.84 6.06 11.20 
IE 0  0 14.23   0  0 
IT 4.35 4.31 19.52 10.25 8.90 5.33 15.25 5.95 8.51 
LT 10.52  104.42 30.20   33.37  0 
LU 0  165.83 31.15     0 
LV 4.37  0 54.91   0  0 
MT   0       
NL 0 52.81 84.23 42.83   0  0 
PL 0 0 0 0   0  0 
PT 3.64 0 0 11.43 0  28.69 5.54 9.36 
SE 0.43  127.14 0   0  0 
SI 0 24.34 0 14.06   0  0 
SK 12.98 24.27 0 0   0 0 0 
UK 0  420.97      0.07 
Total 6.35 4.32 30.70 9.17 6.12 7.04 6.72 7.31 4.17 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Table 10. Total fair premium (€/ha) for area yield insurance with 15% trigger (premiums 
calculated at FADN region level) 
 Barley Grain Maize Potato Rape Rice 
Soybea
n 
Sugar 
beet 
Sunflow
er Wheat 
AT 9.61 8.59 82.12 54.24  0 0 6.48 8.04 
BE 4.31 0 207.99 26.30   0  0 
CY 30.13  134.81      12.82 
CZ 6.85 15.57 0 25.41  15.54 0 0 0 
DE 7.88 13.61 173.22    17.91 15.52 7.92 
DK 10.62  63.91 17.67   24.21  5.44 
EE 14.54  97.78 29.39     5.01 
ES 27.57 21.60 155.63 27.28 20.46  99.64 19.30 26.90 
FI 15.98  116.40 16.53   53.55  22.88 
FR 10.25 16.17 158.32 20.36 38.32 23.48 14.60 13.32 8.17 
GR 5.06 0 0 21.93 16.98  25.39 7.55 5.06 
HU 15.95 21.50 152.92 17.61 26.91 23.00 71.02 18.54 20.38 
IE 8.58  190.18 21.17   38.83  12.12 
IT 9.76 19.09 94.90 21.30 16.04 8.86 46.64 19.08 13.25 
LT 18.24  145.97 38.06   52.94  12.24 
LU 10.72  272.53 60.04     19.40 
LV 7.35  0 68.70   54.60  4.02 
MT   88.32       
NL 0 124.78 84.26 69.67   27.45  0 
PL 7.33 0 38.16 38.24   6.63  0 
PT 17.82 34.18 61.60 13.20 20.07  78.40 8.95 16.23 
SE 7.88  210.35 13.73   0  1.20 
SI 8.12 65.80 138.91 32.77   37.21  16.41 
SK 12.98 35.88 131.67 11.02   36.58 10.46 21.51 
UK 1.59  432.70      1.38 
Total 13.74 25.23 91.83 23.07 18.88 12.10 27.87 15.91 10.35 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Table 11. Total fair premium (000€) for area yield insurance with 30% trigger (premiums 
calculated at FADN region level) 
 Barley Grain Maize Potato Rape Rice Soybean 
Sugar 
beet 
Sun-
flower Wheat 
AT 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
BE 0 0 5,005 65   0  0 
CY 1,576  0      44 
CZ 0 0 0 9,496  0 0 0 0 
DE 2,284 1,496 718    0 306 1,625 
DK 6,302  0 0   0  0 
EE 1,481  0 386     0 
ES 71,836 3,834 22,918 23,049 775  7,528 11,080 40,650 
FI 12,816  11,429 0   3,721  4,430 
FR 1,231 7,095 16,329 5,837 275 1,168 33 2,917 1,501 
GR 261 0 0 1,062 0  297 15 828 
HU 2,709 6,810 1,780 2,441 0 300 889 2,472 11,626 
IE 0  0 49   0  0 
IT 1,617 4,121 2,367 4,669 1,822 1,584 4,103 751 24,242 
LT 4,766  11,521 1,317   978  0 
LU 0  154 50     0 
LV 920  0 653   0  0 
MT   0       
NL 0 485 14,256 390   0  0 
PL 0 0 0 0   0  0 
PT 1,074 0 0 3,862 0  358 1,391 13,303 
SE 151  3,403 0   0  0 
SI 0 1,209 0 58   0  0 
SK 2,964 3,264 0 0   0 0 0 
UK 0  19,451      81 
Total 111,988 28,314 109,335 53,386 2,872 3,053 17,906 18,932 98,329 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Table 12. Total fair premium (000€) for area yield insurance with 15% trigger (premiums 
calculated at FADN region level) 
 Barley Grain Maize Potato Rape Rice 
Soybea
n 
Sugar 
beet 
Sun-
flower Wheat 
AT 2,776 1,617 3,049 3,717  0 0 103,000 2,250 
BE 414 0 10,037 99   0  0 
CY 1,576  1,025      66 
CZ 3,716 822 0 9,496  41 0 0 0 
DE 18,954 3,719 59,102    9,338 748 20,991 
DK 11,185  2,358 2,583   1,627  2,266 
EE 2,795  3,308 509     228 
ES 102,050 9,696 41,371 31,086 1,668  18,548 18,528 62,819 
FI 35,013  16,666 4,368   6,843  12,445 
FR 20,535 28,568 30,825 32,508 606 2.81 7,049 8,565 39,205 
GR 1,229 0 0 1,817 392  1,106 281 5,434 
HU 5,314 55,255 6,024 9,760 75 498 5,328 7,563 21,152 
IE 2,053  5,257 73   1,308  849 
IT 3,630, 18,244 11,506 9,700 3,284 2,631 12,546 2,407 37,775 
LT 8,266  16,106 1,659   1,552  4,026 
LU 162  253 97     166 
LV 1,548  0 818   770  563 
MT   180       
NL 0 1,147 14,256 635   3,312  0 
PL 7,998 0 43,632 18,115   2,366  0 
PT 5,263 38,378 30,934 4,458 2,842  977 2,246 23,065 
SE 2,817  5,631 828   0  354 
SI 94 3,269 1,503 136   211  617 
SK 2,964 4,826 3,950 1,913   1,317 759 8,440 
UK 1,903  19,993      1,654 
Total 242,314 165,543 327,006 134,373 8,865 5,251 74,243 41,200 244,364 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
4.2.4.1. Total premium amounts for all crops 
Table 9 and Table 10 show the total fair premium of RYI yield insurance in the case of the total crop 
surface in the country being insured. However, we have to take into account that these are only 
actuarially fair premiums, so a market premium would also include some loadings, such as 
assessment costs, administrative costs, etc. These loadings, according to Bielza et al. (2006), can 
increase the premiums amount by 42%26. A 50% market penetration would consequently mean a 
reduction by 50% of these quantities. Thus, assuming a load on the fair premium of 42%, the total cost 
and the per hectare cost of the commercial premiums with 50% penetration is shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13. Commercial premiums total cost (50% penetration) and average per hectare cost 
 Total cost (€M) Per hectare cost (€/ha) 
Trigger 30% 15% 30% 15% 
Barley 79.5 172.0 9.0 19.5 
GrainMaize 18.1 115.8 5.5 35.3 
Potato 77.6 232.2 43.6 130.4 
Rape 37.9 95.4 13.0 32.8 
Rice 2.0 6.3 8.7 26.8 
Soybean 2.2 3.7 10.0 17.2 
Sugarbeet 12.7 52.7 9.5 39.6 
Sunflower 13.4 29.3 10.4 22.6 
Wheat 69.8 173.4 5.9 14.7 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat-REGIO data 
 
However, if we consider that index insurance has much lower loss assessment costs than traditional 
insurance, we could think that the loadings on the fair premium would be lower. The estimation of the 
amount is not straightforward, as these components of the premiums are most often in the hands of 
the private sector. However, we calculate that the loss assessment costs can represent the 5% of the 
premiums, and so, the increase on the fair premium could be reduced from 42% to 35-36%.  
If we compare the total maximum cost for all countries, we can see that the increase in the total cost 
from a trigger of 30% to a trigger of 15% is as follows: 
- Soybean 1.7 
- Barley 2.2 
- Sunflower 2.2 
- Wheat 2.5 
- Rape 2.5 
- Potato 3.0 
- Rice 3.1 
- Sugarbeet 4.1 
- GrainMaize 6.4 
 
So, for many crops, the cost is multiplied by 2 to 3, and in the case of sugar beet and grain maize, it 
becomes multiplied by 4 and 6.4 respectively. This big difference probably means that the second 
group of crops have little catastrophic losses but a lot of “normal” or not extreme variability. Instead, in 
the first group the difference of the number of catastrophic losses and little losses is not so big.  
 
 
 54 
4.3. Meteorological or climatic indexes 
 
4.3.1. Analysis of possible meteorological indexes 
In this section we analyse the possibilities of a number of indexes. Panel models have been adjusted 
to Eurostat time series of yield at NUTS-2 level. At the moment, tests have been concentrated on 
wheat, in order to identify a suitable approach to apply to a wider range of crops.  
Regions with roughly similar climatic conditions have been grouped in clusters. Figure 2 shows the 
geographic layout of the clusters of regions. Notice that this map and the related models refer only to 
countries for which data are available at NUTS2 level. In particular this excludes countries like 
Germany, where data are available at NUTS1 level, and other countries for which some elaboration is 
still necessary to adapt the existing data.    
 
 
Source: Made by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 2. Some clusters of NUTS 2 regions to estimate the explanatory power of agro-
meteorological indexes on the yield of main crops.  
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We have estimated some simple explanatory models on the yield based on a number of indexes. A 
pre-selection of explanatory variables (indexes) in each cluster has been carried out through a 
stepwise regression, previous to the panel model. The indexes used for these models are defined as 
follows:  
EMBERGERCONTINENTALITY: Temperature continentality or Emberger-derived Continentality 
Index (M-m) (Emberger, 1930) 
Let M (oC) be the mean daily maximum temperature of the warmest month and m (oC) the mean daily 
minimum temperature of the coldest month. Then, the continentality is defined as follows:  
M - m < 15 °C: oceanic insular zones 
15 ≤ M - m < 25 °C: lowland littoral zones 
25 ≤ M - m < 35 °C: semi-continental zones 
35 °C ≤ M - m:  continental zones 
 
RAINFALLSEASONALITY: Precipitation seasonality or Rainfall Seasonality Index (SIP) (Walsh and 
Lawler, 1981) 
Let PY (mm) be the annual precipitation, PS (mm) the summer semester (May-October in the northern 
hemisphere, November-April in the southern hemisphere) precipitation, and PW (mm) the winter 
semester (November-April in the northern hemisphere, May-October in the southern hemisphere) 
precipitation. Then, the rainfall seasonality index is defined as: 
 
SIP < -0.13: wetter winters than summers 
-0.13 ≤ SIP ≤ 0.13: uniform distribution 
SIP > 0.13: wetter summers than winters 
 
DRYSOILDAYS: days when soil moisture < SWCWP (Barnett et al., 2006) 
Where SWCWP (mm) is the soil water content at wilting point. Some basic hydrological properties are 
set to characterize the soil of interest: 
- FC (m3 m-3): field capacity 
- WP (m3 m-3): wilting point 
- h (m): soil depth 
 
MOISTURE: Precipitation +Temperature  moisture or Moisture Index (IM) (Carter and Mather, 1966) 
Let P (mm) be the precipitation and T (oC) the air temperature. Then, the moisture level is indicated 
by: 
IM < -66.7: arid 
-66.7 ≤ IM < -33.4: semi-arid 
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-33.4 ≤ IM < 0: dry sub-humid 
0 ≤ IM < 20: moist sub-humid 
20 ≤ IM < 100: humid 
100 ≤ IM: perhumid 
 
GDDYEARLY (GrowingDegreeDaysYearly): Accumulated Degree Days 
∑Tavg> Tc for a certain period of time* (Barnett et al., 2006) 
Where ∑Tavg (oC-days) is the sum of Tavg or average temperatures and Tc (oC) is the critical air 
temperature (in general, 0 oC; base temperature for growth, e.g. 5.6 oC) 
* the period of time can be either the whole year, the coldest month, the winter trimester (December-
February in the northern hemisphere; June-August in the southern hemisphere), or first semester of 
the year (January-June in the northern hemisphere; July-December in the southern hemisphere). 
 
DESERTIFICATION: Precipitation+Evapotranspiration aridity or Desertification Index (ID) (UNEP, 
1992) 
Let P (mm) be the precipitation and ETY (mm) the annual total reference evapotranspiration. The 
Desertification level is given by: 
ID < 0.05: very arid 
0.05 ≤ ID < 0.20: arid 
0.20 ≤ ID < 0.50: semi-arid 
0.50 ≤ ID: dry sub-tropic 
 
ACCUMULATEDFROSTYEARLY: sum of degree days where Tmin < 0.0 oC (Barnett et al., 2006) 
Where Tmin (oC) is the minimum air temperature. 
 
DRYNESS: days when P < Pt (Barnett et al., 2006) 
Where P (mm) is the precipitation and Pt (mm) is the minimum threshold precipitation (e.g. 0.2 mm) 
 
The panel models are used because they allow taking into account the time dimension in the model. 
Table 14 shows the coefficients of these models. However, they still need to be improved before 
tackling the problem of quantifying the risk measured by these indexes. 
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Table 14. Panel model estimated parameters 
 CLUSTER 
Coefficients 1 2 3 4 5 6 
EMBERGERCONTINENTALITY -0.0304 -0.1217   -0.047 -0.0380 
RAINFALLSEASONALITY    1.1698   
DRYSOILDAYS -0.0034 -0.0100  -0.0066 -0.004 -0.0056 
MOISTURE -0.4469 -1.3264  -0.404 -0.358 -0.4913 
GDDYEARLY 0.0014 0.0039 0.0009 0.0037 0.002 0.0026 
DESERTIFICATION   -0.6692    
ACCUMULATEDFROSTYEARLY   -0.0019    
DRYNESS   -0.0114    
n 10 11 16 32 9 17 
T 23-30 30 19-30 12-30 30 16-30 
N 274 330 406 798 270 429 
Multiple R-Squared 31.4 % 32% 16.9% 31.5% 28.1% 30.5% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
 
Where n is the number of regions in each cluster; T is the number of years available for every region 
(or the minimum and maximum number of years per region in each cluster); N is the total number of 
observations. The Multiple R-Squared indicates that the models with a higher value (for example, 
cluster 2) explain better the yields than the models with lower values (for example cluster 3). So, the 
models for cluster 1, 2, 4, and 6 have a similar explanation capacity. 
We can observe that the yield in the regions with a more oceanic climate (Cluster 4) is strongly 
defined by the rainfall seasonality, so it is positively correlated with the proportion of summer rainfall 
with respect to winter rainfall, and it is negatively correlated with the moisture index, indicating that too 
high air moisture has a negative effect on yields. Air moisture is also an important index in regions in 
Cluster 2 (mainly Centre and West of France) On the other hand, yield in regions with a warm 
Mediterranean climate (Cluster 3) is more determined in a negative way by the desertification index.  
An insurance could be thus designed for each region on the most relevant parameter or combination 
of parameters according the results of Table 14. However, these combinations of indicators do not 
explain yields optimally, as the Multiple R-Squared is only 30%. Perhaps other indicators should be 
explored. Besides, it is also possible that there is too much heterogeneity within each NUTS2 region 
and a meteorological yield-tailored index could only have a good explanation capacity at a more 
disaggregate level. In section 4.4, we bring another example which underlines the importance of the 
geographical aspects and combination of agro-meteorological conditions in determining the efficiency 
of an indicator. 
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4.3.2. Analysis of late frost on winter wheat 
In this subsection we analyse an index for frost risk. Extreme cold in winter can make a substantial 
damage to crops. The level of damage obviously depends on the minimum temperatures, but should 
not be assessed by a straight mapping of minimum temperatures as reported by meteorological 
observatories (temperature of the air at 2 m above the ground). It requires some elaboration taking 
into account the recent thermal history (last days) and the protective effect of snow. A progressive 
lowering of temperatures is less harmful than an abrupt frost, because the plant has the time of 
protecting itself by a physiologic process knows as “hardening”.  
The estimation of the frost impact is complicated because, besides the meteorological factors like air 
temperature and snow depth, one must take into consideration also the development stage of the 
plant, the gradual increase of plant resistance to frost during the exposing of low but positive 
temperatures (process known as hardening) and the losing of this capacity (dehardening) at 
temperatures higher than 10°C (Gusta and Fowler, 1976). 
As we previously said, we estimate the temperature at crown level using the following formula 
(Ritchie, 1991): 
 Tcr = 2.0 + TempAir*(0.4+0.0018*(SnowDepth – 15)^2)  
A temperature of 0°C at 3 cm soil depth (crown level) doesn’t represent menace for the main winter 
crops but it implies the stop of the growth; temperatures between -6° and -9°C at 3 cm soil depth 
(crown level) may affect the unhardened sensitive winter cereals (like winter barley or durum wheat). 
Temperatures between -9° and -12°C at 3 cm soil depth may affect medium hardened sensible winter 
cereals (like winter barley or durum wheat) or unhardened winter wheat corps. Temperatures between 
-12° and -15°C at 3 cm soil depth may reduce drastically the plant population of sensible winter 
cereals (like winter barley or durum wheat) or even affect the medium hardened winter wheat corps. 
At temperatures between -15° and -18°C at 3 cm soil depth, winter crops like winter barley or durum 
wheat have very low chances of survival and serious damages for winter wheat are expected 
(depending on cultivar and hardening index). Below -18°C at 3 cm soil depth, winter wheat crops are 
subject of severe to lethal damages (spring re-sowing may be necessary in most of the cases) some 
cultivars of rye are able to resist at -21°C.  
Within this study a new aspect of frost, namely late frost was introduced in our MARS Crop Growth 
Monitoring System. Late frost was assessed for the plant development stages (DVS) between 50 
(after the beginning of tillering and start of intensive growth moment in which the plant is considered 
already dehardened) and 190 (just before maturity). 
The following maps give an idea of the frequency of late frost events and show in which zones of 
Europe result to be more vulnerable to this climatic risk. 
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LATE FROST LTA (days with TCmin<0)
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - 7
7 - 15
Late frost not identified
Number of days* with Crown Temperature <0
between DVS** 50 and DVS** 190 of wheat
* LTA  = Long term average (1975-2007); 
** DVS = Development stage 
 
Source: Authors elaborations from Mars data. 
Figure 3. Late frost: number of days with temperature at crown level < 0 °C for winter wheat 
between development stage 50 and development stage 190, long term average 1975-2007. 
 
Number of years with Crown Temperature <0
between DVS* 50 and DVS* 190 (Analysed years:1975 - 2007) 
* DVS = Development stage 
Occurence (years out of 33)
1
2
3
4 - 5
6 - 8
No Data
 
Source: Authors elaborations from Mars data. 
Figure 4. Occurrence of late frost (n° of years out of 33 years) 
 
Figure 4 determines how frequently the late frost event can appear and in which European areas has 
a more aggressive character. 
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Source: Authors elaborations from Mars data. 
Figure 5. Occurrence of the development stage 50 of winter wheat in Spain 
 
The chart (Figure 5) represents in which period of the year the winter wheat reaches the considered 
development stage for late frost analysis. The model used is able to simulate the crop phenology 
using the sowing date provided by one of the two crop calendars available in CGMS (Willekens, 1998; 
Kucera and Genovese, 2004) 
It’s interesting to link the map in Figure 3 and Figure 4 with the chart in Figure 5. The chart explains 
why the risk of late frost in Spain is so high. The development stage of the plant 50 occurs in March, 
winter period in which late frost events are highly probable.  
 
 
Source: Authors elaborations from Mars data. 
Figure 6. Occurrence of the development stage 50 of winter wheat in Ukraine 
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The figure above (Figure 6) shows an opposite situation. In Ukraine there is practically no risk of late 
frost (see maps, Figure 3 and Figure 4) the reason is because the development stage of the plant 50 
occurs during the month of May, in which temperatures are more gentle.  
This analysis is useful to underline that the index risk can differ very much from one European region 
to another. The examples shown in this subsection aim to explain the level of vulnerability of the same 
crop, at the same development stage can vary as function of climatic conditions. In the cases 
observed above, winter wheat in Spain appears to be more exposed to the late frost risk, because the 
physiological stage in which the plant is potentially vulnerable occurs in March, so the risk of late frost 
is higher. On the contrary in Ukraine the same crop at the same physiological development stage 
exceptionally can suffer a late frost event as in that geographical area the temperature is higher as it is 
May. These conclusions express the need of analyse the climatic risk under many points of view, 
accounting with many physiological aspects related to the crop and many other expertise needed to 
aggregate one data with other and reach a robust interpretation of results. 
This study still has few limits that need further research to improve the results. For instance, the risk 
analysis at grid level does not take into account if in the analyzed grid there is winter wheat or another 
crop. So, the next step of the late frost risk study will consist in crossing the information of the 
CORINNE land cover that regards “non-irrigated arable” land-use class in the grid with statistical 
information of crop area in the NUTS and weight the results to the risk considered. Moreover it is 
necessary to clarify that the late frost risk indicator does not give information on the intensity of the 
event, so it’s hard to quantify an eventual yield loss due to the late frost event. This indicator gives a 
picture on the regions where the late frost can occur and with which frequency over a certain period of 
years. 
 
4.4. Parameters computed from an agro-meteorological model 
There is a wide literature of agro-meteorological indexes that should be able to explain potential 
losses in the yield of main crops due to a-biotic factors. For a good example of an index
9
 based on 
agro-meteorological parameters, see the case of the Weather Yield Index (WYX) in Malawi by 
Chavula and Gommes (2006) (section 3.4.3 Examples of agro-meteorological index insurances). 
In this section we analyse several indicators based on the results from the CGMS system: the relative 
soil moisture (RSM), the potential water consumption (PWC) and the Water-Limited Storage Organs 
Weight (WLSOW).   
 
4.4.1. Testing the indices 
                                                     
9 It is in fact a yield-tailored index based on several agrometeorological indicators (see section 3.2.2) 
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We tested three agro-meteorological indices:  
 The Relative Soil Moisture index (RSM),  
 The Water-Limited Storage Organs Weight Index  
 Total Water Consumption index (TWC). 
The weather data used for testing the agro-meteorological-based indices for EU27 were collected 
from the MARS-STAT database. The yield data come from the Eurostat database, for which we also 
apply the de-trending procedure.  
Specifically, the data collected included the following: 
a) Long-term (1975-2006) weather data from Mars-Stat database. 
b) For the RSM we considered the Plant Development Stage (DVS) form 50-150, for the TWCI the 
DVS 190 for all crops analysed from the CGMS (see Annex 4A in section 9.5). 
We did a linear regression analysis comparing the detrended yield and the various agro-
meteorological indicators, outputs of the CGMS.  
The aim was to observe the correlation in between the agro-meteorological indices and the yield data. 
 
4.4.2. Relative Soil Moisture (RSM) 
In CGMS the relative soil moisture (RSM) may be defined as the percentage of water incorporated 
into the soil and available to the crops. The available water is estimated as difference of the soil water 
content between the soil humidity at “field capacity” and at the “wilting point” (for mesophytes plants) 
dynamically calculated according to the “rooting depth” along the crops cycle (considered the soil 
properties homogeneous along soil depth). 
The relative soil moisture (RSM) is an indicator of drought risk. It is estimated by CGMS using 
meteorological data interpolated in a 50-km grid. As the different altitudes are recorded in the grid, 
,RSM integrates the information on rainfall and on soil water capacity and needs of the plant, taking 
into account the phenological calendar and actual evapotranspiration.  
If CGMS simulates for a given crop a value 0 for the Relative Soil Moisture (RSM), this indicates a 
considerable water stress for that crop; if this happens during the development stages of flowering 
(can cause sterility) or grain filling (less biomass production), this corresponds to a serious drought 
situation with consistent losses. Actually the crop can suffer differently from drought depending on its 
vulnerability which is given from the development stages. We have made a first rough split before/after 
flowering starts. After the start of flowering (until short before maturity), a drought event is considered 
twice as serious as before flowering. When the grains (or other storage organs) have been filled and 
the plant is close to maturity, dry soil is not considered anymore a source of damage.  
Alternative drought indicators can be defined considering intermediate drought situations when: 
a) the RSM <10%  
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or  
b) the RSM < ½ min (40%, the long-term average RSM for that time of the year).  
This means for example that, in case (b), a RSM=15% in an area where the long term average is 
slightly above 30 % will be considered an intermediate drought situation, but RSM=25% in an area 
where the long term average is more than 50% will not be considered drought at all. This indicator 
seems better modulated, as has been shown in Bielza et al. (2006).   
For the current study, the values of RSM (GRID_YIELD table) at each 10 days (the output frequency 
of CGMS) between the development stages “beginning of intense vegetative growth“(DVS 50) and 
“mid of grain filling” (DVS 150) were summed up for each combination CROP x GRID x YEAR. Later 
these RSM values were aggregated at FADN level. It was preferred a sum of RSM instead of an 
average of this indicator in order to account for the differences in developmental rate of the same crop 
in years with different thermal conditions. 
 
On having a closer look to the positive results, it seems that some cases may raise interest. For 
example, it’s possible to find very positive results in many of the main wheat producing regions. The 
correlation for wheat in Castilla y Leon (Spain) is 0.57. In Centre (France) the correlations attains 0.56.  
The Figure 7 shows the correlation for RSM Index and the yield variability of wheat in Castilla y Leon 
(Spain). The fluctuations of the yield, especially in the period from 1995 to 2001, coincide with the 
RSM fluctuations.  
 
Castilla-Leon (FADN-545)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
R
SM
 (%
)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Eu
ro
st
at
 y
ie
ld
 (T
/h
a)
RSM-545 Eurostat-545
 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 7. RSM index and Eurostat yields for wheat in Castilla y Leon (Spain) 
 
The figure below, represent the trend of correlation coefficient for wheat in Castilla y Leon on a 7-year 
time lag window. The evolution of the coefficient is clearly improving from the nineties.   
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 8. Correlation Coefficients for TWC index and wheat yield data over a 7-year period. In 
Cataluña (Spain). 
 
Observing the case of wheat in Castilla y Leon, from Figure 7, it’s interesting to notice that the years 
1997 and 2001 the RSM index was very low and reflects the lower yield. The graphs proposed below 
(Figure 9; Figure 10) helps to visualize the variation of RSM index during a period of 3-year in the first 
graph, were the year 2001 results to be a dry year. 
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Figure 9. RSM index and for wheat in Castilla y Leon (Spain); 1999, 2000, 2001. 
 
The graph in Figure 10 shows the RSM as in the previous one, but in three different years. Here it’s 
interesting to notice the low RSM recorded for the year 1997, in which also the yield dropped. 
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Figure 10. RSM index for wheat in Castilla y Leon (Spain); 1996, 1997, 1998. 
 
For the FADN region Puglia (Italy) the RSM indicator for sugar beet is well correlated with the yield. 
Apart from a missing data gap from 1994 to 1996, also in this case it is evident the improvement of the 
correlation coefficient values for the last period of time analyzed (1996-2004). The RSM seems to 
explain well the yield variability for sugar beet in Puglia. 
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 11. RSM for sugar beet in Puglia (Italy) 
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The same situation appears in a central-northern region of Italy, Emilia Romagna, where the 
correlation coefficient is 0.50). 
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 12. RSM for sugar beet in Emilia Romagna (Italy) 
 
The graph in Figure 13 shows the variation of the RSM indicator for 3 different growing seasons, 
compared with average. The year 2003 recorded a consistent yield loss and the RSM was much lower 
than average. The RSM indicates an important water stress in 2003. 
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Figure 13. RSM for sugar beet in Emilia Romagna (Italy) 
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For barley there is an example showing the correlation (0.56) in the south of France. 
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 14. RSM for barley in Provence-Alpes-Cote (France) 
 
The chart below displays 3 growing seasons from 1997 to 1999. The year 1997 suffered a consistent 
lack of water in during certain development stages in which the crop is highly vulnerable; this might be 
the cause of the lower yield for that year. 
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Figure 15. RSM for barley in Provence-Alpes-Cote (France) 
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4.4.3. Total Water Consumption (TWC) 
In CGMS, the TOTAL WATER CONSUMPTION (cm) is a cumulated value of the actual daily 
transpiration. Transpiration is the loss of water from the crop to the atmosphere. Water loss is caused 
by diffusion of water vapour from the open stomata to the atmosphere. The stomata need to be open 
to exchange gasses (CO2 and O2) with the atmosphere. To avoid desiccation, a crop must 
compensate for transpiration losses, by water uptake from the soil. In WOFOST, an optimum soil 
moisture range for plant growth is determined as function of the evaporative demand of the 
atmosphere (reference potential evapotranspiration of a reference canopy) .Within that range, the 
transpiration losses are fully compensated. Outside the optimum range, the soil can either be too dry 
or too wet. Both conditions lead to reduce water uptake by the roots, in a dry soil due to water 
shortage, in a wet soil due to oxygen shortage. A crop reacts to water stress with closure of the 
stomata. As a consequence, the exchange of CO2 and O2 between the crop and the atmosphere 
diminishes, and hence CO2 - assimilation is reduced. This effect is quantified assuming a constant 
ratio of transpiration to gross assimilation.  
For the current study, the values of TOTAL WATER CONSUMPTION (cm) (GRID_YIELD table) for 
development stage “maturity” (DVS 200) were extracted for each combination CROP x GRID x YEAR. 
Later these values were aggregated at FADN level. 
There are some positive results which may raise interest. For instance, the correlation for wheat in 
Cataluña (Spain) is 0.44; in Greece is 0.73. In Bretagne (France) the correlations for grain maize 
attains 0.74. The figures below show the evolution of in time of TWC and Eurostat detrended yields in 
both regions.  
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Figure 16. TWC for wheat in Cataluña (Spain) 
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Extremadura (FADN-570)
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 17. TWC for wheat in Extremadura (Spain) 
 
As we mentioned already for new MS the analysis must be limited to recent years because no data is 
available before 1995. 
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 18. TWC for wheat in Slovakia  
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The correlation for grain maize in Bretagne (France 163) is 0.74. 
Bretagne (FADN-163)
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 19. TWC for grain maize in Bretagne (France)  
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data from 1975 to 2004 
Figure 20. Correlation Coefficients for TWC index and Grain Maize yield data over a 7-year 
period. Bretagne (France) 
 
4.4.4. Water Limited Storage Organs Weight (WLSOW) 
The WLSOW index is included in the analysis of the minimal thresholds for normalised indices, 
presented in the next paragraph. As explained in section 9.5, CGMS uses the WOFOST simulation 
model to simulate crop parameters. WOFOST is a deterministic, dynamic, explanatory “plant model” 
(see Genovese 2004 for further details). The initial version of this model was developed by the Centre 
for World Food Studies and AB-DLO (van Diepen et al., 1988; 1989). In the CGMS, WOFOST version 
6.0 has been used (Hijmans et al., 1994).  
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In WOFOST, crop growth is simulated on the basis of eco-physiological processes. The major 
processes are phenological development, CO2 assimilation, transpiration, respiration, partitioning of 
assimilates to the various organs, and dry matter formation. The plant organs considered are: roots, 
stems, leaves and storage organs (grains or tubers). Potential and water-limited growth is 
simulated dynamically, with a time step of one day. The potential situation is only defined by 
temperature, day length, solar radiation and crop parameters (e.g. leaf area dynamics, assimilation 
characteristics, dry matter partitioning, etc.). For this situation the effect of soil moisture on crop 
growth is not considered and a continuously moist soil is assumed. The crop water requirement, which 
in this case is equal to the water consumption, is quantified as the sum of crop transpiration and 
evaporation from the shaded soil under a canopy. To calculate the potential crop growth, the soil 
parameters rooting depth and soil physical group are not needed. Therefore in a climatic grid cell all 
EMU’s have the same simulation results for the potential situation. In the water-limited situation soil 
moisture determines whether the crop growth is limited by drought stress. In both, the potential and 
water limited, situations optimal supply of nutrients is assumed. 
For each situation, dry matter per hectare of above-ground biomass and storage organs such as 
grains and roots (potatoes and sugar beets) are simulated from sowing to maturity or harvest on the 
basis of physiological processes as determined by the crop’s response to daily weather, soil moisture 
status and management practices (i.e. sowing density, planting date, etc.). The required inputs for 
WOFOST per simulation unit are daily weather data, soil characteristics, crop parameters and 
management practices. 
The parameter which is closest to actual yields is the “water-limited storage organs weight”. However, 
sometimes a re-calibration based on observed data is needed. This can be explained by the fact that 
the model assumes as constant or as not influencing biotic and a-biotic limiting factors, such as pests 
and diseases, micronutrients deficiencies. This explains why simulated storage organ does not 
completely explain plant yield. The quality of the re-calibration versus observed time series of yields 
becomes of course dependent as well on the quality of the reference data. Besides this, it does not 
integrate the technological development (a more efficient agriculture, best variety selection), that can 
be strongly variable, both in time and space. Thus, a time series analysis is often necessary to 
account for the presence of trend factors in interannual yield variations. 
 
4.4.5. Analysis of minimal thresholds for normalised indices 
The objective of this section is to explore the possibilities of finding a threshold for each indicator 
which is able to point out bad years. So, these analyses do not to intend to provide a loss assessment 
based on an indicator, but to see if there is a threshold able to point out all bad years or, in a less 
severe test, most of the bad years. Conventionally, we defined as “bad year” a year with yield below -
10% of the mean of detrended yields for all available years.  
With this objective, we make tests analysing the number of positive results (the indicator points out a 
bad year when there is a bad year), of negative results (the indicator shows it is not bad year and 
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there is not), of false positives (the indicators shows that it is a bad year but it is not) and the false 
negatives (the indicator does not reflect a bad year but it is). Due to the fact that a “bad year” may be 
determined by weather conditions unrelated with the considered indicator (e.g. a drought indicator will 
not account for the years with frost damages), at this step, it was not an objective the reduction of the 
number of “false negative” years. The indicators considered are: WLSOW (in the figures called water 
limited yield simulated WLYS), cumulated RSM between beginning of tillering and mid of grain filling 
and the TWC. In order to compare the thresholds for different FADN regions the values of the three 
considered indicators were normalised. 
Figure 21 shows that a threshold of -0.75 of the normalized simulated water limited grain yield 
(WLSOW) of barley in Estonia is able to select 2 “bad years” out of 3. 
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data 
Figure 21. WLSOW and Eurostat yields for grain maize in Pays de La Loire (France) 
 
Figure 22 gives an example (Limousin –France, grain maize) of a threshold of -1 for the normalized 
TWC. With this threshold, it is possible to separate 4 “bad years” out of 6. With a threshold of -0.75 all 
the “bad years” are pointed out but there appears also a false positive. 
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nTWC as a predictor for grain maize yields <  0.9* LTA
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Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data and CGMS data 
Figure 22. WLSOW and Eurostat yields for grain maize in Pays de La Loire (France) 
 
This approach can be developed in order to introduce automatic selection of the thresholds, automatic 
calculation of the kappa index for the confusion matrix (good-bad, years), introduction of new 
indicators (including aggregate indicators) and selection of a second (upper) threshold for supra-
optimal effects. 
 
4.5. Parameters from satellite images 
 
4.5.1. The satellite images and the MVC NDVI 
We will use an index quite similar to the one used by the Spanish insurance for pastures (section 
9.4.4.2). However, we will not use information from the meteorological NOAA AVHRR satellite but 
from the SPOT-VEGETATION (SPOT-VGT) satellite. The more recent SPOT-VGT sensor is optimized 
for the purpose of evaluating the vegetation canopy almost every day, with nearly the same spatial 
resolution as the NOAA AVHRR (1 km), although with finer optical bands, and more stability so that 
images from one day to another have only a difference of 300 meters.  
The data under goes several pre-processing steps, which are performed by the Flemish Institute for 
Technological Research (VITO). The steps comprise a sensor calibration, geometrical and 
atmospheric corrections as well as compositing from daily to ten-daily values (decades). For the latter 
one, we used the Maximum Value Compositing approach, which is employed for the Spanish 
insurance too (MVC NDVI, see section 3.4.4). NDVI original values are between -1 and 1. In order to 
avoid negative numbers, rescaling is done according to the equation: NDVI=(NDVIoriginal/0.004)-
0.08, so that NDVI I scaled between 0 and 250.  
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A curve of decadal MVC NDVI is obtained for every pixel. This evolution curve is smoothed in order to 
eliminate the residual noise. For this, we use an algorithm of the type modified SWETS (Klisch et al. 
2006, Swets 1999,), instead of “Double 4253H” used in the Spanish pasture insurance. The reference 
curves built from the MVC NDVI are defined as beginning on the first decade of October and finalized 
on the last decade of September of the next calendar year. The data series available extend from 
October 1998 to September 2007. Whenever information is not available for a particular period, a 
linear interpolation method is used to fill the missing gaps10.  
 
4.5.2. The masks 
We want to be able to prove whether there exists or not a correlation between NDVI and yield at 
FADN regional level. To do so we must consider that crop yield data, either official numbers or 
forecast, are always expressed per “region”, while NDVI is expressed per pixel. The gap between both 
approaches can however be bridged by the computation of the regional means of certain image 
values. In this way the CNDVI method developed by Genovese et al. (2001) computes regional NDVI 
means. Besides, it goes one step further as the values are weighted according to each pixel’s acreage 
occupied by the land cover type of interest (a specific crop or group of crops). This CNDVI is based on 
the dimension of FADN regions. 
The masks that can be used are the following: 
1- The Corine Land Cover (CLC-2000) whose previous version was used in the Spanish 
pastures insurance. It has a resolution of 100m. CLC refers only to Europe, while there is a 
Global Land Cover (GLC-2000) mask which contains information of the entire world. GLC 
resolution is 1,000m. CLC is useful to discriminate between areas with pastures, crops, forest 
lands, etc. It differentiates irrigated and non-irrigated crops, but it does not discriminate 
between the different crops in arable land.  
2- CAPRI mask. CAPRI accounts for Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact. The mask 
has a resolution of 1000 m. It is crop specific but there is no differentiation between non-
irrigated and irrigated land.  
3- GLOBCOVER: Global land cover, based on ENVISAT-ESA’s MERIS. MERIS is a 
programmable, medium-spectral resolution, imaging spectrometer operating in the solar 
reflective spectral range. It has a resolution of 300m.   
Since the acreage can vary over space and time, and the existing masks doe not imply a yearly 
update, they are a major limiting factor for the correct retrieving of optimal NDVI based indicators. 
 
                                                     
10 In case of decades without valid information, the value will be calculated by interpolation of the values of the 
previous and the following decade, if and only if the number of missing decades will be lower or equal to four. 
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4.5.3. A first approach  
As a preliminary analysis, we have a look at the correlation between the NDVI and the yield of wheat. 
A first approach considers the possibilities of using the maximum NDVI as an index for hedging yield 
risk. For the NDVI, we have used the max-NDVI per pixel of 1km2, averaged at FADN regional level 
and we applied some masks: Corinne Land Cover with constrains of >50% arable land and the CAPRI 
mask with constrain of wheat >50%. We have used the Eurostat-REGIO yield data, at FADN region 
level. Table 15 and Figure 23 show for every year the correlation between yield of wheat and max-
NDVI masked. Annual average correlation values are between 0.45 and 0.70.  
 
Table 15. Correlation for wheat: YIELD – maxNDVI 
Year 
Eurostat yield-
maxNDVI 
correlation 
1998 0.6024 
1999 0.6602 
2000 0.4525 
2001 0.6612 
2002 0.701 
2003 0.4786 
2004 0.5469 
All 0.5474 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data and MARS NDVI data 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from MARS data and Eurostat REGIO data 
Figure 23. Correlation of maxNDVI with Eurostat-Regio wheat yield 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In the case that an area lacks more than 4 decade data or the last decade data is missing, the values will are 
decided through the analyses of the neighbouring areas of the same type. 
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The index based on max-NDVI could be improved in order to reach a higher correlation with yields. As 
second approach, instead of the max-NDVI of the year we could use the maximum NDVI in the period 
the crop is more sensible to risks and input (nutrients, water, etc) shortages. In particular, for wheat, 
the maximum NDVI during flowering and grain filling could be used. In order to see if this change 
could improve the correlations, we have made an experiment: we have eliminated from the database 
all the maximums which do not take place during the period of highest sensibility of winter wheat 
(stages of crop development: 80-150). As can be observed in Table 16 and Figure 24, correlations are 
higher, between 0.63 and 0.80. Figure 24 shows that the number of observations in the right-bottom 
decreases. The decrease of observations in the right-bottom and top-left corners indicates that there 
are fewer cases when a yield loss is not associated to an index loss and viceversa. This indicates that 
the change of max-NDVI used could improve correlation. 
 
Table 16. Correlation for wheat: YIELD – max MVCNDVI eliminating the values in which max-
NDVI does not take place during winter wheat development stages 80-150 
Year 
Eurostat yield-
maxNDVI’ 
correlation 
1998 0.7196 
1999 0.7395 
2000 0.6349 
2001 0.7733 
2002 0.804 
2003 0.5989 
2004 0.7677 
All 0.6803 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data MARS data 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from MARS data and Eurostat REGIO data 
Figure 24. max-NDVI correlation with Eurostat-Regio wheat yield eliminating the values in 
which max-NDVI does not take place during winter wheat development stages 80-150 
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Figure 25 shows the correlations per region. From the figure we can see that correlation is extremely 
low in most of central Europe (Poland, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, etc.) It shows highest 
values in more arid or dry areas, such as centre-south of Spain, some western regions of Italy, 
Greece, Hungary and also other regions with non-arid climate such as a north west of France or 
England. There is a factor influencing negatively in these correlations: the small number of years 
available (only 7). 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat REGIO data and MARS data. 
Figure 25. Correlation between max-CNDVI and Eurostat REGIO yield on FADN level. 
 
Even if the maxCNDVI index limited to the period of more sensitivity of the plant is not everywhere 
correlated with wheat yields, we have calculated the potential losses based on this index. The NDVI 
deductible closest on average to the FADN yield with 30% deductible is 4.5%. The risk levels for this 
deductible are shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17. maxNDVI risk with different deductibles  
FADN code FADN region 5% 10% 
260 Emilia-Romagna 3.82% 0.00% 
270 Toscana 0.00% 0.00% 
281 Marche 4.81% 0.00% 
282 Umbria 0.00% 0.00% 
291 Lazio 0.00% 0.00% 
292 Abruzzo 0.23% 0.00% 
301 Molise 0.09% 0.00% 
302 Campania 0.00% 0.00% 
303 Calabria 0.00% 0.00% 
311 Puglia 0.00% 0.00% 
312 Basilicata 1.87% 0.00% 
320 Sicilia 0.00% 0.00% 
330 Sardegna 0.00% 0.00% 
460 Ipiros-Peloponissos 1.91% 0.00% 
545 Castilla y Leon 2.19% 0.00% 
550 Madrid 4.62% 2.14% 
555 Castilla-La Mancha 0.00% 0.00% 
560 Comunidad Valenciana 0.00% 0.00% 
565 Murcia 0.00% 0.00% 
570 Extremadura 3.72% 0.90% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from MARS data  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of feasibility of index insurance in the EU should take into account some general 
previous considerations, mainly: 
- Index products are useful for systemic risk, at the aggregated level, so they are more adapted to 
reinsurance and catastrophic risks. 
- Index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas, where all farms have correlated 
yields. Given the heterogeneity of climates and geography in many European countries, index 
products efficiency will be probably lower than in the large homogeneous areas of the USA (for 
example, the corn belt). 
- Insurance can be properly designed when there are yield time-series available (or losses time 
series). In Europe time series are only available at NUTS2 (region) level. Some of these regions 
(like Andalucia or Castilla y Leon in Spain) are very big and heterogeneous, what makes it difficult 
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to create an index that can be useful for all farmers in the region. Thus, the use of yield data at a 
more disaggregated level would be advisable or even necessary. 
- If index insurance was to be subsidized within the CAP frame, it should fall under the WTO Green 
Box. As Paragraph 7 of the WTO Agreement refers to programs addressing directly income 
losses, index insurance seems to fit better in Paragraph 8, because indexes are intended to 
reproduce yield or production risks. However, it is not clear that index insurance by its nature can 
be considered under the Green Box, given that its nature is not to compensate by the actual loss 
of an individual, but by the loss indicated by a parameter (a farmer that did not suffer from a loss 
could potentially benefit from compensations). There is also the possibility of conflict with the need 
of a formal recognition by the Governmental authorities that when the index is below a certain 
threshold, it corresponds to a situation of natural or like disaster for all those who bought 
insurance and are thus entitled for the payment.  
 
Once analysed these aspects and limitations and other technical issues, we have analysed several 
parameters or indicators which could be potentially used for crop insurances: regional yields which 
could be the basis for area yield insurance (Regional Yield Insurance RYI); some meteorological and 
agro-meteorological parameters; and last, an index from satellite images (NDVI). 
RYI was designed for FADN regions and a number of arable crops. The area index used is Eurostat-
REGIO yield. The fair premium rates for RYI with a trigger of 30% and no deductible oscillate for 
wheat from 0 to 14%, with average of 1.1%. The premium with a 30% deductible was also calculated. 
In this case, the maximum would reach 6.48% and the average 0.25%. With a 15% trigger wheat 
premiums reach the 15.7%. This shows that premium rates are very sensitive to the deductibles and 
trigger levels. The total premium amount can be multiplied by 2 or even up to 6 when reducing the 
trigger from 30% to 15%. The country average fair premiums per hectare oscillate between €4.17 and 
€9.17 for most arable crops, but reach €30,70/ha for potato. The final cost or commercial premiums 
are also estimated under certain assumptions. For RYI with a 30% trigger and a 50% market 
penetration (and assuming there is no adverse selection), the total EU-25 cost could be around of 
€77.6M for potato, €79.5M for barley and €69.8M for wheat, of which € 54.67M, €56M and €49.1 M 
respectively are the pure premiums.  
Some meteorological indicators were analysed following the model of the area yield-tailored insurance 
from several indicators. An insurance product could be thus designed for each region on the most 
relevant parameter or combination of parameters according to the results. However, these 
combinations of indicators do not explain yields optimally, as the Multiple R-Squared is only 30%. 
Perhaps other indicators should be explored. Besides, it is also possible that there is too much 
heterogeneity within each NUTS2 region and a meteorological yield-tailored index could only have a 
good explanation capacity at a more disaggregate level. The meteorological indices analysis is useful 
to underline that the index risk can differ very much from one European region to another. The 
example shown in Chapter 4.3 aims to explain the level of vulnerability of the same crop, at the same 
development stage can vary as function of climatic conditions. The results of the late frost study 
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expresses the need of analyse the climatic risk under many points of view, accounting with many 
physiological aspects related to the crop and many other expertise are needed to aggregate one data 
with another in order to reach robust outputs. 
The agro-meteorological indices chosen and analysed in this chapter can be useful to give hints for 
the design of an index insurance product. The data availability it is not always sufficient, for instance 
the Eurostat Regio data series for eastern European countries starts only in 1994; this makes the 
range of calculation for the correlation coefficient of those countries, not possible to be extended for 
more than 10 years, with a certain impacts on the results. It has to be clarifyed that the quality of the 
meteorological data received and collected in the MARS database improved very much in the last 
period. The graph below shows the increase of available weather stations number. 
 
 
Source: JRC Mars database 
Figure 26. Meteorological weather station transmitting data to MARS database. 
 
In general, as the analysis is made on a large scale (EU27), surely the results are not excellent 
because the domain of observations is very wide. Another aspect to consider is the climatic 
differences in Europe. Certain areas suffer lack of water, on the contrary other regions face problems 
of excessive rainfall, so this means that is sometimes tricky to analyse the same index on areas with 
different problematic. A step further could be the division of Europe into climatic zones; this could help 
to refine the outputs of the analyses and to determine which index can represent better the yield 
variability for each zone and each crop. At present, the results suggest many directions that could be 
taken to comprehend how far an index can serve to assess losses due to climatic event or to prevent 
income losses through an insurance scheme based on agro-meteorological indices. 
Analyses for NDVI show that the maximum NDVI appears as a poor indicator of crop yield risk. We 
have looked at the correlations in each FADN region and we have found that the index and yields are 
not correlated. There is a factor influencing negatively in these correlations: the small number of years 
available (only 7). However, results improved when taking into account only those maximum NDVI 
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which fall in the period when the crop is more sensitive to nutrients and water stresses. This means 
that the capacity of NDVI for explaining yields could be improved by using the maxNDVI of this 
sensitivity period. On the other hand, ongoing activities within the Agriculture Unit of the JRC have 
proved that the correlation between the indicators derived from NDVI and yield is dependent on 
different regions. A study in Spain showed that the max NDVI but also cumulated NDVI values for 
different periods of the growing season are significant. Further analysis could include indicators such 
as the start NDVI or the end NDVI of the growing season; the cumulated NDVI during the length of 
growing season; and cumulated NDVI between start and max NDVI, or between max NDVI and end 
NDVI of the season. 
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5. Cross validation of indirect index insurance with FADN data 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to contrast the index insurances analysed with individual farm data 
from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). With this objective we first analyse (section 5.2) 
the individual farm yield risk (5.2.1) and income risk (5.2.2) at FADN region level. In a second step 
(section 5.3) we analyse again farm risk but assuming that all farms buy an index insurance (RYI). 
The decrease of the farm risk gives an indication of the efficiency of the index insurance.   
FADN yield and income risk 
The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is the best available source of data at single farm 
level11. In this chapter we quantify the risk of yield or income loss. The concept of risk is the 
expectation of the loss compared to the “normal” yield or income; in other words the risk is the loss 
averaged on time. 
A “normal” yield or income is often considered the long term trend of the yield or the income of the 
farm. In order to calculate the long term trend, data provided by a time series is needed. Given that the 
FADN data do not contain information on the same farm for a big number of years, that is, we do not 
dispose of time series at individual farm level, we need to look for some alternative method to 
calculate farm risk. An alternative option is presented in this section, which attempts to make more 
flexible the concept of “constant sample”: it is what we call the “2-year constant sample” method. It 
consists on a procedure to indirectly estimate the variation compared to the trend without estimating 
the trend for the farm. The procedure is model-based and consequently its validity depends on the 
acceptation of the model, but we consider it is reasonable enough and it allows to exploit the data of a 
farm whenever data are available for that far on two consecutive years. This methodology is explained 
in detail in Annex 5A (section 1.1) and results are shown in subsection 5.2.1.1. 
On the other hand, the WTO agreements implicitly define the normal income or yield as a moving 
average of three preceding years. More specifically, the WTO green box conditions for aids to yield 
(and similarly for income) losses specify: “a production loss which exceeds 30 per cent of the average 
of production in the preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-
year period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry”. Limiting the sample to the farms that are kept 
for 4 years reduce the sample to less than 30% of the total sample, and the sample would be tiny in 
                                                     
11 The FADN database is described in Annex 5B (section 9.11) 
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many regions if we only consider farms with data on 6 consecutive years12. However, we have 
performed also this analysis and results are shown in subsection 5.2.2.  
The analyses are restricted to EU-15 and for barley, grain maize, sunflower and wheat because of 
data availability. For the FADN loss risk assessment long time series are required, and are not 
available for the new MS. Income indicators based on FADN data are analysed since 1994. 
Cross-validation for wheat area yield insurance 
Next, the efficiency of RYI is validated with the FADN farm data. In order to attain this objective, we 
simulate the effects of RYI on each farm revenue, so that we obtain a new sample of farm revenues 
with insurance. The comparison of the risk on this second sample with the risk on the non-insurance 
sample allows to quantify the potential effects of the insurance on the average risk of the farms.  
 
5.2. Quantitative assessment of the loss risk on the basis of FADN data 
 
5.2.1. Risk of yield reduction at farm level  
5.2.1.1. Risk of yield reduction from a trend: “2-year constant sample” method 
The risk of yield reduction has been calculated using the 2-year constant sample method for a number 
of crops (barley, grain maize, sunflower and wheat). The risk of yield reduction is what is known in 
actuarial terms as fair premium or pure risk premium, and it corresponds to the risk that is undertaken 
by the insurer (expected compensation to be paid to the farmer) of a multi-risk yield insurance.  
For every farm i  of region k  we observed production itq  and area itS  for crop c  in the year t  and 
the yield is ititti SqZ = . The regional trends used in the method have been calculated according to 
the process described in the Annex 3C (section 9.12).  
The FADN total sample is described in Annex 5B (Section 9.11), Table 40. The number of farms with 
observations in two consecutive years is shown in Table 42 in the same Annex, and the percentage of 
these farms on the average of all farms in each pair of years is Table 43. We have calculated the risks 
with a 30% trigger, according to WTO constraints, and with no deductible.  
Figure 64 shows the results for wheat and barley for each FADN region. The results for the other 
crops are shown in Annex 5D (section 9.13.1). Table 18 below shows the average values per country. 
The computation has been carried out only for the regions for which the crop is sufficiently important 
to have a large enough sample size in FADN for a reliable estimate. Eastern European countries do 
not appear in the results as there was not enough available data. 
                                                     
12 The actual application of this rule would require an individual record of yearly production for each farm, but 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 27. Farm yield risk (losses from trend with 30% trigger) for wheat and barley with “2-
year constant sample” method 
 
Table 18. Farm yield risk (losses % from trend with 30% trigger) “2-year constant sample” 
method 
% Wheat Barley Grain maize Sunflower 
AT 1.51 2.73 4.28 2.91 
BE 0.52 1.19 4.35  
DE 1.19 1.71 5.00 6.64 
DK 1.00 2.66   
ES 5.44 5.96 2.73 10.37 
FI 6.26 4.78   
FR 1.59 2.34 3.06 3.55 
GR 4.79 5.09 0.88 8.91 
IE 0.75 2.38   
IT 2.76 3.37 3.38 4.90 
LU 0.83 1.42   
NL 1.38 2.31 17.78  
PT 10.53 14.47 11.65 19.60 
SE 1.34 4.94   
UK 0.90 1.11   
All 2.96 3.47 4.12 6.18 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN yields 
                                                                                                                                                                     
such system does not exist in most European countries.  
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As explained in section 2.3, the risk rate of yield reduction in percentage is equivalent to the actuarially 
fair premium rate calculated for the RYI. In both cases, risks are expressed as a rate, that is, a 
percentage of the average or expected yield. It can be observed that these farm yield risks are on 
average higher than those represented by the fair premiums of RYI. Given that in some of the regions 
farm risks are quite high and an individual yield insurance policy could results unaffordable for the 
farmer, a RYI could be proposed in these cases. 
 
5.2.1.2. Risk of yield reduction from a moving average: WTO method 
 
If we follow the WTO indications on allowed aids in case of a disaster or calamity on production (see 
section 9.3 and also section 4.1.2 for a more in-depth analysis on the topic), the trigger and also the 
maximum amount of indemnities and payments should refer to one of these moving averages: “the 
average in the preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five year 
period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry”.  
The yield loss in year t would be given by:   tiγ−1      with  
321
3
−−− ++
=
ititit
ti
ti ZZZ
Zγ  
If applying a deductible d:  
( )
( )⎩⎨
⎧
−−
−>=
otherwised
dif
h
ti
ti
ti γ
γ
1
10
 
For region k, the relative loss for the insurer is ( )kihEL titk ∈= /  
In order to perform these calculations, we need 4-year constant sample yields for each individual farm 
or 6-year constant samples in the second case. The analysis of FADN yields shows that 4-year 
constant samples are available for some farms and years (see Table 44 in Annex 4B) at least in the 
most important producing regions, but the number decreases for 6-year constant samples (Table 45).   
We have first calculated the risk of yield reduction with a 3 year moving average for the 4-year 
constant sample. Figure 28 shows the mapping of the results for wheat and barley per FADN region. 
The results for the other crops are shown in Annex 5D (section 9.13.2). Table 19 shows the averages 
per country. In a second step, we have done the same for the three-year average of the previous five 
years disregarding the maximum and the minimum, from the 6-year constant simple. The mapping of 
the results per FADN regions is shown in Figure 29 for wheat barley and in annex 5D for the other 
crops. The average risk ratios per country are shown in Table 20. 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 28. Risks of yield reduction (‘3 year’ moving average- 30% trigger) for wheat 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 29. Risks of yield reduction (‘5 year –minmax’ moving average - 30% trigger) for wheat 
and barley 
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Table 19. Risk of yield reduction (‘3 year’ moving average with 30% trigger) 
 Wheat Barley Grain maize Sunflower 
AT 2.08 3.95 5.86 3.09 
BE 0.68 1.39 4.45  
DE 1.65 2.60 4.18 7.65 
DK 1.45 4.11   
ES 6.17 8.48 3.23 11.99 
FI 6.14 7.49   
FR 2.19 2.96 3.24 4.25 
GR 5.54 4.30 1.00 7.94 
IE 2.34 3.82   
IT 4.12 4.07 4.37 2.90 
LU 1.21 1.79   
NL 1.03 2.22 14.04  
PT 15.46 14.80 10.12 27.49 
SE 2.14 6.27   
UK 1.32 2.01   
All 3.82 4.50 4.10 6.56 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN yields 
 
Table 20. Risk of yield reduction (‘5 year –minmax’ moving average - 30% trigger) 
 Wheat Barley Grain maize Sunflower 
AT 2.39 5.25 6.30 3.40 
BE 0.43 1.15 4.30  
DE 1.53 2.24 3.64 9.30 
DK 0.67 1.43   
ES 4.70 7.95 2.13 9.87 
FI 3.06 3.39   
FR 2.17 2.98 3.61 4.19 
GR 4.51 7.07 0.61 6.38 
IE 0.80 1.47   
IT 5.33 9.21 2.32 6.48 
LU 0.87 1.39   
NL 1.08 1.40   
PT 10.87 8.76 7.35 13.09 
SE 1.74 4.30   
UK 2.26 1.33   
All 3.18 4.19 3.29 6.19 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN yields 
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From the comparison of all the yield results we can observe several things. First, regarding, the 
amount of data, we see that the use of a 3 year moving average involves that data are not available 
any longer for some regions. But the effect is much more evident on comparing the results of the 
average of the 5 previous years minus the minimum and the maximum (for example South of Italy and 
Sardegna, part of Portugal, for wheat and also Slovenia and north-east of Italy for Barley).  
The 3 years moving average show risk levels which on average are considerably higher than the “2-
year constant sample” method. In fact, the 3 year moving average usually shows higher risks than any 
of the other two methods, but mainly for wheat and barley. The effect is smaller for sunflower and 
grain maize. In some cases the risk remains similar or with a slight decrease, and in very exceptional 
cases it decreases (for example: sunflower in Italy from 4.90% to 2.90%). This could lead to think that 
this moving average in general would not be restricting for aids given on the basis of the trend, but of 
course it should be checked on a case by case basis.  
If we compare the levels of risk shown by the two moving averages, the risk with the 3-year is usually 
higher than the one with the 5-year. This can be explained because crop yields generally have a 
positive trend. This suggests that in most cases a moving average based on the last 3-years will be 
higher than a moving average based on the 5 previous years, so that the risk of yields below the 
obtained average is higher. At the same time, a moving average is oscillating, so its intrinsic risk is 
higher that the trend risk. This could have a potential implication at the political level. Given that the 
WTO definitions permit to compare the losses with the 3-year moving average and that risks with this 
method are on average bigger than with the other ones for winter cereals, it means that in these cases 
WTO rules would not be restrictive on average with respect to the trend loss calculation. 
 
5.2.2. Risk of income and revenue reduction  
The income reduction has been estimated from Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) data. The FNVA 
trends have been estimated in a similar way as the ones for yields (see Annex 4C, section 9.12). 
However, they have not been estimated from the Eurostat database, because it does not provide data 
on farm income. Instead, the weighted averages of farm FADN data per region, year and farm type 
have been used. The types of trends found for the different types of farms are shown in the same 
Annex 4C (Figure 62 and Figure 63).  
Applying the “2-year constant sample” method to the FNVA presents some additional difficulty 
because the behaviour of FNVA is more irregular than the behaviour of the yield. In particular negative 
values can appear and the meaning of 
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 needs some adaptation. As a provisional 
way to go ahead, we have limited the values of the ratio to the interval [0.1 – 10]. Values outside this 
interval are artificially pushed to 0.1 if they correspond to a decrease of FNVA or to 10 if it 
corresponds to an increase. In Annex 4C, Table 46, the special cases with FNVA values below 0.1 are 
listed. The rule that has been applied generally introduces a moderate underestimation of the risk. 
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We represent in Figure 30 and Figure 31 the calculated risk or pure premium rate (in %) of a 
hypothetical FNVA insurance with a 30% deductible. The choice of a 30% deductible is justified by the 
WTO constraints on public compensations for income losses. Pure premiums are above 7.5% in 
several regions (south of Sweden and Portugal, Campania and Puglia in Italy, Catalonia in Spain and 
central Germany). There are also large areas all around Europe with premium rates above 5%. We 
can observe that the risks are not lower than the yield risks seen before with the “2-year constant 
sample” method, even though here a deductible is applied, and so the expected risk should be lower. 
We can deduce from this that income risks are higher than farm yield risks.  
 
  
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 30. Risk (30% deductible) of Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) for specialists field crop and 
specialists horticulture 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 31. Risk (30% deductible) of Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) for specialists permanent 
crops and mixed crops 
 
Table 21 summarizes the average pure premiums per country. The lowest premium rates are found in 
Austria and Belgium. The average premiums for all Europe are around 4%, much higher than yield 
averages, which were between 1 and 2.5%. This means that the main farm risks are not exclusively 
due to yield oscillations, but can be due to price risks or financial risks as well. 
FNVA shows negative values and risks which differ much from yields. Given that this can be 
influenced by financial factors and other factors not directly related to the farming activity, we will 
analyse another FADN variable: the Value of Production (VP). This does not represent farmer’s 
income but farmer’s revenue, and thus, would not be linked to Paragraph 7 nor to Paragraph 8 of the 
Annex 2 of the WTO agreement on agriculture. However, this indicates us whether farmer’s income 
risks are mostly due to price and production variability, or whether they are due to other factors.    
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Table 21. Farm Net Value Added average risk levels (pure premiums with 30% deductible)  
 Specialist field crop Specialist horticulture Specialist permanent 
crops 
Mixed cropping 
AT 1.994%  3.786% 1.881% 
BE 2.153% 2.762% 4.585% 2.274% 
DE 3.798% 2.272% 3.970% 4.879% 
DK 6.708% 3.574% 4.759% 6.485% 
ES 4.675% 4.254% 5.484% 3.530% 
FI 4.402% 4.118%   
FR 3.242% 3.271% 3.912% 4.166% 
GR 2.825% 4.140% 4.498% 3.559% 
IE 3.602%    
IT 5.003% 5.433% 4.594% 4.212% 
LU   3.084%  
NL 4.832% 3.344% 4.389% 3.420% 
PT 6.167% 6.356% 6.526% 6.488% 
SE 6.621%    
UK 4.134% 3.541% 3.287% 6.757% 
All 4.235% 3.954% 4.629% 4.289% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN value of production 
 
  
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 32. Risk (30% deductible) of FADN Value of Production (VP) for specialists field crop 
and specialists horticulture 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 33. Risk (30% deductible) of FADN Value of Production (VP) for specialists permanent 
crops and mixed crops 
 
Table 22. Value of production average risk levels (pure premiums with 30% deductible)  
 Specialist field crop Specialist horticulture Specialist permanent 
crops 
Mixed cropping 
AT 0.639%  1.573% 0.747% 
BE 0.751% 1.001% 2.390% 0.823% 
DE 0.779% 0.867% 1.544% 0.863% 
DK 1.259% 1.460% 2.910% 2.629% 
ES 1.941% 2.318% 2.932% 1.869% 
FI 1.986% 0.926%   
FR 0.923% 1.139% 1.844% 1.341% 
GR 1.838% 1.522% 2.931% 1.808% 
IE 1.300%    
IT 2.219% 2.707% 2.535% 1.708% 
LU   1.042%  
NL 1.102% 0.986% 1.674% 1.604% 
PT 2.997% 2.800% 3.662% 2.931% 
SE 1.971%    
UK 1.179% 1.016% 2.083% 1.255% 
All 1.558% 1.653% 2.431% 1.675% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN value of production 
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From comparing the maps of VP (Figure 32 and Figure 33) with those of FNVA (Figure 30 and Figure 
31) we see that while in some regions the level of risk remain unchanged, for most regions and crops, 
the level or risk undergoes an important increase. The increase, however, is not proportional, given 
that in some cases it goes from the lowest levels to the highest levels. For example, Hessen in 
Germany for mixed crops, or Catalonia in Spain for specialists permanent (>1% in VP, >7.5% in 
FNVA).  
We see that the average risks shown in Table 22 for all countries are between 1.5 and 2.4, so the 
levels are closer to yield risks than to income risks. This means that the price and the production risk 
account only for a part of the income risks, being far from explaining most of the farm risk. 
 
5.3. Cross-validation for RYI for wheat 
 
5.3.1. Methodology 
In order to see the effects of the area yield insurance on the farm economic results, we will not take 
into account the whole farm income, given that previous analysis have shown that farm income risk is 
not very much related to farm production risk (section 5.2.2), because of the effect of other income 
components which often are not intrinsic to the farming activity. So, we will look directly at the effect of 
area insurance (RYI) on the farm crop revenue. 
The RYI provides for each region r and each year t and indemnity in yield-equivalent (T/ha): 
pYCovYI rtrtr ×−×= ),0max(  where rY  is the average crop revenue in region r, Cov is the 
coverage level of the insurance and Ytr is the actual regional yield in year t.    
The farmer has to pay every year a premium, which in the long term equals the indemnities: 
( )rtrt IEP =  where E is the mathematical expectation. 
Thus, if the farm buys area insurance every year, the farm economic results are modified by the 
premium paid, and by the indemnity in the years the region yield is lower than the guaranteed yield. 
So, we could say that the revenue of farm i in region r, when there is not insurance (Ri0) is modified in 
this way by insurance.  
rtrtiirt PIRR −+= 0'  
 
In this way, we obtain for each farm in the FADN database a new revenue R’ for every year. For 
simplicity of calculations, we have assumed a unitary price, so we have used farm yields instead of 
farm production values. The indemnities and premiums were expressed in percentage of the regional 
yield, in order to adapt them to the yield level of the farm.  
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However, given that the FADN farm sample is not constant, we could not use the average yield of the 
farm, but the actual yield, what makes the risk reduction effect of the insurance be much lower. 
Instead, the farm trend should have been used. Another option considered was to apply to all the 
farms of the region a fixed premium (and fixed indemnities) expressed in T/ha. We also tried this 
system, but the results did not differ much from the previous ones.  
 
5.3.2. Results 
Figure 34 shows the risk calculated with the “3 year moving average” method for the farms with 
insurance. The map for the same farm risk without insurance was shown in Figure 28.  
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN and Eurostat data 
Figure 34. FADN production risk (30% deductible) with area yield insurance for wheat 
 
If we compare both maps we can observe that the risk levels are very similar. However, we can see a 
significant decrease of the risk level in some regions: North-West of Portugal, south of Spain, East of 
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Germany, south of Finland. So, this decrease of the risk is observed mostly in Mediterranean areas, 
while in central and northern Europe the usually low risk levels remain unchanged. 
Figure 35 shows the observed yield reductions. The yield reduction is largest: 
• in Spain: in Andalucia and Extremadura; 
• in Portugal, in Entre Douro e Minho; 
• in France, in Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon, Bourgogne and Auvergne; 
• in Italy: Sardegna, Puglia, Toscana; 
• in Germany: in Brandenburg 
• in Finland: in Etela-Suomi.  
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN and Eurostat data 
Figure 35. Wheat production risk reduction from area yield insurance 
 
Figure 36 shows the decrease expressed as a percentage of the original risk. In most o the cases, the 
highest risk decreases correspond to a decrease of more than 50% of the risk, with a maximum of 
68% in Brandenburg (Germany) and Bourgogne (France). Although the absolute risk reduction in 
Bourgogne is not high, the relative risk reduction is important. This means that in this region the RYI 
risk is quite efficient even if the original risk was not very high.   
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN and Eurostat data 
Figure 36. Wheat production relative risk reduction from area yield insurance 
 
The first results from this analysis show that: 
- The effect of area yield insurance on the farm production risk is generally low. 
- However, in some regions, the risk reduction is relevant.  
- These results have to be considered cautiously, given that the quality of the data is not optimal. 
The correlations between Eurostat yields and FADN yield averages are often weak. 
 
5.4. Conclusions  
FADN data are used to compute and map the level of risk of yield reduction with a deductible 30% for 
major field crops at the level of the farm. The concept of risk used corresponds to the long term 
average payment by the insurer to the farmer. This is often labelled in the academic literature as “fair 
premium”, although in practice the premium is higher because of the management costs (including 
loss expertise) and the profit of the insurance company. Two different methodologies using FADN 
data have been used:  
• One method based on the WTO-suggested approach that compares the yield each year with 
the average of previous years 
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• A newly developed method, that we have called “2-year constant sample”, that allows to use a 
higher number of FADN data and that takes into account the yield trend in each region.  
The results show a geographic layout without any major surprise, but give a good indication of the 
quantitative level of risk. Preliminary results confirm that the risk level at the scale of the individual 
farm is much higher than the risk level using regional yield averages as trigger of a hypothetical index 
insurance.  
Both approaches give results that are consistent with each other, but the two-year constant sample 
method gives in general slightly lower values for the risk than the 3-year moving average method for 
winter cereals. A possible explanation for this fact is that the WTO does not take into account the long 
term trend. We point out that the practical application of the WTO rule would require a farm-level 
register of yields going at least 3-5 years back; this does not seem to be available in most EU 
countries.  
A spin-off of the study is the characterization of the regional yield trends with different functional 
shapes (linear, quadratic and logarithmic). This is a product that has a value as a tool to improve the 
current procedures of yield forecasting. However some additional work is necessary to collect time 
series of yields longer and more complete than the data available in the REGIO database. 
The analysis of the income reduction risk is made by farm type instead of by crop. The application of 
the same methods to the income level measured through FNVA (Farm Net Value Added) is more 
problematic. We find a conceptual challenge in the application of the “30% deductible” when the 
average income in the previous year(s) is very low or even negative: What does it mean “a loss of 
more than 30% of the average income of the previous three years” when this average is negative? 
This inconvenient has been skipped by eliminating “awkward” ratios, but we have to warn that this 
may have a strong impact on the results, probably reducing the computed levels of risk. Even with this 
data cleaning implying a reduction of apparent risk, the risk levels computed for the income reduction 
are much higher than the risk of yield reduction. The reason for that is easy to understand: assuming 
relatively stable prices, a yield reduction of 30% correspond to an income reduction of much more 
than 30%, because the cost of production does not decrease with the yield. An alternative concept 
has been analysed: the value of production, or revenue, for which the estimated risk is much closer to 
the risk of yield reduction. 
Cross-validation of wheat RYI 
As could be expected, given that area yield indexes are more adequate for homogeneous regions, the 
risk reduction capacity of RYI is not very high for the example analysed. We can expect that the 
results do not depend from the crop type, but on the scale of the analysis. Besides, we have to take 
into account that it was underestimated due to the data constraints (the percentage indemnities were 
multiplied by actual farm yields and not by average or expected farm yields). However, there are some 
regions where the risk can be reduced up to a 68%.  
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The test for risk reduction capacity of other indexes could be done, however, it would be expected to 
be lower than the one from yield area index, given that theoretically regional yield area should 
describe the behaviour of farm yield better that other indexes at a regional scale.   
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6. General conclusions 
 
6.1. Main conclusions on the index insurances 
There is a debate on the nature on index insurances, because they are very close to financial 
derivative contracts. Also the pricing of index insurance is a complex issue: traditional methods for 
pricing financial derivatives have been used in most studies, but insurance or actuarial methods can 
be more adequate. From the literature review we can see that the market of agricultural weather 
derivatives is in the early stages. Also the agricultural index insurance markets quite new and is the 
object of study of the current literature. Due to the characteristics of indirect index insurance, that 
makes it more accessible and affordable than traditional crop insurance; many pilot programs have 
recently been implemented in developing countries. Some examples exist in Canada, the USA and 
only a few in Europe: mainly a pilot project in Austria of a weather index insurance based on 
meteorological data to cover yield from the risk of drought, and a satellite index insurance for fodder in 
Spain.   
The literature review includes some studies that analyse area yield insurance, while all the rest refer to 
indirect insurances based on meteorological indicators. Among these, there are some examples of 
exogenous index insurance, and others of yield tailored insurances. A particular example which 
combines an exogenous standardised contract and yield-tailoring is the work by Torriani et al. (2007) 
in which the weather derivative which triggers the payment is exogenous but he proposes a yield-
tailored combination of weather derivatives for the farmer.  
The exogenous indexes can either have a fixed payment per unitary index decrease (for example a 
payment of 1€ per 1mm rainfall shortfall), or be proportional (a decrease of the rainfall of 50% would 
trigger a compensation of the 50% of the insured capital). The yield-tailored examples with multiple 
indicators adjust yield with the estimation of a model combining different indicators. Other yield-
tailored indexes have only one indicator. They optimize the index-yield correlation by the application of 
weights for the different agronomic growth stages. The available examples are calculated for drought 
and use the cumulated precipitation. Their results show that a better correlation is achieved when the 
exogenous single indicator is weighted on the agronomic growth stages. Globally, most of the studies 
agree on the fact that the better or worse results from index products depend fundamentally on the 
correlation existing between the real loss of the farmers and the index analysed.  
The analysis of feasibility of index insurance in the EU should take into account some general 
previous considerations, mainly: 
- Index products are useful for systemic risk, at the aggregated level; consequently they are more 
adapted to reinsurance and catastrophic risks. As Woodard and Garcia (2007) state, limited 
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potential efficacy of weather derivatives has been identified in hedging agricultural exposures. 
However, the potential for weather derivatives in agriculture may be greater than previously thought 
for aggregators of risk such as re/insurers.  
- Index-based products are best suited for homogeneous areas, where all farms have highly 
correlated yields. Given the heterogeneity of climates and geography in many European countries, 
index products efficiency are lower than in the homogeneous areas of the USA (for example, in 
the corn belt). 
- Insurance can be properly designed when yield time-series are available (or losses time series). In 
Europe time series are only available for relatively large regions. Some of these regions (like 
Andalucia or Castilla y Leon in Spain) are very big and heterogeneous. Thus it is difficult to create 
an index that can be useful for all farmers in the region: the use of yield data at a more 
disaggregated level would be advisable or even necessary. 
- If insurance was to be considered within the CAP framework, the subsidies should comply with WTO 
green box criteria. Subsidies to index insurance could be considered as payments (made either 
directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance schemes) for relief from 
natural disasters (Paragraph 8 of Annex 2 of WTO Agreement on Agriculture), because indexes 
are intended to reproduce yield or production risks. However, it is not clear that index insurance by 
its nature can be considered under the Green Box, given that its nature is not to compensate the 
actual loss of an individual, but the loss indicated by a parameter (a farmer that did not suffer from 
a loss could potentially benefit from compensations). Practical difficulties would also arise from the 
requirement of a formal recognition by the Governmental authorities of natural disaster, as it would 
have to be linked to a certain threshold for the indexes used.  
Once analysed these aspects and limitations and other technical issues, we have analysed several 
parameters or indicators which could be potentially used for crop insurances: regional yields which 
could be the basis for area yield insurance (Regional Yield Insurance RYI); some meteorological and 
agro-meteorological parameters; and last, an index from satellite images (NDVI). 
RYI was designed for FADN regions and a number of arable crops. The area index used is Eurostat-
REGIO yield. The fair premium rates for RYI with a trigger of 30% and no deductible oscillate for 
wheat from 0 to 14%, with average of 1.1%. The premium with a 30% deductible was also calculated. 
In this case, the maximum would reach 6.48% and the average 0.25%. With a 15% trigger wheat 
premiums reach the 15.7%. This shows that premium rates are very sensitive to the deductibles and 
trigger levels. The total premium amount can be multiplied by 2 or even up to 6 when reducing the 
trigger from 30% to 15%. The country average fair premiums per hectare oscillate between €4.17 and 
€9.17 for most arable crops, but reach €30,70/ha for potato. 
The final cost or commercial premiums are also estimated under certain assumptions. For RYI with a 
30% trigger and a 50% market penetration (and assuming there is no adverse selection), the total EU-
25 cost could be around of €77.6M for potato, €79.5M for barley and €69.8M for wheat, of which 
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€54.67M, €56M and €49.1 M respectively are the pure premiums. We have assumed here an 
overhead of 42% for management costs, profit, reinsurance, etc.  
Some meteorological indicators were analysed following the model of the area yield-tailored insurance 
from several indicators. An insurance product could be thus designed for each region on the most 
relevant parameter or combination of parameters according to the results. However, these 
combinations of indicators do not explain yields optimally, as the Multiple R-Squared is only 30%. 
Perhaps other indicators should be explored. Besides, it is also possible that there is too much 
heterogeneity within each NUTS2 region and a meteorological yield-tailored index could only have a 
good explanation capacity at a more disaggregate level. The meteorological indices analysis is useful 
to underline that the index risk can differ very much from one European region to another. The 
example shown in Chapter 4.3 aims to explain the level of vulnerability of the same crop, at the same 
development stage can vary as function of climatic conditions. The results of the late frost study 
expresses the need to analyse the climatic risk under many points of view, accounting better for 
physiological aspects related to the crop and additional expertise is needed to aggregate data to reach 
more accurate results. 
The analysis of the agro-meteorological indices is made on a large scale (EU 27); this factor limits the 
quality of the results, because the domain of observations is very wide. There is a wide range of 
climatic differences in Europe. Certain areas suffer lack of water, while other areas face problems due 
to excessive rain, kill frost, etc. This means that is sometimes inappropriate to analyse the same index 
on areas with different limiting factors. Dividing Europe into climatic zones could represent an 
improvement for the analysis; this could help to refine the outputs and to determine which index can 
represent better the yield variability for each zone and each crop. At present, the results suggest many 
directions that could be taken to comprehend how far an index can serve to assess losses due to 
climatic event or to prevent income losses through an insurance scheme based on agro-
meteorological indices.  
Analyses for NDVI (Normalised Difference Vegetation Index) computed on SPOT-VEGETATION 
images, show that the maximum NDVI is a poor indicator of crop yield risk. We have looked at the 
correlations in each FADN region and we have found that the index and yields are not correlated. 
There is a factor influencing negatively in these correlations: the small number of years available (only 
7). However, results improved when taking into account only those maximum NDVI which fall in the 
period when the crop is more sensitive to nutrients and water stresses. This means that the capacity 
of NDVI for explaining yields could be improved by using the maxNDVI of this sensitivity period. On 
the other hand, ongoing activities within the Agriculture Unit of the JRC have proved that the 
correlation between the indicators derived from NDVI and yield is dependent on different regions. A 
study in Spain showed that the max NDVI but also cumulated NDVI values for different periods of the 
growing season are significant. Further analysis could include indicators such as the start NDVI or the 
end NDVI of the growing season; the cumulated NDVI during the length of growing season; and 
cumulated NDVI between start and max NDVI, or between max NDVI and end NDVI of the season. 
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6.2. Main conclusions on the cross-validation 
FADN data are used to compute and map the level of risk of yield reduction with a 30% trigger for 
major field crops at the level of the farm. The concept of risk used corresponds to the long term 
average payment by the insurer to the farmer. This is often labelled in the academic literature as “fair 
premium”, although in practice the commercial premium is higher because of the management costs 
(including loss expertise) and the profit of the insurance company. Two different methodologies using 
FADN data have been used:  
• One method based on the WTO-suggested approach that compares the yield each year with 
the average of previous years 
• A newly developed method, that we have called “2-year constant sample”, that allows to use a 
higher number of FADN data and that takes into account the yield trend in each region.  
The results show a geographic layout without any major surprise, but give a good indication of the 
quantitative level of risk. Preliminary results confirm that the risk level at the scale of the individual 
farm is much higher than the risk level using regional yield averages as trigger of a hypothetical index 
insurance.  
Both approaches give results that are consistent with each other, but the two-year constant sample 
method gives in general slightly lower values for the risk than the 3-year moving average method for 
winter cereals. A possible explanation for this fact is that the WTO does not take into account the long 
term trend. We point out that the practical application of the WTO rule would require a farm-level 
register of yields going at least 3-5 years back; this does not seem to be available in most EU 
countries.  
A spin-off of the study is the characterization of the regional yield trends with different functional 
shapes (linear, quadratic and logarithmic). This is a product that has a value as a tool to improve the 
current procedures of yield forecasting. However some additional work is necessary to collect time 
series of yields longer and more complete than the data available in the REGIO database. 
The analysis of the income reduction risk is made by farm type instead of by crop. The application of 
the same methods to the income level measured through FNVA (Farm Net Value Added) is more 
problematic. We find a conceptual challenge in the application of the “30% deductible” when the 
average income in the previous year(s) is very low or even negative: What does it mean “a loss of 
more than 30% of the average income of the previous three years” when this average is negative? 
This inconvenient has been skipped by eliminating “awkward” ratios, but we have to warn that this 
may have a strong impact on the results, probably reducing the computed levels of risk. Even with this 
data cleaning implying a reduction of apparent risk, the risk levels computed for the income reduction 
are much higher than the risk of yield reduction. The reason for that is easy to understand: assuming 
relatively stable prices, a yield reduction of 30% correspond to an income reduction of much more 
than 30%, because the cost of production does not decrease with the yield. An alternative concept 
has been analysed: the value of production, or revenue, for which the estimated risk is much closer to 
the risk of yield reduction. 
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The cross validation of area yield insurance with FADN data showed, as could be expected, that the 
risk reduction capacity of yield area index is not very high for the case analysed. We can expect that 
the results do not depend from the crop type, but on the scale of the analysis. Besides, we have to 
take into account that it was underestimated due to the data constraints (the percentage indemnities 
were multiplied by actual farm yields and not by average or expected farm yields). However, there are 
some regions where the risk can be reduced up to a 68%. These results have to be considered 
cautiously, given that the correlations between Eurostat yields and FADN yield averages are often 
weak.  
The test for risk reduction capacity of other indexes could be done. However, it would be expected to 
be lower than the one from yield area index, given that theoretically regional yield area should 
describe the behaviour of farm yield better than other indexes at a regional scale. 
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8. List of acronyms 
 
AIDA  Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance-Canada 
AGR  Adjusted Gross Revenue 
APH  Actual Production History 
AWU  Annual Work Unit 
B  Billion 
CAIS   Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization 
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy 
CHU  Corn Heat Unit 
CGMS  Crop Growth Monitoring System 
CRC  Crop Revenue Coverage 
CRMG  Commodity Risk Management Group 
MVC NDVI Maximum Value Composite NDVI 
DG-AGRI Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development 
EC   European Community 
ENSO  El Nino-Southern Oscillation 
ERHT  Excessive Rain at Harvest Time 
ESU  European Standard Unit 
EU   European Union 
FADN   Farm Accounting Data Network 
FCDD  Factores Climaticos Dañinos Diarios 
FNVA  Farm Net Value Added 
FWC  Financial weather contracts 
GRP  Group Risk Plan (USA) 
GRIP  Group Risk Income Protection (USA) 
GRIP  Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (Canadian) 
HDD  Heating Degree Days 
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ICICI  Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
IFC  International Finance Corporation 
IP  Income Protection 
JRC  Joint Research Centre (European Commission) 
LGM  Livestock Gross Margin 
LRP  Livestock Risk Protection 
M   Million 
MVC NDVI Maximum Value Composite NDVI 
MS   European Union’s Member State 
NDVI  Normalised Difference Vegetation Index 
NOAA   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NUTS  Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques 
RA  Revenue Assurance 
RSM  Relative Soil Moisture 
RYI  Regional Yield Insurance 
SADC  Southern Africa Development Community 
SGM  Standard Gross Margin 
SI  Satellite Imagery 
SHR  Selyaninov Hydrothermal Ratio 
T  Metric ton 
TWC  Total Water Consumption 
USA / US  United States of America 
UK  United Kingdom 
VP  Value of Production 
WB  World Bank 
WD  Weather derivatives 
WI  Weather index insurance contract 
WLSOW Water Limited Storage Organs Weight 
WTO  Word Trade Organisation 
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Countries acronyms 
 
FADN  Eursotat  
BEL Belgium  AT Austria  
CYP Cyprus  BE Belgium  
CZE Czech Republic  CY Cyprus  
DAN Denmark  CZ Czech Republic  
DEU Germany  DE Germany  
ELL Greece  DK Denmark  
ESP Spain  EE Estonia  
EST Estonia  ES Spain  
FRA France  FI Finland  
HUN Hungary  FR France  
IRE Ireland  GR Greece  
ITA Italy  HU Hungary  
LTU Lithuania  IE Ireland  
LUX Luxembourg  IT Italy  
LVA Latvia  LT Lithuania  
NED Netherlands  LU Luxembourg  
OST Austria  LV  Latvia  
POL Poland  NL Netherlands  
POR Portugal  PL Poland  
SUO Finland  PT Portugal  
SVE Sweden  SE Sweden  
SVK Slovak Republic  SI Slovenia  
SVN Slovenia  SK Slovak Republic  
UKI United Kingdom  UK  United Kingdom  
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9. Annexes 
9.1. Annex 2A. Summary of the report on Agricultural Insurance Systems 
(AGRINSUR-I) 
As mentioned above, this study is a continuation of the study on “Agricultural Insurance Schemes” 
(AGRINSUR-I), by Bielza et al. (2006). The main points and conclusions from the study were:  
The economic situation of farms has a strong variability for several reasons:  
- Policy reforms: trade agreements and market liberalisation (reduction of prices). 
- An unbalances relationship with retailers better organised to put pressure on prices. 
- Risk of animal diseases 
- Climate change: There is a general perception that the frequency and intensity of extreme 
meteorological events is growing. 
The AGRINSUR-I study makes a review of the agricultural risks management systems in Europe (EU-
27) with a special focus on agricultural insurance. The role of Governments is analyzed for every 
country: offering or subsidizing insurances and providing aid ex-post. Most information comes from 
fact sheets collected from experts or consultants in the different countries.  
The definition of crisis and disasters is rather generic. More precise definitions can be found for the 
authorisation of state aids in case of disaster or adverse climatic conditions. The positions of Member 
States in authorising these aids are analysed and compared with the “Community guidelines for State 
Aid in the Agriculture Sector” (EC, 2006b) and with the Regulation on the same topic (EC, 2006a). 
Aid is sometimes given on an ad-hoc basis through compensation schemes, or finds, partially 
financed by the agricultural sector (on a voluntary or compulsory basis). Mutual funds, calamity funds 
and ad-hoc payments existing in European countries are summarised.  
Agricultural insurances are fostered in a number of countries, where the law forbids that ad-hoc 
measures or disaster funds compensate damages that could have been insured. The levels of ad-hoc 
payments per country are compared.  
The different types of agricultural insurance systems in Europe and key figures in each country are 
analysed. Some technicalities are described, such as reinsurance, triggers and deductibles.  
The relationship between Government involvement and insurance development is highlighted. Usually 
private companies insure only hail and fire, and the government subsidies and public reinsurance are 
needed to make possible the insurance of agricultural systemic risks. 
One conclusion is that the risk management tools available in the Member States (MS) could be 
further developed. However, given the heterogeneous situation in the MS, the interest of a 
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harmonised EU-wide system of agricultural insurances is debatable. Conditions for a feasible EU-wide 
insurance scheme are analysed and classified into a) decisions of the policy makers (political criteria); 
b) decisions of the private sector: insurers, re-insurers and farmers (socio-economic); and c) technical 
conditions. 
The existing insurance level is generally insufficient to smooth significant income reduction in bad 
years. The possible amount of costs of an EU-supported insurance system has been roughly 
quantified for a few hypothetical scenarios, under given assumptions. The feasibility of control 
systems and the technical aspects are analysed. 
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9.2. Annex 2B. The Income Stabilization project 
Within the 6th Framework Program for the Research and Technological Development (RTD), there 
was a horizontal activity called “Scientific Support to Policies”. It was in the frame of the call of 
proposals of this activity in October 2003 that a project on risk management was selected under the 
Task “Crisis/risk management tools”. The full name of the project was: “Design and economic impact 
of risk management tools for European agriculture”, but it is better known by its acronym “Income 
Stabilization”. It started mid-2005 and finished in March 2008.  
The Income Stabilisation Project, with 7 partners from 5 countries, was co-ordinated by the University 
of Wageningen. It was structured in 7 work packages (additional to WP1, management). It has the 
particularity that it had several potential overlaps and complementary aspects with the AGRINSUR-I 
project, so contacts were established and several meetings scheduled to ensure synergy between 
both projects. Especially Work Package 4 was particularly similar to the AGRINSUR-I project, 
although there are major differences: The AGRINSUR-I project was more specifically focused on EU-
27 and on insurances, rather than generic risk management strategies. Another difference is that the 
AGRINSUR-I project had an additional target of exploring methods to map the variability of yield that 
can endanger a suitable farm income.  
The aim of the Income Stabilisation project (Meuwissen et al. 2008) was to analyse the opportunities 
that risk management tools offer for stabilising farm incomes in the European Union in the 
contemporary context of new agricultural risks, an enlarged European Union, changing views about 
eligible forms of income support and disaster relief, and on-going developments at international risk 
management markets. Results present a representative cross-section of European farming, i.e. risk 
exposure, risk perception and economic impact issues have been studied in depth for 5 member 
states, i.e. Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. 
The project had three pillars: (1) a detailed analysis of farmers’ risk exposure in the past and projected 
risks in the future; (2) a review of risk management experience and farmers’ perceptions of risk; and 
(3) the economic impact of and policy options for viable risk management instruments. 
(1) Risk exposure 
Past risk exposure. This component of the project thoroughly analysed farm-level data from the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) in order to provide insight into the volatility of farmers’ risk 
exposure and into the chances of facing catastrophically low production, price or income levels. 
Specific research objectives included: (i) to provide insight into farm-level production, price and 
income distributions, including downside risk; (ii) to make a clear distinction between normal income 
fluctuations and income crises; and (iii) to discuss the usefulness of FADN data for measuring 
farmers’ income (crisis) risk. Its main conclusion: Data from FADN can partly provide insight into the 
wide range of on-farm risks. 
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Future risk exposure: what can we expect in the next ten years? Since risks are constantly 
changing, data from the past generally tell only part of the story. This component of the project 
provided insight into the impact of future World Trade Organisation (WTO) and CAP scenarios on 
farmers’ risk exposure and risk management opportunities. Research objectives were (i) to define 
likely future CAP and WTO scenarios with their implications for price, production and farm income; (ii) 
to analyse the impact of these scenarios on price, production and income probability distributions of 
farmers in the European Union; and (iii) to analyse the impact of these scenarios on the chances of 
catastrophically low incomes. Its main conclusion: Increasing levels of liberalisation do not seem to 
lead to widespread negative effects on the stability of farm-incomes in the EU, although vulnerability 
differs significantly across farm types and member states. 
(2) Risk management experience and perception 
Review of the international risk management arena. This part of the project reviewed historical, 
current and developing risk management instruments, both within the European Union and in non-EU 
countries. Research objectives were (i) to report on successful and unsuccessful risk management 
instruments; and (ii) to analyse the major characteristics of these schemes (e.g. the risks covered and 
the underwriting criteria applied), and their performance and economic impact. Its main conclusion: 
There is an increasing variety of risk management instruments, including tools to capture the problem 
of asymmetric information. Public sector involvement can (still) lead to undesired incentives.  
Risk and risk management perception. Risk analyses by scientists do not necessarily correspond to 
the perception of risks by farmers. Also, what may be perceived as theoretically promising risk 
management instruments may not work well for farmers. Research objectives of this component of the 
project were: (i) to analyse farmers’ perceptions of (crisis) risk and (crisis) risk management; and (ii) to 
analyse farmers’ perceptions of the role of various possible risk financing partners, ranging from their 
own role to that of national and European governments. Its main conclusion: Risk perception varies 
considerably across member states. Price and weather risk however is generally perceived to be most 
threatening.  
(3) Economic impact and policy options 
The economics of risk management instruments. Theoretically ideal concepts may not work well at 
the farm level, or may just be too costly. This component of the project modelled the economic impact 
of potential risk management instruments for the European Union. Research objectives included: (i) to 
select promising risk management instruments, including purely private instruments, public-private 
partnership instruments and entirely public risk management instruments; (ii) to develop a whole-farm 
optimisation model and to analyse the economic impact of potential risk management instruments at 
farm level, including their impact on production decisions and on the level of (crisis) risk; and (iii) to 
analyse the budgetary impact of potential risk management instruments. Its main conclusion: Despite 
application of a portfolio of prospective risk management instruments, substantial on-farm income 
volatility remains. Also, on-farm diversification seems to have its limitations. 
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Policy options for risk management. The various themes of the project, i.e. risk exposure, risk 
management experience, risk perception and the economic impact of various schemes, were brought 
together in the final component of the project. The main research objective was to synthesise all 
previous project components in order to come up with policy options for (crisis) risk management that 
are feasible from a design and budgetary point of view, legitimate in CAP and WTO frameworks, and 
interesting for farmers. Its main conclusion: For normal on-farm enterprise risk, infrastructural 
improvements are needed. For crisis risk, rules need to be set at EU level, but premium subsidies 
should be avoided. 
General conclusions from the project include: 
(1) There is not sufficient data to accurately and instantly assess farmers’ income risk. FADN data 
are worthwhile for farm-level risks, but only partly and retrospectively. Off-farm income data are 
largely lacking.  
(2) Income risk measures and methods used throughout the analyses ( i.e. income variation at 
individual farm level, shortfall risk and whole-farm modelling), provide insight into the wide 
variety of income risks faced by EU farmers. 
(3) Eastern EU finetuning among stakeholders disclosed that there is not a commonly shared risk 
management perception, knowledge and view on the prospects of (innovative) risk management 
solutions.  
(4) Due to established differences among EU-farming, both in risk exposure, risk perception and 
whole-farm consequences, risk management solutions need to be “tailor-made”. However, from 
an analytical perspective, premium subsidies are nowhere to be preferred. Moreover, all risk 
management instruments require careful and proper design.   
From the experiences from the project, also a number of issues for further research have been 
identified: 
(1) Public sector involvement in on-farm risk management. If, from a political perspective, this 
option is considered, further research is needed to transparently set the rules for support and 
design. Rules should aim at public involvement leading to “crowding in private markets” instead 
of “crowding out” these markets. 
(2) Crisis risk assessment. As FADN data did not fully allow to analyse farm-level effects of crisis 
risk, further analyses should be directed towards specific risks such as liability risk and 
disruptions through environmental damages. 
 
The project as a whole seems to us a very complete and interdisciplinary analysis on the risk 
management current debate. Moreover, it combines the inputs of academics and scientific experts 
with those of the main actors of risk management: mainly famers and also insurance companies. We 
found a big strength of the project in the open discussions, which were not only limited to the project 
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partners but also counted with the collaboration of many external agents and experts in the risk 
management field. Overall, our general impression of the project is very positive even if we found that 
some of its final statements stay unclear to us; for instance the conclusion on avoiding subsidies to 
insurance, whose motivation does not seem sufficiently explained.  
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9.3. Annex 2C. WTO Uruguay Round Agreements on Agriculture (Annex 2) 
 
7. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programmes 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss, taking into account only 
income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 30 per cent of average gross income or the 
equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the same or similar schemes) in the 
preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, 
excluding the highest and the lowest entry. Any producer meeting this condition shall be eligible to 
receive the payments. 
(b) The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 per cent  f the producer's income 
loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to receive this assistance. 
(c) The amount of any such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall not relate to the type or 
volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer; or to the prices, domestic 
or international, applying to such production; or to the factors of production employed. 
(d) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under paragraph 
8 (relief from natural disasters), the total of such payments shall be less than 100 per cent of the 
producer's total loss. 
8. Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop 
insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall arise only following a formal recognition by government 
authorities that a natural or like disaster (including disease outbreaks, pest infestations, nuclear 
accidents, and war on the territory of the Member concerned) has occurred or is occurring; and shall 
be determined by a production loss which exceeds 30 per cent of the average of production in the 
preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, 
excluding the highest and the lowest entry. 
(b) Payments made following a disaster shall be applied only in respect of losses of income, livestock 
(including payments in connection with the veterinary treatment of animals), land or other production 
factors due to the natural disaster in question. 
(c) Payments shall compensate for not more than the total cost of replacing such losses and shall not 
require or specify the type or quantity of future production. 
(d) Payments made during a disaster shall not exceed the level required to prevent or alleviate further 
loss as defined in criterion (b) above. 
(e) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under paragraph 
7 (income insurance and income safety-net programmes), the total of such payments shall be less 
than 100 per cent of the producer's total loss. 
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9.4. Annex 3A. Examples of index insurances per countries 
 
9.4.1. Examples of area index insurances  
9.4.1.1. Europe (Sweden and United Kingdom) 
In the 50’s, Sweden was managing an insurance program based on the yield and revenue of 
geographic areas (Skees and Hartell, 2004).  
In the United Kingdom an area revenue insurance programme was launched in 1998 based upon the 
yield statistics of the Home Grown Cereals Authority and upon the LIFFE commodity futures prices. 
The cover provided indemnity for a 10% fall in yield and a 5% fall in price. Premium rates varied 
depending of the region from 1.10% to 3.5%. Take up was minimal and the product offering was 
cancelled in the following season. 
 
9.4.1.2. India 
In India, in 2004 a pilot program was introduced by the public insurance company AIC(Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India Limited). It is called “Farm Income Insurance Scheme” (FIIS) and is a 
area revenue insurance product. Indemnities are calculated as the difference between guaranteed 
revenue and actual revenue. Guaranteed revenue results from a basic price times the 7 year average 
yield of the district. The area actual revenue is calculated from district yields and a weighted average 
price provided by several local “Agricultural Produce Market Committees” at district or at state level. It 
applies for rice and wheat, and losses due to bad yields are covered when they are due to the 
following perils: flood, inundation, storm, cyclone, hailstorm, landslide, drought, dry spells, and large-
scale outbreak of pests/diseases. The scheme is compulsory for loanee farmers and voluntary for 
non-loanee farmers. It is subsidized in a 75% for small and marginal farmers and 50% for other 
farmers. Given that appropriate rating methodology is not available at this stage, and that the 
guarantee price is completely independent from market price, the Government has the compromise to 
bear the claims above the year’s collected premiums. In Parbhani district of Maharashtra state for 
wheat crop during the rabi (spring) season 2003-2004, 981 wheat growers participated, and the loss 
ratio for the district was 1.34 (Bhise et al. 2007). 
 
9.4.1.3. Mongolia 
One particular case has been included in the area indices: it is the case of Mongolia. In the last years, 
Mongolia’s shepherds have suffered important losses due to weather calamities such as the winter 
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thunderstorms. Given the nature of highly correlated death rates for animals in Mongolia, an index-
based livestock insurance (IBLI) product was proposed and in May 2005, and the World Bank 
approved a loan to Mongolia to finance the Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project.. The major 
objective of the pilot program is to determine the viability of IBLI including testing herders’ willingness 
to pay for the IBLI product. The index is based on area mortality rates by species and by province 
(number of adult animals dead divided by the number of total animals censed in the area at the 
beginning of the year). Indemnities would be triggered when the mortality rate is above a certain 
threshold. The indemnity would be function of the mortality rate multiplied by the protection value (or 
insured value) bought by the shepherd. This scheme was never made before, and it is possible 
because Mongolia performs a complete census of every species each year (Skees et al. 2005). 
Elaborate systems are in place to assure the quality of the data. 
A traditional insurance on animal mortality would be hindered by several factors. The width of the 
territory in which shepherds take more than 30 million animals to pasture results in that the insurance 
of single heads would not work; even the most simple question, which is the identification of the 
propriety of the heads would demand very high transaction costs; besides, there are multiple 
possibilities of fraud and abuses and the monitoring costs needed to avoid them would be high (Skees 
& Hartell, 2004).  
The project will support continued research to strengthen the mortality index by incorporating other 
indexes, for example, the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), as a means of establishing 
a more secure index for paying losses. (WB, 2005). 
Mongolia’s insurance market is a nascent market with extremely limited access to global risk-shifting 
markets, so significant financial exposure for this market remains among the largest challenges. Given 
concerns about financing extreme losses, the pilot design involves a syndicate pooling arrangement 
for companies. Herder premiums go directly into a prepaid indemnity pool. In the short term, the 
government of Mongolia will offer a 105 percent stop-loss on the pooled risk of the insurance 
companies. Once the reinsurance pool is exhausted, the government of Mongolia can call upon the 
contingent debt to pay for any remaining losses. In the long-term vision, the syndicate will be well 
positioned to find risk-sharing partners in the global community quickly. Reinsurers might be willing to 
provide capital and enter quotashare arrangements on that risk (WB, 2005).  
 
9.4.1.4. Morocco 
Drought insurance has been offered in Morocco since 1995-96. This scheme was implemented 
(private but Government subsidized) following the recommendations of the report ARML (1993). This 
insurance scheme has three guarantee levels, each of which has a different threshold and provides a 
different fixed indemnity. Of course, there are three different premiums according to the levels. In 
order for the insurance scheme to begin making indemnity payments, an official drought declaration 
must be made. At Level 1 (the lowest coverage level), the insurance pay-out is based on the realized 
average area yield for the rural commune. For the other two levels, the pay-out is based on 
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assessments of the individual farm’s realized yield. The formula for indemnification is non-
proportional:  
Indemnification/ha= Insured level/ha – Unit Price x Yield 
For further information on the Moroccan drought insurance scheme see Skees et al. (2001). 
 
9.4.1.5. USA 
While the price component of existing USA revenue insurance products is based on an index, the 
insurance products GRP, GRIP, LRP and LGM are the only current Federal Crop Insurance Program 
(FCIP) products that base indemnities completely on the realized value of an underlying index 
(Barnett, 2004).   
The Group Risk Plan or GRP has been offered since 1993. For the U.S. GRP program, indemnities 
are calculated as follows: 
ueinsuredval
levelGuaranteed
indexlevellevelGuaranteedIndemnity ×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= ,0max  where the “index level” is the 
effective yield of the county where the farm is located (Skees, Black and Barnett, 1997), and the 
“guaranteed level” is the product of the coverage level selected by he policy buyer and the official 
estimate of the county’s expected unitary yield. The choice of coverage level can be from 70% to 90%. 
The county’s expected unitary yield is estimated from a detrended series of  45 years county yield 
data. The “insured value” is the product of the county’s expected yield, the official estimate of the 
price, the coverage level, the scale  and the crop surface in the farm. The scale is also chosen by the 
producer, depending on how is his individual expected yield in relation with the county yield, and it can 
vary from 90% to 150%.  
The GRP type of contract is also defined as “proportional” because the yield reduction is measured as 
a percentage of the guaranteed level. An interesting characteristic  of proportional contracts is that 
they have a “disappearing deductible”: as the index becomes closer to zero, the indemnity tends to 
100% of the insured value, with independence of the coverage level chosen (Skees & Hartell, 2004). 
Barnett et al. (2005)  compare risk reduction from MPCI and GRP crop insurance contracts. The 
analysis is based on the actual GRP indemnity function rather than the area-yield indemnity function 
commonly used in the literature. Even with a number of conservative assumptions favouring MPCI 
relative to GFtP, results indicate that at least for some crops and regions GRP is a viable alternative to 
MPCI. 
Later, a similar policy was developed and commercialised: Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP). In 
this program, the index is an “area revenue”, that is, the product of the area yield times the price of the 
specific product. In 2004, both area yield and area revenue policies accounted for 7.4 % of total 
acreage insured but less than 3 % of total premiums. The average loss rate (indemnities/premiums) of 
GRP on its activity period prior to 2004 was 90%. 
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Barnett (2004) reviews GRP and GRIP, and compare them with the USA’s traditional farm-level crop 
insurance product known as Actual Production History (APH) multiple-peril crop insurance. Besides, 
he discusses the new livestock index insurance products, which are in fact price insurance products: 
Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) and Livestock Risk Protection (LRP). Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) 
protects against decreases in the market value of insured cattle or swine. Livestock Gross Margin 
(LGM), which is available only for swine, protects against decreases in the margin between the market 
value of the animal and the cost of feed inputs.  Both are index insurance products because 
indemnities are based not on actual prices received and/or paid by the producer but rather on 
changes in futures market prices (the index) for the animal (in the case of LRP) or the animal and feed 
inputs (in the case of LGM) during the life of the insurance policy. Thus, both products are, in essence, 
derivatives based on exchange-traded futures contracts. When comparing LRP and LGM to GRP and 
GRIP, it is important to note that price risk (for livestock and major crops) tends to be much more 
systemic than crop production risk.  Crop production shortfalls in one region of the U.S. do not 
necessarily imply crop production shortfalls in other regions. In contrast, price increases or decreases 
are much more likely to affect all producers, regardless of where their farms are located.  This means 
that, in general, one would expect less basis risk for index insurance products such as LRP and LGM 
that provide price risk protection, compared to products like GRP (GRIP) that protect against yield 
(revenue) risk (Barnett, 2004).   
 
9.4.2. Examples of weather index insurances 
9.4.2.1. Austria 
In Austria an index is applied for the coverage of drought in yield insurance since 2007. 
 
9.4.2.2. Canada 
In 2000, after a serious drought, Ontario has introduced an index insurance based on rainfall. It was 
developed by the State agricultural insurance corporation, Agricorp. The Agricorp forage plan protects 
farmers against forage crop losses with rainfall insurance settled on local weather stations. The 
scheme enjoyed great success with farmers and increasing participation rates. Rates are subsidized 
at around 50%. The scheme matured from a pilot program to a normal insurance product in 
2003/2004 (Stoppa and Hess, 2003). 
AFSC also developed for Alberta a lack-of-moisture insurance where Spring Soil Moisture is used to 
estimate moisture conditions at the beginning of the growing season for pasture and silage producers. 
Rainfall information is also collected for the months of May, June and July to determine the payments. 
In 2002, around 4,000 livestock farmers have bought this contract. 
Last, corn producers in Alberta can use a temperature index to insure their losses of silage. The 
Agriculture Financial Services Corp. (AFSC), the Canadian financial crown corporation of Alberta, has 
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been offering Corn Heat Unit insurance program, a weather index-based insurance product offered to 
protect farmers against the financial impact of negative variations in yield for irrigated grain and silage 
corn. The contract is designed to insure against lack of Corn Heat Units (CHU) over the growing 
season. It has been offered on a pilot basis since 2000 and was planned to last until 2005. The 
program is scheduled for a thorough evaluation to assess its impact over the year 2006.  
The CHU index falls into the Growing Degree Day category, and represents the energy available for 
the development of corn. Given the small window for agricultural production in Canada, the availability 
of sufficient solar energy is vital for the development of this crop. The index has been designed to 
indemnify the policyholder against an annual CHU below Threshold Corn Heat Unit (TCHU) level at 
the specified weather station. The CHU is estimated from daily maximum and minimum temperature, 
beginning on May 15 each year. The Celsius-based formula used to calculate daily CHUs is defined 
as follows (Brown and Bootsma, 1993): 
maxmin 5.05.0 YYCHU ×+×=        (1) 
[ ]4.45/9 minmin −×= TY     (2) 
[ ] [ ]2maxmaxmax 10084.00.1033.3 −×−−×= TTY  (3) 
where Tmin and Tmax are the daily minimum and maximum temperatures, respectively. 
The daily CHU values are calculated from these temperatures. The daytime relationship involving 
Tmax, uses 10°C as the base temperature (if Tmax is less than 10, its value is set at 10) and 30°C as the 
optimum temperature, as warm-season crops do not develop when daytime temperatures fall below 
10°C and develop at a maximum rate at around 30°C. The nighttime relationship involving Tmin uses 
4.4°C as the base temperature below which daily crop development stops. (If Tmin is less than 4.4, its 
value is set at 4.4.). The CHU value is calculated by taking into account the functional relationship 
between daytime and nighttime temperatures and the daily rate of crop development, as shown in 
Brown and Bootsma (1993). The accumulation of CHU stops on the first day on which a minimum 
temperature of minus two degrees Celsius or less is recorded, after 700 CHU have been 
accumulated. This means the accumulation continues until the first killing frost hits the crop. An early 
frost setback is also built into the AFSC calculation (WB, 2005) 
The weather data for settlement of the contracts are provided by the federal and provincial weather 
stations and compiled by the Irrigation Branch of the Alberta Government. Contract end users can 
select a weather station for the settlement from the federal and provincial stations available, choosing 
the station that best represents the temperatures on their farms. Weather stations used for CHU 
insurance are divided into three groups based on similar historical heat accumulations. Weather 
stations within each group have similar threshold options, premium rates, and loss payment functions. 
When buying the insurance policy, farmers must elect the dollar coverage per acre, select the weather 
station for settlement purposes, and indicate if they prefer a hail endorsement to the contract or the 
variable price benefit. 
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The farmer must insure all the seeded acres of eligible corn and must insure a minimum of five acres 
for each crop: grain and silage crops are considered separate for the purposes of referring to a 
specific insurance contract.  
Since the lack of heat units affects grain corn more than it does silage corn, the table of premium and 
payment rates differs for the two types of crop. The actual premium and payment rates are not 
available for public disclosure. The formula to calculate the indemnity for each insurable crop is given 
by the following equation: 
 
Indemnity = Dollar coverage per acre x Payment rate x Number of Insured Acres 
 
If a farmer chose to insure one hundred acres at $225 per acre, for example, and the accumulated 
CHU payment rate was 30 percent of the expected level, a claim of $6,750 dollars would result. The 
maximum indemnity payable is 100 percent of the Dollar Coverage per Acre (including the additional 
dollar coverage if a Variable Price Benefit is activated) multiplied by the number of insured acres. 
Claims are based on accumulated CHUs calculated using the temperature data recorded at the 
selected weather station. CHUs accumulated before the killing frost are compared to the threshold 
chosen by the producer at the weather station. If the annual CHUs are less than a chosen threshold, 
the insurance program starts to make payments according to a predetermined table. The further the 
annual CHUs are below the threshold, the greater the insurance payment. Producers can choose 
between two deductibles or threshold options: High and Low “Trigger”, which are approximately the 95 
and 90% of the long-term normal CHU. Payments begin sooner under the high threshold option, so 
this choice has a higher cost than the low threshold option. 
The main peril for producers is lack of heat during the growing season, but this insurance plan also 
includes a provision for late spring frost. A late spring frost can set back corn plant growth and affect 
production. To trigger this provision, a temperature of less than zero degrees Celsius must be 
recorded on or after June 1 and prior to the recording of 700 CHUs at the weather station. If both 
these conditions are met, 50 CHUs will be deducted from the accumulated total CHUs at the end of 
the year for the first day and an additional 15 CHUs will be deducted for every other day between 
June 1 and the day the frost in question occurred. 
It is important to point out that the CHU contract with the hail endorsement is designed to protect corn 
against two major perils: lack of heat and hail. The grain and silage corn farmers are also eligible for 
traditional crop insurance contracts based on individual records; nevertheless, the premiums are lower 
for the CHU contract because of AFSC’s reduced transaction costs. It should also be noted that the 
premiums paid by the farmers for the CHU contract are subsidized by approximately 55 percent, so 
the farmer pays only 45 percent of the cost of the contract. The subsidy is 40 percent for the hail 
endorsement. The federal and provincial governments coshare the financial burden of the program, 
and they subsidize all AFSC’s administration costs (WB, 2005). 
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9.4.2.3. Ethiopia 
To address the drought and food-insecurity situation in Ethiopia, two agricultural risk management 
structures were being considered in 2005 (WB, 2005): one at the farmer or microlevel and the other at 
the government or macrolevel. Both at the macro and the micro level, the scarcity of weather data in 
the country limits the scope of the project in its first years. 
At the microlevel, the state-owned Ethiopia Insurance Corporation (EIC) planned to launch a small 
pilot program (for which it receives technical support from the World Bank). It was due to start in April 
2006, and it consists on a weather insurance program for wheat and pepper farmers in southern 
Ethiopia, in the woreda (district) of Alaba. The products would be similar in concept to the products 
offered to farmers in India, but it will be sold at the group rather than individual level (to ‘kebeles’ or 
small groups of farmers and to farming cooperatives) 
At the macrolevel, lack of rainfall in the critical months of August and September is the dominant, 
immediate cause triggering emergency relief operations in Ethiopia. The macrolevel structure consists 
on an index-based weather insurance as a reliable, timely and cost-effective way of funding 
emergency operations. Risks would be passed to the international reinsurance market. It does not aim 
to serve the food-insecure population, but the 35% of the population above the chronically food-
insecure who are fully vulnerable to become so in the case of a drought as such the one in 1984.  
The scheme was under study by the World Bank and the United Nations World Food Programme 
(WFP). WFP launched a pilot experience, by putting in place a small hedge for Ethiopia’s 2006 
agricultural season from March to October 2006. The aim was to demonstrate the possibility of 
indexing and transferring the weather risks of least-developed countries and facilitating price discovery 
for Ethiopian drought risk in international financial markets. The index must be based on a weighted 
average, or “basket”, of as many stations as possible to capture the macrolevel nature of the risk the 
Government faces. So, the 2006 index pilot was based on a basket of 26 weather stations distributed 
throughout the agricultural producing areas of the country. The correlation (R2) of the WFP drought 
index and the number of food aid beneficiaries between 1994 and 2004 was around 80%. (Hess et al. 
2006). In the pilot stage of the program, the WFP was the counterparty to any commercial transaction 
with the international risk market, and donors would pay for the premium associated to the risk 
transfer. The ultimate aim of the initiative would be for the Government to go directly to the market and 
take responsibility for the risk management program as part of its overall long-term poverty reduction 
strategy.  
Let’s have a look at the design of the insurance (WFP, 2006). After a selection of the weather stations 
with the most complete datasets (42 from the 600 available), spatial analysis techniques were used to 
assign woredas (districts), and hence rural populations, to the 42 selected rainfall stations. The 
objective was to find woredas whose normalized vegetation index13 (NDVI) patterns correlated with 
rainfall recorded at each of the 42 stations. For a more detailed information on spatial analysis see 
                                                     
13 For insurance products based on NDVI see next section on satellite imagery index insurances 
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WFP 2006. After the spatial analysis, only 26 of the 42 stations initially considered were finally 
selected for the pilot project. 
In Ethiopia there are two main rainfall periods: (i) the kiremt, associated with the meher main growing 
season accounting for 95 percent of national production, and (ii) the belg, the minor rainfall and 
growing season that accounts for 5 percent of national production, but whose rains are important in 
vulnerable areas and vital for pasture regeneration, water supply and planting of long-cycle crops. The 
FAO Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (WRSI) established how production of the dominant crops 
grown in each micro-climate can be indexed to rainfall amount and distribution. The pilot project uses 
the USGS/FEWS-NET WRSI (Senay and Verdin 2003), a modified version of the FAO WRSI (Frere 
and Popov (1986) to index crop yield to rainfall variability. There are many more robust and data-
intensive physically-based crop models available, but the FAO WRSI model has the advantages of its 
limited data requirements and simplicity in operational use. It has been successfully tested Senay and 
Verdin made it an operational model with some modifications in the algorithm.    
WRSI is an indicator of crop performance based on water availability during the growing season, 
calculated using a crop water balance model. Studies by FAO have shown that WRSI can be related 
to crop production using a linear yield-reduction function specific to the crop in question (FAO, 1986). 
WRSI is defined as the ratio of seasonal actual evapotranspiration experienced by a crop to the crop’s 
seasonal water requirement; hence it monitors water deficits throughout the growing season, taking 
into account the phenological stages of a crop’s evolution and the periods when water is most critical 
to growth. The WRSI model was initially developed for use with weather station data to monitor the 
supply and demand of water for a rain-fed crop during the growing season. The model currently is 
used by FEWS-NET as one of the operational remote-sensing products to monitor agricultural areas 
around the world for signs of drought on a near-real-time, spatial and continuous basis using a 
combination of satellite-derivative rainfall estimates and rain-gauge data from the GTS to compute 
WRSI values (Senay and Verdin, 2003). 
The inputs and data sources required to calibrate the WRSI model for an area and a crop during a 
growing season include: 
i) cumulative decade rainfall (mm) for the 26 rainfall stations 
ii) average decade potential evapo-transpiration (PET) (mm) for the 26 rainfall stations 
iii) the water-holding capacity (WHC) (mm) of the soil 
iv) crop coefficients (Kc) for each crop; Kc values define the water-use pattern and are 
defined for each of the critical phenological points of a crop’s evolution 
v) maximum crop root depth (m) and the allowable depletion fraction 
vi) seasonal yield-response factors (Ky) for each crop to convert WRSI values to yield 
estimates   
WRSI can be related to crop production or yield estimate by using the following linear yield-reduction 
function: 
Actual Yield (AY)=1-(1-WSRI)*Seasonal Ky*Maximum Yield 
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The study was performed for the staple crops in Ethiopia: maize, teff, and sorghum, together with 
millet, wheat and barley. These crops were given weights based on their average-area-planted ratios 
(αcrop) for each woreda, and thus constituted a staple crop basket. Production per hectare for the 
staple crop basket of each woreda, Yw, is therefore defined as follows:  
Yw=αMaizeAYMaize+αSorghumAYSorghum+αMilletAYMillet+αTeffAYTeff+αWheatAYWheat+αBarleyAYBarley  
and 
αMaize+αSorghum+αMillet+αTeff+αWheat+αBarley=1 
Indexing the staple crop production in this way established an objective indicator for household 
production per unit area cultivated for each woreda. For more details on the model see WFP 2006. 
Vulnerable or at-risk households were characterised for each woreda: number, size, income, income 
sources, asset (mainly livestock) holdings and farm choices. Income from agricultural production was 
estimated to average 68 percent of total income (HI) for vulnerable households. The impact of 
production variations in the staple-crop basket on at-risk household in each woreda was modelled. 
The following relationship was assumed between deviations in production per unit area, measured by 
the staple-crop basket WRSI, and agricultural income losses per at-risk household: 
Drought-related agricultural income loss per at-risk household = expected at-risk household 
agricultural income under normal (non-drought) conditions x % deviation of Yw from median  
Last, household purchasing power is reduced as a result from increased market prices associated 
with extreme drought. So, a market-price inflation factor was added to the model to ensure that 
income losses are adjusted upwards to compensate for reduced household purchasing power. A 
simple price-inflation factor was calculated for each woreda by considering the staple-crop basket for 
the woreda and multiplying the proportion of each crop in the basket by the approximate price 
increase observed for it in 2002, Ethiopia’s last extreme drought year. These price increases were 
200% for maize, and between 115 and 150% for the rest of the crops. 
The final index of livelihood losses for at-risk beneficiaries is defined as follows: 
Index =sum of livelihood losses in the woredas associated to the 26 weather stations  
( )∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −×××= medianwmedianwwww YYYXHAIpNIndex ,0max  
Where Nw is the number of at-risk households in each woreda, pw is the price inflation factor, 
HAIw=0.68HIw, HIw being the expected household income from the 2000 Welfare Monitoring Survey14, 
Yw and Ymedian are respectively the actual and the median crop production per hectare of the staple-
                                                     
14 Central Statistical Authority 2000 
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crop basket for that woreda, and Xw is the woreda-specific income-loss trigger level adjustment factor, 
which is defined as follows:  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛= medianw YX 2.12,1min  
 
9.4.2.4. India 
India has an application of insurance microfinance. Studies had indicated that rainfall variation 
accounts for more than 50 percent of variability in crop yields (Bhise et al. 2007). The Government 
asked the Agricultural Insurance Corporation (AIC) to start a weather-based crop insurance scheme 
on a pilot basis in some states, in consultation with the Governments concerned, as an alternative to 
the indemnity-based National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) (Roth et al. 2007). In 2003, the 
Icici Lombard General Insurance Company started two pilot insurance programs, one of which covers 
against shortage of rainfall, and the other against excess of rainfall. These policies were offered 
through different banks. These index policies have the advantages of providing the indemnities within 
a shorter delay than the current agricultural insurance system in India. Weather index insurance has 
since developed, as can be appreciated in Table 23, which shows all the weather insurance products 
in India. Reinsurance is made mostly in the international reinsurance market. It is estimated that 
during 2005, 250,000 farmers bought weather insurance throughout the country (WB, 2005). 
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Table 23. Weather index insurance in India 
Name 
Index 
Crop covered Years Promoter / seller Region Buyer Maximum demand 
I1-ICICI Rainfall 
Deficit rainfall 
Khariff groundnut 
Castor 
2003 - 
CRMG /  ICICI 
Lombard 
directly and 
through BASIX 
(KBS & BSFL) 
(At the beginning 
Andra 
Pradesh) 
Farmers (borrowers 
and non 
borrowers) 
(2005) 
6.703 farmers 
7.685 policies 
I1- ICICI Rainfall 
Excessive 
rainfall 
Groundnut 
Castor 
2003 - 
CRMG / ICICI 
directly & 
through BASIX 
Since 2005 
7 States 
Farmers (borrowers 
and non 
borrowers) 
(2005 all ICICI’s?) 
100000 farmers 
I1-ICICI rainfall 
Deficit rainfall 
Cotton 2004 - 
CRMG / ICICI 
through BASIX 
 
Farmers (borrowers 
and non 
borrowers) 
 
Deficit rainfall 
Soya 
 
2003 - 
ICICI Lombard 
through KBS 
Madhya Pradesh 
Borrower farmers 
(embedded in 
loan price) 
 
Excessive rainfall 
Soya 
Rice 
2003- ICICI 
Madhya Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh 
Farmers 
(2003) 
1500 soya farmers 
Various 
Crop lending 
portfolio 
2004 - 
CRMG / ICICI 
Lombard 
 BSFL-BASIX  
I2- Deficit rainfall 
Orange (Khariff) 
Coriander (Rabi) 
2004 - 
ICICI and regional 
Government 
through banks 
and ICICI 
agents 
Rajasthan Farmers 
(2004) 
783 orange farmers 
1036 coriander farmers 
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I3-Barish Bima 
Yojana 
Rainfall (drought) 
Monsoon crops 2004 - IFFCO-Tokio 
Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, 
Andhra 
Pradesh and 
Karnataka 
Farmers 
(2005) 
16000 contracts 
I4- AIC Varsha 
Bima Yojana 
Deficit rainfall 
Khariff crops 2004 AIC or NAIC 10 states Farmers 
(2005) 
Options I & II: 107977 
farmers, 77693 has. 
Option III: 17476 farmers, 
19945 has. 
I5- AIC Sookha 
Suraksha 
Kavach 
Drought protection 
shield) 
All major khariff 
crops: 
sorghum, 
pearl millet, 
maize, 
groundnut, 
soya-bean, 
cluster bean. 
2004 AIC or NAIC Rajasthan Farmers  
I6- AIC coffee 
rainfall index 
Coffee  AIC or NAIC Karnataka Farmers  
?  2005 - 
HDFC Chubb in 
association 
with Mayhco & 
WRMS 
Maharashtra Farmers 50,000 farmers 
Source: Self-made from information in WB (2005), Kelkar (2006), and http://www.weather-risk.com/Clients.aspx 
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Legend: 
CRMG: Crop Risk Management Group of the World Bank 
BASIX: Microfinance institution 
KBS: Krashi Bima Samruddhi local area bank of BASIX 
BSFL: Bharatiya Samraddhi Finance Ltd., the non-banking finance arm of the BASIX group 
ICICI-Lombard: Subsidiary of ICICI Bank 
IFFCO-Tokio: Joint venture insurance company (the Indian insurance arm of the Millea Group) 
NAIC: National Agricultural Insurance Company responsible for the government-sponsored area-yield indexed crop insurance scheme 
AIC: Agricultural Insurance Corporation 
HDFC Chubb HDFC Chubb General Insurance Company Limited is a joint venture between HDFC, India's premier financial services company and Chubb Corporation. 
Mayhco An Indian seed company partially owned by Monsanto 
WRMS Weather Risk (www.weather-risk.com) 
Khariff: Autumn crop, Monsoon season, from June to September. The Kharif crop is the autumn harvest (also known as the summer or monsoon crop) in India and 
Pakistan. Kharif crops are usually sown with the beginning of the first rains in July, during the south-west monsoon season. The term Kharif means 
"autumn" in Arabic. Major Kharif crops: Millets (Bajra and Jowar), Paddy, Maize, Moong (Pulses), Groundnut, Red Chillies, Cotton, Soyabean (from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kharif_crop) 
Rabi: Spring crop. The Rabi crop is the spring harvest (also known as the "winter crop") in India and Pakistan. The term Rabi means "spring" in Arabic, which is 
reflected in two months of the Islamic lunar calendar, Rabi' al-awwal and Rabi' al-thani (which usually span mid/late April to mid/late June), when the crop 
is harvested. Major Rabi crops: Wheat, Barley, Mustard, Sesame (from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabi_crops) 
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Source: Made by Oscar Rojas for this report 
Figure 37. States in India 
 
Technical characteristics of the indexes: 
I115- The weather insurance contracts designed for the castor and groundnut farmers are based 
on of rainfall collected and recorded at different weather stations and rain gauges in Andra 
Pradesh.  
The initial product (2003) was based on a weighted rainfall index. High-yield rainfall correlations 
were measured for khariff crops in the area; nevertheless agronomic information was used to 
enhance and strengthen the yield-rainfall relationship for the contract structures. In the case of 
groundnut, for example, the most critical periods—when groundnut is most vulnerable to low 
rainfall and therefore water stress—are the emergence periods immediately after sowing and the 
flowering and podfilling phase two to three months after emergence (Narahari Rao et al. 2000). 
On the basis of farmer interviews, agrometeorological studies (Gadgil et al. 2002), local yield 
information, and models such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
water satisfaction index (UNFAO 2005), a groundnut-specific rainfall index was developed. The 
index was defined as a weighted sum of cumulative rainfall during the period from May 11 to 
                                                     
15 See Table 23 for the identification of the insurance 
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October 17, the average calendar dates for the groundnut growing season. Individual weights 
were assigned to consecutive ten-day periods (decades) of the growing season, so the index 
gave more weight to the critical periods during the crop’s evolution when groundnut is most 
vulnerable to rainfall variability. Furthermore, a decade cap on rainfall of 200 mm was introduced 
to the index because excessive rain does not contribute to plant growth. The individual weights 
were determined by groundnut water requirements, as advised by local agrometeorologists that 
maximized correlation between district groundnut yields and the rainfall index but defined 
homogenous rainfall periods, making the contract understandable and more marketable to the 
farmers and less susceptible to basis risk. More information on the index construction can be 
found in Hess (2003). The average or reference weighted index value for groundnut and castor 
were determined to be 653mm and 439mm, respectively. These reference-weighted index values 
represent the expected growing conditions that produce satisfactory yields for farmers of these 
crops in the region. The weather insurance contracts were designed so that payouts started at 95 
percent of this reference level. The initial pilot limited how much insurance a farmer could 
purchase by offering three different fixed contracts depending on the size holding of the farmer 
wanting to buy the insurance. Sums insured are fixed by landholding size: for groundnut farmers: 
small (less than 2.5 acres); medium (2.5 to 5 acres); and large (more than 5 acres); and for castor 
farmers, small (less than 2.5) and medium (more than 2.5 acres). The premium rates relative to 
sum insured are 3.2%, 3.0% and 3.0% respectively fro groundnut farmers, and 3.2% and 2.2% 
respectively for castor farmers (WB, 2005 and Kelkar, 2006). The payout schedule as a function of 
index is not a linear relationship (more details in WB, 2005). The weighted rainfall indices for 
Khariff 2003 were calculated to be 516 mm for groundnut, and 490 mm for castor, triggering a 
payout for groundnut farmers and no payout for castor farmers. The net incurred claims were 70.3 
% of the net premium earned for groundnut, and 53.3% for the total insurance. 
The second pilot program in khariff 2004 introduced significant changes to the 2003 design. In 
light of the farmer feedback from khariff 2003, the drought protection products for 2004 were 
structured by dividing the groundnut and castor growing seasons into three phases each, 
corresponding to the plants’ three critical growing periods: (1) establishment and vegetative 
growth, (2) flowering and pod formation, and (3) pod filling and maturity. With a departure from the 
weighted index design, the new contracts specified a cumulative rainfall trigger for each of the 
three phases, with an individual payout rate and limit for each phase. Trigger levels and payout 
rates were determined in consultation with local agrometeorologists and farmers and with 
reference to local yield data as in 2003. Premiums and threshold levels vary by weather station, 
depending on the risk profile of each individual location. This simplified design was introduced to 
give clarity to the recovery process by clearly associating each critical growth phase with an 
individual deficit rainfall protection structure. In a further departure from the 2003 pilot, the 
contracts were designed to be sold per acre. A farmer could buy as many acres of protection as 
he wished, provided he actually cultivated that many acres of the crop to be insured. The premium 
associated with Groundnut Weather Insurance for Narayanpet Mandal, for example, was 4.17% of 
the sum insured.  
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New contracts were also offered for cotton farmers, and an excess rainfall product for harvest was 
offered to all castor and groundnut farmers. This product covered from excess rainfall between 
September1st and October 10th and the index is based on the number of consecutive days with 
rainfall greater than or equal to 10 mm rainfall. The premium was 3.3% of the maximum liability, 
which would correspond to more than seven consecutive days with more than 100mm/acre 
rainfall, and the minimum indemnity corresponds to 4 consecutive days.  
The new policies feature a dynamic contract start date and they are “monsoon failure” policies 
meaning that they are area-specific rather than crop-specific products, targeting general livelihood 
losses rather than losses associated with yield variations of a specific crop. 
I2- Perils covered for oranges (Kelkar, 2006): 
 a- Lack of effective shower to initiate flowering (Premium 16.6%) 
 b- Dry spell during flowering (Premium 12.6%) 
Premiums are on insured amount. Small and marginal farmers can have a 50 discount on the 
premiums.  
I3- Weather insurance contracts similar to the ICICI deficit rainfall contract of 2003 (I-1). 
I4 – The scheme was initially introduced in 27 districts of 4 states from the Rabi 2004 season. 
Later on it was extended to 142 districts in 10 states.. AIC has been providing three options under 
this insurance scheme (not all in all states) (Bhise et al. 2007):  
- Option 1: Seasonal Rainfall Insurance 
- Option 2: Rainfall Distribution Index 
- Option 3: Sowing failure 
Premium rates have been optimized between 4% and 6% by adjusting benefits. The sum insured 
ranges between the cost of production and the value of production and farmers can buy insurance 
till the onset of the monsoon (Kelkar, 2006).  
I5 – Premium rates have been optimized between 5% and 8% by adjusting benefits. The sum 
insured ranges between the cost of production and the value of production and farmers can buy 
insurance till the onset of the monsoon (Kelkar, 2006).  
I6 – It blends rainfall index and yield parameters. Nearly two-thirds of the payout is decided on the 
basis of coffee yield at harvest time. Premium rates are flexible, with coffee growers allowed to 
choose benefits on the basis of their premium affordability. AIC announces that it was likely to 
introduce short period covers insuring coffee against deficit rainfall during ‘blossom showers’ and 
backing showers’. 
 
Within the evaluation by Kelkar (2006), we find that “Through personal communication with ICICI 
Lombard, it was learnt that the company made profits in two ventures – insurance of rice crop against 
excess rainfall and insurance of oranges in Rajasthan. However it did not make a profit in insurance of 
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groundnut crop against deficit rain in Andra Pradesh, which was implemented by BASIX. The basic 
problem was that of high administration costs of selling the insurance to individual farmers. ICICI 
Lombard found it uneconomical to seek out each farmer, but would instead prefer to sell insurance 
cover to state governments. 
 
9.4.2.5. Malawi 
At the microlevel, a pilot study by the World Bank proposed a crop production index constructed from 
weather data recorded at the airport weather station in Lilongwe (Malawi’s capital). All that is needed 
is for demand to be aggregated at product distribution channels (WB, 2005). 
At the meso level, index insurance has been proposed to reduce loans risk, by packaging it with the 
loans into a single product. Banks would increase interest rates to pay the premiums, and borrowers 
would pay only a fraction of the usual loan due in case of a severe drought impacting crop yields. 
Weather insurance products have been designed to secure credit for groundnut farmers (WB, 2005). 
Bundled loan and insurance contracts were offered in four pilot areas. These pilot areas were chosen 
because the National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM) had farmer clubs located 
near meteorological stations with reliable precipitation data. Additionally, the relatively good rain 
patterns for Malawi standards made the pilot scheme more feasible there. The most vulnerable 
Malawian farmers, located in more drought-prone areas are currently excluded from this scheme 
(Osgood et al. 2008). 
The insurance contracts were designed to pay out if the rainfall data from the nearest meteorological 
station showed a deficit at one or more critical stages of the growing season. Each contract had a ‘no-
sow’ clause that would pay out if insufficient rain fell during the early part of the season, from mid-
November to early January. This was followed by clauses specifying the different levels of rainfall that 
would trigger payments during the three major phenological stages of establishment, flowering, and 
maturation. (Hellmuth et al. 2007) 
Malawi’s leading insurance companies are participating as a consortium, the Insurance Association of 
Malawi, to aid learning during the project’s pilot phase. Once the insurance scheme and the 
mechanisms for administering it have been developed and tested, the companies will operate 
individually, in competition with one another. (Hellmuth et al. 2007). The cost of the insurance 
premium, currently about 7.5% of the loan, is likely to remain a barrier for the poorest farmers, who 
often live in the areas at greatest risk of drought. Competition may create some scope for reducing 
this cost, but affordability for poor farmers will doubtless remain an issue as the program expands.  
892 policies were sold (to banks) in October 2005 for the 2005/2006 groundnut growing season 
(Osgood et al. 2008). The season unfolded with rainfall recorded at the meteorological stations close 
to normal levels for the various production areas. In three of the four pilot locations adequate rainfall 
was received to avoid payouts, but farmers in the Kasungu area received a small payout of US$ 0.68 
each. (Hellmuth et al. 2007). A total of 2536 farmers joined the scheme in October and November 
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2006. A household survey in the first pilot showed that 86% of subjects wanted to join the scheme 
again the following season, and 67% said they had encouraged other farmers to join in (Osgood et al. 
2008). One concern expressed by the farmers was that the rainfall data used to determine payouts 
were from a single rainfall station that could be up to 20 km away. As a result some farmers were 
winners and others losers, as rainfall on their farms differed from that at the station. This is one of the 
major challenges facing the design and implementation of index insurance in heterogeneous rainfed 
environments. (Hellmuth et al. 2007).  
At the macro level, a specific nationwide maize production index for the entire country could form the 
basis of an index-based insurance policy or operate as an objective trigger to a contingent credit line 
for the government in the event of food emergencies that put pressure on government budgets. 
Applying the Lilongwe maize farmer index approach to the macrolevel situation, a Malawi Maize 
Production Index (MMPI) can be defined as the weighted average of farmer maize indexes measured 
at weather stations located throughout the country, with each station’s contribution weighted by the 
corresponding average or expected maize production in that location. Given the objective nature of 
the MMPI and the quality of weather data from the Malawi Meteorological Office, such a structure 
could be placed in the weather risk reinsurance market. Analysis shows that Malawi could need up to 
US$70 million per year to financially compensate the government in case of an extreme food 
emergency. The estimated premium for such a product would be of US$6.96 million or the insurance 
rate of 10 percent (WB, 2005). 
The MMPI indicator analysed by the World Bank turned out to be relatively poorly linked with crop 
yields. This is the reason why an agro-meteorological indicator was later developed (see next 
subsection 3.4.3 on agro-meteorological indicators).  
 
9.4.2.6. Mexico 
Mexico is the first developing country in stipulating a reinsurance agreement based on a bunch of 
weather indexes. In fact, weather indexes are used in reinsurance, in mutual insurance and 
hydrological-resources markets (Skees and Hartell, 2004). 
The progressive diffusion of meteorological derivatives or weather derivatives has provided the 
possibility of using these tools to manage the risks relative to the effects of natural calamities on 
agriculture. The society for agricultural insurance in Mexico, Agroasemex, is a Mexican government-
owned company operating exclusively in agricultural insurance. Among its roles, there is the 
reinsurance of Mexican insurance companies, mutual insurance societies and insurance funds. 
Agroasemex relies heavily on the traditional reinsurance market to protect its agricultural portfolio from 
inordinate losses. As a result of a 70 percent increase in the retrocession rates of 2001, Agroasemex’s 
search for new alternatives led it to analyze the comparative efficiency of the weather derivatives 
market. As a result, in 2001, Agroasemex has used the weather markets to reinsure a part of their 
insurance programs’ coverage. By using weather indexes based on temperature and rainfall 
measures in the mean production areas, a weather index was created which shows a very high 
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correlation with the historical series of insurance indemnities in agriculture. This method of 
reinsurance proved to be more efficient than traditional reinsurance.  
According to a publication by the World Bank (WB, 2005), there are two agricultural production cycles 
in Mexico: spring-summer and autumn-winter. The former is primarily a rain-fed production cycle, 
while the latter is generally irrigated. The Agroasemex weather risk transfer program was specifically 
designed for the autumn-winter cycle of 2001 to 2002. The main weather risks for agriculture during 
this cycle were potentially large negative deviations in temperature and excess rainfall. For some 
areas, where irrigation was not used, lack of rainfall was also an important risk. The index was based 
on a total liability of Agroasemex computed for five states and five crops (tobacco, maize, sorghum, 
chickpeas and beans. The crop and weather risks were selected according to several factors (their 
relative importance in the portfolio, the availability of consistent and high-quality weather data, etc.). 
This total liability represents approximately 10 percent of the risk in the entire portfolio of Agroasemex 
in 2001-2002 (US$269 million). The total expected traditional reinsurance premium for the entire 
Agroasemex portfolio was estimated to be US$1.9 million. The following method was used to establish 
the relationship between weather indices and the expected indemnities of the Agroasemex agricultural 
portfolio. First, a severity index was created for each crop in the portfolio in order to understand, at the 
portfolio level, how important this crop risk would be when a given weather phenomenon, as captured 
by an index, occurred. A very simple severity index (SI) is defined as follows: 
SI= (Indemnities/Total Liability)ti 
t=1991/92, 1992/93, … 1999/2000; autumn-winter cycles 
i= Crop 
Once the severity index was calculated for each crop, the next step was to find a mathematical 
relationship between the SI and the weather index most relevant to the crop. Agroasemex performed 
linear least square regressions for each crop severity index to establish the SI–weather-index 
relationship: 
ttt xmmy ε++= 10  
where yt= (Indemnities/Total Liability)t 
and xt=FCDDt 
where FCDD (Factores Climaticos Dañinos Diarios) represent the index that captures the critical 
weather risk of each crop in the portfolio; εt is a normally distributed noise term; and the estimators for 
the linear gradient and intercept, m1 and m0, were calculated using a least squares regression 
method. The gradient estimator for m1, in particular, is very important, as it establishes the relationship 
between the individual severity indices and the relevant weather indices. Once all the linear 
regressions for each crop are performed and all the linear estimators are calculated, the expected 
indemnities (in monetary terms) for each severity index, given a certain weather index (FCDD) and 
total liability, can be calculated as follows: 
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(Indemnities)t=(Total Liability)t x FCDDt x m1 
The FCDD term for each crop represents the weather index or indices that best capture the weather 
risk for that crop. If we are analyzing the exposure of beans to low temperatures, for example, the 
FCDD index could be defined as the number of days that the daily minimum temperature drops below 
a specified daily threshold during the growing season. It is important to note that even though each 
severity index (SI) is a seasonal aggregate, the types of risks relevant for an agricultural portfolio of 
crops can occur over very short periods of time; for example, crop damage due to frost can occur in 
just one day. Therefore the selection of the individual weather indices for each crop was based on two 
criteria: first, and primarily, on the agronomical surveys and experience of the technical personnel of 
Agroasemex, and second, on the strength of the mathematical relationship obtained when comparing 
the available data on indemnities for the crop in question, with the weather index - this was done both 
on a daily basis (data on indemnities were available in daily resolution) and on a seasonal basis. 
In total, eleven independent FCDDs were designed to represent the exposure of the crops and risks 
selected. The FCDD calculation methodologies using daily weather data are presented in Table 3 for 
all crops in the portfolio. To understand how each individual FCDD was estimated, consider the 
example for the weather index chosen for tobacco in Nayarit: DDD-12. Low temperature is the 
greatest risk for tobacco crops in Nayarit; when the daily minimum temperature drops below 12°C, the 
expected tobacco yields will be below average. Hence 12°C is the minimum temperature threshold 
level for tobacco crop damage: DDD-12 represents Damage Degree Days with a 12°C threshold. The 
DDD-12 index is defined as follows:  
∑ −=− )12,0max(12 minTDDD  
where the DDD-12 summation is over each day in the growing period of tobacco: November 1 to 
March 31 of the following year. The data are aggregated at a seasonal level. The DDD-12 estimation 
is consistent with the El Niño, as the worst year recorded of cold temperatures affecting the tobacco-
producing area.  
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Table 24. The eleven FCDD indices 
Crop FCDD Calculation methodology  
(in mm and degree Celsius) 
Calculation 
period 
Tobacco DDD-12 DDD-12 = Sum Daily [max (0, 12 − Tmin)] Dec 1–Mar 31 
 EMNF EMNF = Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 1] + Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 
2] 
Nov 1–Feb 28 
 EMMA EMNF = Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 1] + Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 
2] 
Mar 1–Apr 30 
Beans DDD-5 DDD-5 = Sum Daily [max (0, 5 − Tmin)] Oct 1–Apr 30 
 DDD-3 DDD-3 = Sum Daily [max (0, 3 − Tmin)] Dec 1–Dec 31 
 EMF EMF = Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 1] + Sum Daily [Rainfall Station 
2] + Sum Daily[Rainfall Station 3] 
Nov 1–Mar 31 
 MAX-5 MAX-5 = max (MP - 200, 0);  
MP=max(Sum5-dayD3)-max rainfall for a consecutive period of 5 
days, where D3 = Daily Rainfall Station 1 + Daily Rainfall 
Station 2 + Daily Rainfall Station 3 
Nov 1–Mar 31 
Chickpeas EMG EMG = Sum [max (Daily Rainfall − 55, 0)] Nov 1–Apr 15 
Sorghum MAXPS PS = Sum [max (250 − CMP1, 0)] + 2 ∗ Sum [max (250 − CMP2, 0)]; 
CMP1 = Monthly Cum. Rainfall Station 1 
CMP2 = Monthly Cum. Rainfall Station 2 
Oct 1–May 31 
Maize DDD-5 DDD-5 = max [D5 − 22, 0]; D5 = Sum Daily [max (0,5-Tmin)] Oct 1–Apr 30 
 DDD-3 DDD-3=Sum Daily [max(0,3-Tmin)] Dec 1–Dec 31 
Source: WB (2005) 
 
FCDD indices are converted into expected indemnities in monetary terms using the equations 
established above. The strength of the approach outlined above was back-tested by using annual 
historical indemnity and total liability information from the Agroasemex direct insurance operations 
from 1990 to 2001. The values of the severity index for each crop were calculated using both the 
historical and the modelled data for comparison. By combining the information from the different 
crops, the basket of all the expected indemnity indices was used to replicate the overall weather 
exposure of the agricultural portfolio. This “combined index”—essentially the sum of all the expected 
crop indemnity indices—was used as an underlying proxy and therefore hedge for the weather 
exposure of a portfolio. The results demonstrate that the combined weather index model explains 
about 93 percent of the variability demonstrated by the empirical data. A derivative structure based on 
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this combined index, such as a call option, is therefore conceptually the same as a stop-loss 
reinsurance strategy for the portfolio, as weather is the greatest risk to Agroasemex.  
The original analysis performed by Agroasemex focused on four possible call option derivative 
structures, which varied in the strike price and limit of payout that could be used as an alternative to a 
traditional stop-loss reinsurance contract to manage the portfolio risk (Table 25). The historical results 
and the stochastic analysis (Monte-Carlo simulation) for the actuarial fair value of risk for each call 
option structure (average and standard deviation) are summarized in Table 25. In addition to the 
actuarial fair value of risk, the market premium was calculated. The market premium charged 
combined the expected or fair value of the risk— the pure risk premium—with an additional risk 
margin. Considering market standards at the time, the following risk loadings above the expected 
value were considered: 
• Loading Based on Standard Deviation: Market standards 20 to 40 percent. An intermediate loading 
of 30 percent was considered by Agroasemex. 
• Loading Based on the Uncertainty due to Gaps in the Historical Weather Data (for more information 
see WB, 2005) 
• Loading for Administrative Expenses: A margin of 15 percent was added. 
Table 25 shows the estimated commercial premium (full price) - calculated as the expected value plus 
risk margin - for the four weather derivative structures. 
 
Table 25. Estimated Commercial Premium for Weather Derivative Structures (in US$) 
Call option structure A B C D 
Strike price 1,000,000 1,100,000 1,200,000 1,300,000 
Payout limit 1,200,000 1,100,000 1,000,000 900,000 
Premiums 
Last Ten-Year HBA     
Pure Risk Premium 181,447 151,447 121,447 91,447 
Standard Deviation Loading 83,372 69,669 55,987 42,347 
15% Margin 46,733 39,020 31,312 23,611 
Full Price 311,552 232,229 186,622 141,157 
Simulation Analysis     
Pure Risk Premium 133,460 104,291 80,252 60,528 
Standard Deviation Loading 80,241 70,226 60,638 51,634 
Data Uncertainty Loading 31,750 27,584 23,693 20,136 
15% Margin 43,315 30,797 24,863 19,793 
Full Price 288,766 232,898 189,447 152,091 
Source: WB (2005) 
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Despite the risk loading, Agroasemex eventually bought structure D from the market (for more 
information see WB, 2005).  
Besides using weather indexes for reinsurance, Agroasemex has started a cooperation with mutual 
insurance funds, composed of small trading agricultural companies. The objective of this cooperation 
is to allow to the mutual funds to buy insurance indexed on meteorological parameters and, so, to 
decide which kind of products to offer to their own members. These programs are at the moment in an 
initial development stadium. (Skees and Hartell, 2004).  
Agroasemex technicians are also evaluating the possibility of using the index insurance to develop 
links with the water resources markets. Based on this approach, when the water availability is lower 
than an agreed level, the institution controlling water for irrigation would guarantee an indemnity to the 
users. (Skees and Hartell, 2004) 
Last, the greatest interest generated by the 2001 transaction was from the Mexican government 
regarding their catastrophic weather exposure: since 2001, Agroasemex has sold weather index 
insurance to three Mexican states to cover the states’ catastrophic exposure related to agriculture. In 
turn, Agroasemex has bought protection for this risk, on a quota share basis, in the international 
weather derivatives market. The three transactions together have an approximate notional value of 
US$15 million, with several other states in the coverage pipeline. There are unofficial reports that the 
international market has also closed several transactions with the private industry in Mexico as a 
result of this first weather derivative transaction. (WB, 2005). 
 
9.4.2.7. Morocco 
In Morocco, given the limitations of the Drought program (see the Moroccan yield insurance scheme in 
the previous section), the Government agreed to participate in a World Bank research project aimed at 
exploring the feasibility of weather-based insurance. The product proposed was a rainfall index 
insurance contract that would indemnify cereal producers when the rainfall index in a given area fell 
below a specified threshold. The indexes were developed by local agronomists together with farmer’s 
representatives. They were not just cumulative measures of rainfall but included specific weights for 
different plant growth phases and a “capping” procedure to take into account the loss of water in 
excess of storage capacity and hence unavailability to contribute to plant growth. This process allowed 
the indexes developed to reach correlation values of over 90 percent (Stoppa and Hess 2003). The 
implementation of the planned pilot program in Morocco did not take place. The main reason for this 
failure was that rainfall precipitation in the selected areas showed a downward trend, and the 
reinsurance company involved in the deal made the cost of the insurance prohibitive for producers. 
The experience developed through this study, however, generated expertise that led to the realization 
of other WB-facilitated deals (for example India) and of other independent programs (for example, in 
Colombia).  
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9.4.2.8. Nicaragua 
In the case of Nicaragua, Hazell and Skees provided the first feasibility study in 1998. Subsequently, 
Skees and Miranda (1998) examined the issue in more detail and made specific recommendations 
about insufficient and excess rainfall insurance in the major cereal production. After Hurricane Mitch 
arrived in October 1998, the World Bank developed an aggregate weather index that would provide 
disaster financing to the Government during severe weather events. The index was even priced in the 
global reinsurance markets. However, the Government rejected the idea considered it unnecessary 
because “they could depend on the global community for assistance when major catastrophes 
occurred” In 2004, the World Bank responded to the interest of INISER (Instituto Nicaraguense de 
Seguros y Reaseguros) in developing a local weather index insurance market for agriculture. The 
World Bank provided technical assistance to analyze potential markets for a pilot project in 2005 and 
decided to secure lending for the groundnut (mani) sector. Final contracts have been designed and 
priced by reinsurers. The pilot project was expected to begin operations in the summer of 2006. (WB, 
2005). According to the Nicaraguan diary “La Prensa” (21st December 2006), it is already available 
and it covers groundnut from deficit and excess rainfall during growth period, and from excess rainfall 
during harvesting   
(http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2006/diciembre/21/noticias/economia/163423.shtml).  
 
9.4.2.9. Peru 
In Peru agricultural weather insurance is under study. The feasibility study focuses in the following 
crops: rice, mango, yellow maize, potato, coffee, cotton and asparagus (WB, 2005).  
 
9.4.2.10. SADC: Proposal for reinsurance in SADC 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is composed by 14 Southern African 
countries. If index insurance such the one proposed for Malawi was applied in the other SADC 
countries, the WB (2005) proposed the following strategy as the most efficient way to manage the risk. 
It would be to layer risk as follows:  
• SADC Fund: The size of the SADC fund could be set at US$80 million, the average financial impact 
of four average droughts in the region, with each member contributing its share according to an 
actuarially fair assessment of the expected claim of each country. The SADC fund approach would 
reduce insurance costs by 22 percent for Malawi due to risk pooling effects. 
• Reinsurance and/or contingent credit lines: SADC wide events incurring a financial loss of, say, 
US$80 million to $350 million could be transferred to the weather-risk reinsurance / professional 
investor market. Alternatively, in such situations, the SADC members could have access to a World 
Bank contingent credit line. 
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• Securitization: The final and extreme layer of risk, such as drought in ten countries, occurring 1 
percent of the time, could be securitized and issued as a CAT bond (investors lose the principal if the 
event occurs in exchange for a higher coupon) in the capital markets. The advantage of capital 
markets for this risk transfer is the immense financial capacity of these markets and also the longer 
tenure of CAT bonds: up to three years and possibly longer. (WB, 2005) 
 
9.4.2.11. Ukraine 
Regarding Ukraine, a pilot project (Appendix 2 in WB 2005) was developed by the World Bank, for 
winter wheat producers in the Kherson oblast16, in the south of Ukraine. This pilot was sold by the 
insurance company Kiev-based Credo Classic. However, the regulator only approved weather index 
insurance as an insurance product in April 2005, and so only a few weather insurance policies were 
sold to farmers during the brief marketing period of the first pilot of 2005.  
The most significant weather risks for growing winter wheat in the Kherson oblast are (1) winterkill 
during the crop’s hibernation period from December to March, and (2) water deficit during the 
vegetative growth period from mid-April to June. Informal interviews with farmers in the oblast indicate 
that farmers are less concerned with winterkill risk than with drought risk, even though it can 
potentially cause complete damage, because of the potential to resow. The following drought index 
insurance was suggested for Kherson in 2005. 
In the absence of reliable yield data, expert assessment and the results of a report by the Ukranian 
Hydrometeorological Center were used as the basis for constructing an appropriate weather index for 
winter wheat in Kherson. Agricultural drought can take two forms: air drought and soil drought. Air 
drought, characterized by a long rainless period, high air temperature, and low air humidity, is often 
described using the Selyaninov Hydrothermal Ratio (SHR). For the vegetative growth period for winter 
wheat in Kherson, April 15 to June 30, the SHR is defined as follows: 
( )∑∑ −− ×= JuneAprilJuneApril urelyTemperatAverageDaifallDailyRainSHR 1515 1.0.  
It holds for periods when daily average temperatures are consistently above +10°C. This period, on 
average, begins on April 15 in the Kherson oblast. Daily rainfall was capped to avoid for too much 
rainfall that is not useful for the crop, so that 
Capped Daily Rainfall =min(50, Daily Rainfall Total in mm) 
The SHR does not always serve as a reliable criterion of agricultural drought because it does not 
account for soil moisture, but because soil dryness, unlike rainfall and average temperature, is 
generally not an observed variable, the SHR is the only objective indicator that can be used to capture 
drought risk during the vegetative period. Conditions for obtaining the best harvest are when the SHR 
                                                     
16 Oblast: a political subdivision of Imperial Russia or a republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of 
the Russian Federation 
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is between 1.0 and 1.4. When the SHR is greater than or equal to 1.6, plant yields will be depressed 
by excessive moisture. When the SHR is less than or equal to 0.6, plants are depressed by drought 
conditions. In general, the isoline SHR = 0.5 coincides with regions of semidesert climate conditions. 
Results from the UHC crop model that suggest the impact on yields of SHR during the vegetative 
growth stage between April 15and June 30 are defined in Table 26. 
 
Table 26. Relationship Between SHR and Winter Wheat Yields During 
the Vegetative Growth Phase of Plant Development 
SHR Description Yield loss (%) 
1.6 Excessive humidity 30+ 
1.3-1.6 Damp - 
1.0-1.2 Sufficient humidity - 
0.7-0.9 Dry - 
<0.7 Drought conditions - 
0.5-0.6 Medium drought 20 
0.4-0.5 Severe drought 20-50 
<0.4 Extreme drought 50+ 
Source: Hess et al. (2005) 
 
The SHR can therefore be used as an index to monitor the impact of air drought on winter wheat crop 
yields. The payouts – SHR correspondence is shown in Table 27, the payouts expressed in 
percentage of the insured amount. The insured amount can be chosen by the farmer, with a maximum 
which equals the maximum production and input costs the farmer can have per hectare. 
 
Table 27. Relationship Between SHR and Financial Losses 
Associated with Winter Wheat Yield Fluctuations 
SHR Payout per hectare (% of max. loss) 
0.51-0.60 20 % 
0.46-0.50 30 % 
0.41-0.45 40 % 
0.36-0.4 50 % 
0.31-0.35 60 % 
0.26-0.3 70 % 
0.21-0.25 80 % 
0.16-0.2 90 % 
<0.15 100 % 
Source: Hess et al. (2005) 
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The payout of a SHR index insurance contract is determined by the following equation: 
( )( )XSHRKMPayout ×−= ,0max,min  
where M is the limit of the contract (maximum liability), K is the strike, SHR is the SHR index 
measured during the calculation period, and X is the payout rate, determined by the structure of the 
contract. The final premium will be the expected payout E(P) plus an additional risk margin the 
provider will charge for taking the weather risk from the end user, that is, 
Premium= E(P)+ Risk Margin 
There are many methods for measuring risk and hence for determining a risk taker’s risk margin. Two 
examples of simple methods that have been suggested (Henderson et al. 2002) for the weather 
market are the Sharpe Ratio and the Return on Value at Risk (VaR); both measure expected excess 
return in terms of some measure of risk and hence determine the “cost of risk” for the contract seller. 
Sharp Ratio17 α:   )()(Pr PPEemium σα ×+=  
Return on VaR(99%)18 β  [ ])()()(Pr 99 PEPVaRPEemium −×+= β   
In both methods outlined above, α and β quantify the risk loading appropriate for the risk preferences 
of the provider. Reasonable estimates for α and β, given prices in the weather market, are α = 15–
30% and β = 5–10%. It was assumed that α = 25% and β = 5%. By simply taking the thirty years of 
payouts for a weather insurance contract with a strike level of SHR = 0.4, the payout statistics result: 
E(SHR) = UAH 70, σ(SHR) = UAH 220 and VaR97(SHR)=UAH 800. A first-order estimate of an 
appropriate premium to charge a farmer for an insurance contract with a strike level of SHR = 0.4 at 
Behtery Weather Station, therefore, is between UAH 110 and 125 per hectare for a sum insured of 
UAH 1000. (WB 2005). 
After the 2005 experience, the insurance company leading the pilot in Kherson was already providing 
consultations to other markets players in Ukraine on designing index-based products in-house and 
drafting the insurance rules for these new products. There were also plans to scale up weather 
insurance activities to cover more crops and regions in 2006. (WB 2005). 
                                                     
17 The Sharpe Ratio uses standard deviation as the underlying measure of risk; therefore α represents the “cost 
of standard deviation” as determined by the seller’s risk preferences. One of the benefits of relating risk to the 
standard deviation of payouts is that it constitutes an easy parameter for estimating; however, it is a symmetric 
measure of risk capturing the mean width of the payout distribution, and, for traditional risk exchange products, 
the payout distribution is often not symmetric but has a long tail. (WB 2005, Appendix 1) 
18 The Return on VaR method uses VaR(99%) as the underlying measure of risk and therefore b represents the 
“cost of VaR.” Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a term that has become widely used by insurers, corporate treasurers, and 
financial institutions to summarize the total risk of portfolios. The advantage of VaR99 is that it is computed from 
the loss side of the payout distribution, where loss is defined with respect to the expected payout E(P), and 
therefore captures the potential financial loss to the seller. Using the Return on VaR method is more appropriate 
for pricing structures that protect against low-frequency/ high-severity risk, which have highly asymmetric payout 
distributions. VaR99 is a harder parameter to estimate, however, particularly for strike levels set far away from 
the mean, and it is usually established through Monte Carlo simulation. The worst-case recorded historically can 
often be used as a crosscheck for VaR. (WB 2005, Appendix 1) 
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The World Bank has also performed a feasibility study on how to develop weather index insurance in 
the country. The World Bank advises that the Government cooperates in two fields: one, the 
acquisition, installation and maintenance of automated weather stations. Two, the performance of a 
reinsuring role. This role could be implemented in this way, in order to achieve cheap access to the 
international reinsurance market: risk layers representing relatively frequent but mild adverse events 
would be insured by a Government risk fund. Intermediate risk layers (for example events happening 
less than once in twenty years) could be transferred to a Government’s Backstop Facility. The 
catastrophic risk layer (once in a hundred years events) could be transferred to international 
reinsurance markets (WB, 2005).   
 
9.4.3. Examples of agro-meteorological index insurances 
9.4.3.1. Malawi 
The indicator analysed by the World Bank (see above, in the section 9.4.2.5 on weather insurances in 
Malawi) turned out to be relatively poorly linked with crop yields. FAO proposed to use the tools 
included in the FAO AgroMetShell (AMS) software to derive an effective weather-based maize yield 
index (WYX, Weather Yield indeX) that could be used for crop insurance purposes in Malawi. The 
technical work and results of the technical cooperation programme between World Bank and FAO are 
collected in Chavula and Gommes (2006). AMS computes a crop specific water balance to derive 
value-added crop-weather variables that can be combined with other data (e.g. remote sensing inputs, 
farm inputs such as fertilizer use) and statistically related with crop yield using standard multiple 
regression techniques. “Value-added crop-weather variables” are variables such as actual 
evapotranspiration that are know to be more meaningful than raw meteorological variables. So, 
average maize yields were regressed against selected significant variables, mixing cross-sectional 
and time series data. Calculations were made geographically by Extension Planning Area (EPA) for 
two types of maize: local maize and hybrid maize. The final Malawi local maize forecasting equation 
is, for each pixel, 
Yield=0.93*Yavg+1.81*DEFtot-0.17*WEXtot +2.36*ETAveg-26.50*DEFveg 
Where: 
Yield is the weather – based yield index for local maize 
- Yavg is average yield for local maize 
- DEFtot is total water deficit 
- WEXtot is total water excess 
- ETAveg is Evapotranspiration at vegetative stage 
- DEFveg is water deficit at vegetative stage. 
For hybrid maize, the following equation was derived: 
Yield/Yavg=0.03Year-2E-05Year2+0.01WRSIfin-0.008ETAtot+1.2E-05 ETAtot2 
 
  159 
 
Where: 
- Yield is the weather – based yield index for hybrid maize 
- Yavg is average yield for hybrid maize 
- Year is the year for which the calculations are done 
- WRSIfin is the Water satisfaction index computed for the end of the crop cycle 
- ETAtot is the total Evapotranspiration over the cycle. 
 
9.4.4. Examples of satellite imagery index insurances 
One of the satellite networks with more information available for these purposes comes from the 
NOAA satellite. It is the network used by the Canadian and Spanish pasture insurances. The NOAA 
satellite has blue, green, red, infrared, and thermal sensors and takes one image per day for every 
square kilometre of the earth’s surface. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is a type 
of vegetative index based on the relationship between red light (visible) and near-infrared light. 
Healthy vegetation absorbs the red light from the sun and uses it for photosynthesis while reflecting 
near-infrared light from the sun. The formula used to calculate the NDVI is given by: 
NDVI =(NIR − "Red")/(NIR + "Red") 
where NIR is near-infrared light and Red is red light. The more red light is absorbed by the plants, the 
smaller the amount of red light is, in turn, reflected by the plant and recorded by the satellite, therefore 
the larger the NDVI value. An important disadvantage of this system is the alterations caused by the 
cloud-covered days, because the satellite cannot get the proper radiations from the crops. Another 
important input for the use of NDVI as index insurance is the design of an appropriate mask19. (WB, 
2005).  
 
9.4.4.1. Canada 
In Canada, in the province of Alberta, the Agricultural Financial Service Corporation (AFSC) 
developed a Satellite Imagery Insurance in order to insure fodder production. The pilot was launched 
in 2001 and was limited to a geographical area of the province where pasture is the predominant land 
cover.  
It is based on data from satellites that use specific wavelengths of light to estimate growth conditions 
on native pasture. An NDVI, scaled appropriately to reflect native pasture production, was calculated 
for each township in the pilot area and a Pasture Vegetation Index (PVI) was generated. The 
insurance compensates producers according to a predetermined payment schedule when the average 
accumulated Pasture Vegetation Index (PVI) in a township falls below a threshold value of 90% of the 
                                                     
19 A mask is simply a set of geo-referenced information identifying specific land features that can be laid over the 
satellite imagery information. The overlaying of this information allows some of the satellite imagery to be 
extracted from the information file prior to making production assessments. 
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township normal PVI value from previous years. The program was expanded slightly in 2002 to the 
portion of the province in which the square kilometre resolution of the NOAA satellite was considered 
practical for pasture20. The program has been running for several years (Stoppa & Hess 2003, WB 
2005).  
The mask used for the project selects only information known to be at least 85 percent native or 
improved pasture at a quarter section level (160 acres). In the pilot area, where satellite imagery 
insurance operated, a significant percentage of land, 80 to 90 percent, is native pasture. Areas of crop 
irrigation and some bush land also need to be extracted, or they significantly influence the program 
outcome. If a quarter section of land has irrigation, it is removed from the program dataset. 
While ample data existed to calculate the PVI, little accurate “in-field” pasture information was 
available to judge whether the PVI actually correlated to pasture growth. In the past, however, AFSC 
had operated a cage clipping system (to avoid animal grazing) to measure forage production. This 
permitted to obtain estimates from 1991 to 1999 that permitted comparing historical PVI values to 
pasture production trends over time. Correlation was confirmed with farmers. To augment the 
information acquired by satellite imagery, AFSC developed research plots throughout the pilot pasture 
area to measure rainfall and the growth of pasture under cages and to note changing pasture 
conditions over the growing season throughout the pilot area (thirty in total). The correlations were 
improved substantially through this process.  
Pasture insurance is sold in the spring of each year, but farmers must make their purchasing 
decisions by the end of February. Farmers must insure all the acres of pasture within the same 
category—native, improved, or bush pasture—but a lower than normal PVI value in one township is 
not offset by a higher than normal PVI in another. Coverage is derived by multiplying the pounds of 
pasture production expected in each forage risk area, as determined by AFSC, by 80 percent of one 
of the four price options available to the farmer. The premium rate for the 2003 native pasture 
insurance program was 21 percent, 60 percent of which is subsidized by the government (WB 2005). 
 
                                                     
20 The NOAA satellite system was used because historical satellite images were readily available. To be effective, 
however, any non-pasture land had to be excluded from the satellite images. With the square kilometer 
resolution of the satellite image, pastureland outside the pilot area is situated in smaller land parcels and within 
other crop and forested land. Moving beyond the pilot area, with this resolution, would dictate the exclusion of 
many pixels that do not meet the minimum pasture content criteria. Without a minimum number of pixel images, 
the sample size for a township production estimate is not credible. 
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9.4.4.2. Spain 
General presentation 
The parametric insurance scheme in Spain was engineered mainly to cover farmers from droughts 
affecting the pasture areas.  
The product has been offered since 2001 for all the farms performing extensive livestock production, 
specifically cattle, sheep, horses, and goats. (MAPA, 2007) 
The index (ENESA, 2007 and WB, 2005) 
The index utilized is also the NDVI (estimated from NOAA images). In contrast to the previous case 
study, the insurable index is based only on pure imagery, that is, no verification with actual yields was 
performed. The satellite images are processed by the Remote sensing Laboratory from the University 
of Valladolid.  
Images are obtained by the AVHRR sensor, on board of the satellites from the series NOAA. The 
images transferred by the satellite at its noon passing over the peninsula are calibrated and corrected 
from atmospheric effects and geometric distortions with an accuracy lower than a pixel (1km2).The 
vegetation activity indicator is NDVI, explained above, but in contrast to the weekly NDVI values, this 
scheme is based on a ten-day period NDVI index. NDVI is calculated daily and from these daily 
measures the Maximum Value Composite (MVC NDVI) index per ten-day period (decade) is 
obtained. It is the pastures activity indicator for each ‘ten-day’ in the year (in fact, three ‘ten-days’ are 
considered per natural month). In this way, the effects from clouds, as well as the discrepancies 
produced by the different light intensity and other perturbing effects are eliminated.  
A curve of ‘ten-day’ MVC NDVI is obtained for every pixel. This evolution curve is smoothed with an 
algorithm of the type “Double 4253H” in order to eliminate the residual noise. This algorithm has the 
property of keeping constant the area below the curve. The reference curves built from the MVC NDVI 
are defined as beginning on the first decade of October and finalized on the last decade of September 
of the next calendar year. Whenever information is not available for a particular period, a linear 
interpolation method is used to fill the missing gaps21.  
The mask in this scheme is based on the Corine Land Cover (CLC-90), which is used to discriminate 
between areas with and without grassland production. A minimum of a 50% of the surface occupied 
by grass and pasture lands has been required to consider a pixel as an area with grassland 
production. Besides, areas (pixels) with more than 10% of the surface occupied by woods and forests 
have been dismissed.  
                                                     
21 In case of decades without valid information, the value will be calculated by interpolation of the values of the 
previous and the following decade, if and only if the number of missing decades will be lower or equal to four. 
In the case that an area lacks more than 4 decade data or the last decade data is missing, the values will are 
decided through the analyses of the neighbouring areas of the same type. 
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The MVC-NDVI (from now on Vegetation Index, VI) curves are obtained for the years 1987-2006, and 
the ‘ten-day’ average (AVI) and standard deviation (SDVI) are established for each ‘ten-day’ and each 
homogeneous pasture area.  
How the insurance works 
The description of the product is detailed in ENESA (2007) and MAPA (2007). The drought on 
pastures insurance is designed to cover the farmers experiencing more than thirty dry days (defined 
as based on the average historical information on pasture per ‘ten-day’).  
There are two guarantee levels. So, there are two Guaranteed Vegetation Index (GVI), high (GVIh) 
and low (GVIl): 
( )SDVIAVIGVIh ×−×= 7.098.0  
( )SDVIAVIGVIl ×−×= 5.198.0  
So, the coverage is 98% of the historic average VI for each area and ‘ten-day’, with an additional 
deductible of 0.7 or 1.25 of the standard deviations from the average VI.  
The VI observed in a given ‘ten-day’ in year t is given by actual VIt.  
The indemnity or compensation value (CompVal) for each decade is given by: 
36
InsValCompVal α=  
Where InsVal is the insured value, which is calculated as the product of the number of animals in the 
farm multiplied by the unitary price chosen. 
And α is an indemnity coefficient, for each period of the year, risk region, and guarantee level. For 
example, the indemnity coefficients for the central area can be seen in Table 28. 
 
Table 28. Indemnity coefficients for central Spain 
 GVI-h 
High guarantee level 
GVI-l 
Low guarantee level 
 Option A Option B Option A Option B 
December-February 10% 10% 20% 20% 
March 30% 30% 80% 80% 
April 40% 40% 110% 110% 
May-June 50% 50% 150% 150% 
July-September - 10% - 20% 
October-November 30% 30% 70% 70%- 
Source: Made by authors from data in MAPA (2007) 
 
  163 
 
There are two main insurance options the farmer can choose22 . 
Option A23: The trigger for a compensation is that VIt<GVI during at least three ‘ten-days’. The 
guarantee periods vary depending on the region.  
Option B: The trigger for a compensation is that the Compensation Value in the whole period is above 
the 10% of the insured value (CompValtotal>10%InsVal), considering that there is a loss in any ‘ten-
day’ for which VIt<GVI.. 
 
 
                                                     
22 There is a minor third one covering only the months of October and November 
23 The third option (Option C) is similar to Option A but it applies only to October- November. 
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9.5. Annex 4A. Data available: CGMS and CGMS indicators 
CGMS responds to Crop Growth Monitoring System. CGMS24 has been developed within JRC (Joint 
Research Centre- European Commission). The mission of the “system” is to provide timely, consistent 
and reliable analysis at pan-European level on the status of the crops and on the harvest prospective. 
The information and the derived forecasts are used at CAP decision maker level especially to fill crop 
balance sheet estimates. For instance in 2003 the system contributed to assess the effect of the 
severe summer drought on the European crop productions. The system has started R&D in the late 
80s and has become fully operational since 1999. 
The MCYFS is called a system because several elements and independent modules are integrated to 
reach the final purpose, i.e. to monitor crop behaviour and produce crop yield forecasts. The MCYFS 
is run operationally on an area covering the whole European Continent, Maghreb and Turkey. The 
crops covered by system simulation models are: wheat, spring barley, grain maize, rape seed, 
sunflower, potato, sugar beet, field bean (pastures, rice, soy bean are in phase of study/evaluation). 
However, the crop parameters simulated can be extended to other crops or varieties belonging to the 
same class such as winter barley, durum wheat, and field peas. The main pillars of the system are:  
• Observed meteorological data collection, processing and analysis  
• Simulation of agro-meteorological crop growth parameters  
• Low resolution satellite data analysis  
• Statistical analysis and forecasts 
 
                                                     
24 CGMS has been developed by the Mars-Stat Action, Agriculture and Fisheries Unit, Institute for Protection and 
Security of the Citizen (Directorate General Joint Research Centre of the European Commission). CGMS is 
the kernel of the EC agro-meteorological system (MARS Crop Yield Forecasting System), that finds its legal 
basis in EU Parliament - Council Co-decision 1445/2000/CE for the period 1999-2003. This co-decision was 
recently renewed to cover the period 2004-2007 (Ref. PE/CONS 3661/1/03 OJ L 309 of 26.11.2003) and 
again in the FP6/JRC-Multi Annual Working Program (Action 1121: MARS-Stat period 2002-2006) for the 
related R&D activities. 
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Figure 38. Crop Growth Monitoring System (CGMS) 
 
Source: Genovese (2004) 
 
In CGMS, there are three levels of analysis (see Figure 1). The first one consists on analysis and 
aggregation (correction and interpolation) of meteorological data coming from a multitude of 
meteorological stations spread all over the EU area. At the second level, crop growth simulation takes 
place. In addition to weather data obtained at level 1, crop characteristics and soil information are 
added. At level 3, simulation results are aggregated at the national level, and yield is predicted 
through statistical regressions analysis.  
The system is organized around 3 internal “infrastructures”, namely a Meteorological Monitoring 
Infrastructure (its main DB is the observed interpolated meteorological data since 1975), a Vegetation 
Monitoring Infrastructure (its main DB is the vegetation indicators based on low resolution satellite 
data since 1989), and Agrometeorological Infrastructure (its main DBs are crop parameters, crop 
calendars and phenology). The DB are exploited to run a main crop growth simulation model (CGMS-
WOFOST) and a pasture model (CGMS-LINGRA). 
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The outputs of the system are threefold:  
• dB and mapped outputs of agricultural season quality indicators. Examples: extreme 
temperatures maps at a given crop stage; simulated biomass and grain production, estimated 
actual soil moisture reserve, state of advancement of the development stage during a given 
month, differences from the long term average at a given decade or period within the growing 
season for any agro-meteorological indicator;  
• Alarm and risk warning: Detection of abnormal weather conditions (during a given month, or 
cumulated since the start of the season).  
• Calculated yield forecasts. 
Each ten days meteorological and agro-meteorological maps are produced by the system and 
screened by analysts. The data are updated on the web site according and published in the 
MARS bulletin about 6-7 time a year as complete analysis and each 15 days as Climatic Updates 
during the main crop vegetative period. 
 
A) European weather data (observed interpolated meteorological data since 1975) 
There is a big amount of weather data available in the Mars-Stat meteorological data bases that could 
be used as indexes to monitor weather risks. The original data are obtained from meteo-stations all 
around Europe, and the composition of the database, calculation of indirect variables (i.e. ET0) and 
interpolation of data when needed, is performed. The main weather variables available are: 
- Average daily temperature - Number of cold days 
- Longest heat wave period - Number of days with significant rain 
- Number of heat waves - Precipitation 
- Maximum daily temperature - Climatic water balance 
- Minimum daily temperature - Potential evapotranspiration (ET0) 
- Snow depth - Vapour pressure 
- Temperature sum - Wind speed 
- Global radiation 
The suitability of these data to constitute a weather index useful for yield losses estimation shall be 
studied. Several types of insurance can be based on these data: drought insurance (see Skees 2001), 
excess of rain insurance, frost insurance, etc. 
 
B) Crop simulation model. 
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Weather data are inserted together with the Agrometeorological Infrastructure Data (crop parameters, 
crop calendars, etc.) in the crop simulation model (WOFOST) to predict crop yields. WOFOST is 
based on a photosynthesis model. The outputs of the model are: 
- Development stage - Total water consumption 
- Potential leaf area index - Total water requirement 
- Potential above ground biomass - Water limited leaf area index 
- Potential storage organs - Water limited above ground biomass 
- Relative soil moisture - Water limited storage organs 
- Status of development stage -  
 
Other values can be obtained through the model, which are indicatives of the stresses suffered by the 
crops. These could potentially constitute risk indexes: 
- Longest heat wave period around crop development stage 
- Number of heat waves around crop development stage 
- Rain around crop development stage 
- Rain around sowing 
- Temperature around crop development stage 
 
The following sections will explore the possibilities to use these variables as indexes.  
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9.6. Annex 4B. Comparison of losses calculated at farm level (FADN yields) and 
at regional level (Eurostat yields) 
In order to understand the difference between the deductibles at farm and at regional level, we have 
compared the risks (expected losses from a trend25) for wheat yield calculated at farm level with the 
“2-year constant sample” method (like in section 5.2.1.1) with the risk calculated at regional level from 
Eurostat wheat yields. The two maps in Figure 39 show the risks with a 30% deductible at farm level 
from FADN data and at the level of FADN regions (NUTS2 or NUTS1) level from Eurostat data. Figure 
40 shows the differences between the risks in the two maps of Figure 39. As can be observed in the 
map, most differences are positive, indicating that FADN or individual risks are higher than regional 
risks. The average difference is approximately of 1%. However, we find some exceptions in which the 
regional risk obtained is higher that the farm risk. This is the case of the south-east of Spain and some 
regions in the south of Italy.  
 
 
 
                                                     
25 See section 9.12 for the calculation of the trend.  
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data and from FADN data. 
Figure 39. FADN yield risk and Eurostat yield risk for wheat with a 30% deductible 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN and Eurostat data 
Figure 40. Differences FADN risk -Eurostat risk for wheat yields with a 30% deductible 
 
In order to understand the reason of these negative risk differences, we look at the FADN and 
Eurostat yields in the largest region showing this inconsistency, Andalusia. We can observe the 
Andalusia yield data in Figure 41. The correlation between Eurostat and FADN yields appears quite 
low (0.35), with only a similar loss in 1999. The losses registered by Eurostat in 1995 and 1993 are 
not registered by FADN data. Similar divergences exist in other regions, like Murcia. This poses a 
question on the quality of the data. 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat and FADN data 
Figure 41. Wheat yields in Andalucía (Spain). FADN average and Eurostat NUTS2 
 
We have calculated the Eurostat yield risk at different straight deductibles for every region, in order to 
find out the straight deductible which results in a risk level similar to the average FADN risk with a 
30% deductible. Table 29 shows the weighted averages (weighted with the crop surfaces) for both 
Eurostat and FADN yields. As can be seen in Table 29, the region deductible that would be equivalent 
to 30% farm deductible would be 18.7% for the average of all the regions. However, regional 
differences are very important, so that the equivalent deductible would change from one region to 
another. The last column refers to the differences of both risks in the regions (values shown are the 
average of the absolute values of the regional differences between both risks). The deductible that 
minimizes the regional differences is 22%. For this reason, for our future calculations we will assume 
that the 30% farm-level deductible is equivalent to a 19% deductible. 
 
Table 29. Wheat yield farm and regional risks for FADN regions 
Deductible 
Area risk (Eurostat) 
Weighted average 
Farm risk (FADN) 
Weighted average 
Average of risk 
differences 
30% 0.48% 1.19% 1.00% 
22% 0.92% 1.19% 0.97% 
18.70% 1.19% 1.19% 0.99% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN (1989-2004) and Eurostat (1975-2003) data 
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We had seen in the map in Figure 40 that some regions presented anomalies, showing higher risk at 
regional level than at farm level. If we eliminate these regions for the calculations, Table 29 would be 
modified as shown in Table 30. The region deductible which would be equivalent to a 30% farm 
deductible in this case would be 14.60%. The deductible which minimizes the differences is 17%, so in 
this case we can assume that the average region deductible equivalent to a 30% farm deductible 
would be around 15%.  
 
Table 30. Wheat yield farm and regional risks for FADN regions without anomalous regions 
Deductible 
Area risk (Eurostat) 
Weighted average 
Farm risk (FADN) 
Weighted average 
Average of risk 
differences 
30% 0.24% 1.14% 0.96% 
17% 0.92% 1.14% 0.68% 
14.60% 1.14% 1.14% 0.69% 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN (1989-2004) and Eurostat (1975-2003) data 
 
In summary, from the previous analyses we can deduce that the equivalence between a regional 
deductible and a farm deductible will depend on the region considered (and probably also on the 
crop). For the case of wheat, we can establish that the average region deductible equivalent to a 30% 
farm deductible would be between 15% and 19%. 
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9.7. Annex 4C. Comparison of losses triggered from a trend and from three 
year moving averages 
A first approach would indicate that insurers would prefer to base their insured amount in an expected 
production/income based on the average of a detrended time series, given that it is a more stable 
amount. A three-year moving average, for a region of high risks, can have big oscillations. Due to the 
lack of individual data, we will try to illustrate it with regional yield data. Figure 42 shows the regional 
wheat yields in Castilla y Leon (Spain), a detrended average line and the WTO-moving-average 
curves. It can be observed that the moving averages present big oscillations. For example, the 3 year 
moving average from the prior five years eliminating the maximum and minimum would result in an 
insured amount of 2.27T/ha in 1991, and only 1.80 T/ha two years later (1993), while the general trend 
is increasing.  
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 42. Trend and moving averages for wheat yields in Castilla y Leon (Spain) 
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In order to compare the eligible losses (losses above a threshold) for an insurance based on a 
detrended average with the losses allowed by the WTO moving averages criteria, we have performed 
an analysis on yields at regional level. Given that regional yields are expected to oscillate less than 
individual yields, we have used a 15% trigger, assuming that it could be equivalent to 30% trigger in 
individual yields (see Annex 5A, section 9.4). In fact, for Eurostat NUTS2 yields the eligible losses are 
almost always zero with a 30% trigger, showing that this trigger is too big for regional yields. Figure 
43, Figure 44 and Figure 45 graph the region yields, the corresponding trend minus 15%, with the 
three years moving averages minus 15%.  
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 43. Trend and moving averages minus 15% for green maize yields in Schleswig-Holstein 
(Germany) 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 44. Trend and moving averages minus 15% for potato yields in Ireland 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 45. Trend and moving averages minus 15% for grain maize yields in Belgium 
 
Results show some interesting conclusions:  
1- The trigger from the detrended average can either less constraining (year 1995 in Figure 43 and 
years 1983 and 1986 in Figure 44) or more constraining (year 1983 in Figure 43 and year 1981 in 
Figure 44) than losses from the moving averages.  
2- The triggers from the two moving averages are more close to each other than the trigger from the 
detrended average.   
3- In general, when the trend is increasing, the lower values in the years before cause that the moving 
averages have on average lower values than the trend. So, when the trend is increasing, the WTO 
conditions would be constraining on average for an insurance based on a moving average (see Figure 
44 and Figure 45).  
4- Instead, when the trend is constant, such as in Figure 43, we can have some period when WTO 
criteria would be constraining (from 1992 to 2002, and particularly for the loss in 1995, where the 
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actual yield is below the detrended average but above the moving averages), and some periods when 
they would allow aids (1979-1989). There would even be some cases when WTO would allow aids but 
payments are not triggered by the insurance (for example in 1991, where the actual yield is just above 
the trend but below the moving averages).  
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9.8. Annex 4D. Discussion on the deductibles and maximum subsidies allowed 
for income insurance by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
Paragraph 7 of Annex 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture permits a maximum subsidy 
to income losses equivalent to 70% of the losses. This would mean a 100% subsidy to an insurance 
with a 30% deductible. However, is the subsidy percentage is lower, the deductible could be smaller in 
order to reach this maximum compensation. In order to analyse the mutual effect of the deductibles 
and the subsidy percentage on the compliance with WTO criteria, we will put some examples.  
Example 1: Let us assume that the expected indemnities of a farmer equal 100 monetary units. Then, 
the market premium of an insurance product with no deductible could amount to 14026. If the 
Government subsidizes the 50%, the money from the Government would be 70 (see Figure 46). If, as 
expected, the farmer has a loss of 100, he is receiving from the Government 70, so 70% of his loss 
which is the maximum admitted by WTO. This means that the insurance product would need a trigger 
of 30% but not a deductible of 30% when the Government subsidizes only 50% of the premiums. 
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Source: Elaborated by authors 
Figure 46. Subsidies and WTO: Example 1 
 
Example 2: We can propose another example. If the expected loss is still 100, and the 
Government’s subsidy is 70% of the premium, then 98, we could say that the money from the 
Government has exceeded the 70% of the losses and that it does not comply with WTO (see 
Figure 47). However, it could also be argued that the Government is paying the Administrative 
costs of insurance, so 40, and that the farmer actually only receives the difference, 58. In fact, 
                                                     
26 Bielza et al. (2006) estimate that the average loss rate in Europe can be around 70%. This means that the 
expected indemnities are 0.7 for every euro of premium paid. As the fair premium is equivalent to the 
expected indemnities, we can consider that to a fair premium of 0.7 we have to add 0.3 for administrative 
costs, so, to increase it by 43%.  
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the farmer paid a premium of 140-98= 42 and received 100 as indemnities, so he only 
received net 58, so less than 70% of the loss. 
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Source: Elaborated by authors 
Figure 47. Subsidies and WTO: Example 2 
These examples show that the insurance design would need to take into account the foreseen 
subsidy from the Government, or perhaps more simple, that the Government should take into 
account the deductibles of the insurance in order to fix the subsidy. These examples also lead 
to a question, developed in Example 3.  
Example 3: If we assume the most restrictive situation, in which we would not accept that the 
subsidies from the Government pay the administrative costs, but that they are entirely paid to 
the producers, and we assume the most common minimum deductible of 10%, which would 
be the maximum subsidy possible in order to comply with WTO requirements? A 10% 
deductible would mean that the fair premium would decrease to 90, and the market premium 
to 126. The maximum subsidy allowed would be 70% of the loss, so 70 monetary units. In this 
way, it can be obtained by a simple calculation that the maximum subsidy possible would be 
55% of the market premium (see Figure 48). 
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Figure 48. Subsidies and WTO: Example 3 
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9.9. Annex 4E: Premium rates for RYI  
9.9.1. Premium rates for cereals 
 
The premium rates for wheat are shown in section 4.2.4.  
 
Table 31. Premium rates (%) for barley (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.94% 1.94% 1.94% 
BE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 
CY 13.99% 13.99% 13.99% 13.99% 13.99% 13.99% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.55% 1.55% 1.55% 
DE 0.32% 4.49% 0.00% 1.60% 7.84% 0.00% 
DK 1.08% 1.08% 1.08% 1.92% 1.92% 1.92% 
EE 3.85% 3.85% 3.85% 7.27% 7.27% 7.27% 
ES 6.62% 15.74% 0.00% 8.94% 18.16% 2.99% 
FI 1.69% 1.69% 1.69% 4.62% 4.62% 4.62% 
FR 0.30% 1.81% 0.00% 1.98% 6.14% 0.00% 
GR 0.56% 2.25% 0.00% 2.27% 4.92% 1.30% 
HU 2.44% 4.13% 0.00% 5.05% 7.97% 1.62% 
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.18% 1.18% 1.18% 
IT 1.66% 8.48% 0.00% 3.09% 11.75% 0.00% 
LT 4.27% 4.27% 4.27% 7.40% 7.40% 7.40% 
LU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.88% 1.88% 1.88% 
LV 2.29% 2.29% 2.29% 3.84% 3.84% 3.84% 
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.82% 3.36% 0.00% 
PT 2.21% 2.21% 2.21% 10.84% 10.84% 10.84% 
SE 0.82% 2.47% 0.00% 3.43% 7.23% 1.43% 
SI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.25% 2.25% 2.25% 
SK 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83% 
UK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.83% 3.11% 0.00% 
Europe 2.09% 15.74% 0.00% 4.15% 18.16% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 49. Premium rates for RYI for barley (trigger 30% and 15%) 
 
 
 
 Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 50. Premium rates for RYI for grain maize (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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Table 32. Premium rates (%) for grain maize (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76% 0.76% 0.76% 
BE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 
DE 2.08% 7.51% 0.00% 3.95% 9.20% 0.00% 
ES 0.98% 3.93% 0.00% 2.57% 7.84% 0.00% 
FR 0.73% 3.43% 0.00% 2.02% 6.72% 0.00% 
GR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
HU 0.71% 4.24% 0.00% 8.07% 11.56% 5.36% 
IT 0.64% 2.95% 0.00% 2.64% 7.95% 0.57% 
NL 4.04% 4.04% 4.04% 9.54% 9.54% 9.54% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.67% 4.67% 4.67% 
SI 2.92% 2.92% 2.92% 7.89% 7.89% 7.89% 
SK 4.13% 4.13% 4.13% 6.11% 6.11% 6.11% 
Europe 1.47% 7.51% 0.00% 4.56% 11.56% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 51. Premium rates for RYI for rice (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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Table 33. Premium rates (%) for rice (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 10% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
ES 0.67% 2.56% 0.00% 2.05% 5.20% 0.00% 
FR 1.37% 1.43% 1.30% 2.81% 3.32% 2.31% 
GR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.07% 1.12% 0.97% 
HU 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.18% 3.99% 2.37% 
IT 0.67% 2.18% 0.00% 2.13% 4.63% 0.61% 
PT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.51% 1.51% 1.51% 
Europe 0.45% 2.56% 0.00% 2.13% 5.20% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
9.9.2. Premium rates for oilseeds: rapeseed, soybean and sunflower 
The rapeseed calculations encountered several problems. In many cases, the yield variations where 
huge and with an unusual behaviour, which could be due to the variation in the cultivated surface. In 
fact, in many regions the crop progressively disappeared, with the last years showing a surface of one 
hectare or less per region. This can have an impact on average yields, with an increase/decrease of 
cropped rapeseed-suitable areas. These aspects where found for example in Italy, where we tried to 
combat these effects by artificially modifying the trend adapting it to the different periods observed. A 
similar case was found in Greece. In this case we did not manipulate the data, and consequently, the 
premiums rates resulted to be very high, as can be observed in Table 34. Anyway, it is not actuarially 
advisable to design an insurance product for a crop and regions which suffer from this kind of data 
problems. 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 52. Premium rates for RYI for rapeseed (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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Table 34. Premium rates (%) for rapeseed (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 15% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.89% 6.89% 6.89% 
BE 1.53% 1.53% 1.53% 2.33% 2.33% 2.33% 
CZ 3.72% 3.72% 3.72% 3.72% 3.72% 3.72% 
DK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.88% 1.88% 1.88% 
EE 5.41% 5.41% 5.41% 7.13% 7.13% 7.13% 
ES 4.40% 11.51% 0.00% 7.54% 15.45% 2.04% 
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.94% 3.94% 3.94% 
FR 0.37% 1.59% 0.00% 2.41% 4.55% 0.00% 
GR 11.51% 17.14% 0.00% 15.16% 20.80% 1.51% 
HU 0.54% 3.23% 0.00% 2.46% 7.87% 0.00% 
IE 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 2.32% 2.32% 2.32% 
IT 4.98% 26.76% 0.00% 7.07% 28.54% 0.79% 
LT 5.04% 5.04% 5.04% 6.35% 6.35% 6.35% 
LU 3.11% 3.11% 3.11% 5.99% 5.99% 5.99% 
LV 9.47% 9.47% 9.47% 11.85% 11.85% 11.85% 
NL 3.73% 3.73% 3.73% 6.08% 6.08% 6.08% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.78% 6.75% 2.52% 
PT 5.78% 5.78% 5.78% 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 
SE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.71% 1.71% 1.71% 
SI 3.37% 3.37% 3.37% 7.86% 7.86% 7.86% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.94% 1.94% 1.94% 
Europe 3.07% 26.76% 0.00% 5.53% 28.54% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 53. Premium rates for RYI for soybean (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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Table 35. Premium rates (%) for soybean (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.39% 4.39% 4.39% 
FR 0.99% 3.40% 0.00% 2.89% 7.48% 0.00% 
HU 4.99% 14.91% 0.00% 6.92% 16.73% 1.98% 
IT 0.19% 1.87% 0.00% 1.45% 3.85% 0.00% 
Europe 1.54% 14.91% 0.00% 3.91% 16.73% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
Table 36. Premium rates (%) for sunflower (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.21% 1.21% 1.21% 
DE 2.10% 8.19% 0.00% 4.18% 12.64% 0.00% 
ES 3.44% 7.85% 0.00% 7.74% 11.80% 3.40% 
FR 0.59% 2.13% 0.00% 2.48% 4.76% 0.00% 
GR 4.54% 9.08% 0.00% 8.56% 14.97% 2.15% 
HU 1.13% 3.40% 0.00% 4.07% 7.86% 1.64% 
IT 1.95% 8.07% 0.00% 4.68% 10.18% 2.08% 
PT 5.79% 5.79% 5.79% 9.34% 9.34% 9.34% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.52% 2.52% 2.52% 
Europe 2.17% 9.08% 0.00% 4.98% 14.97% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 54. Premium rates for RYI for sunflower (trigger 30% and 15%) 
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9.9.3. Premium rates for tubers: potato and sugarbeet 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 55. Premium rates for RYI for potato (trigger 30% and 10%) 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data 
Figure 56. Premium rates for RYI for sugar beet (trigger 30% and 10%) 
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Table 37. Premium rates (%) for sugar beet (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
BE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
DE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.07% 2.32% 0.00% 
DK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 
ES 1.01% 1.88% 0.00% 4.01% 8.71% 2.09% 
FI 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 3.90% 3.90% 3.90% 
FR 0.07% 1.00% 0.00% 0.95% 2.20% 0.00% 
GR 1.96% 3.92% 0.00% 3.06% 5.69% 0.00% 
HU 0.50% 3.02% 0.00% 4.27% 6.86% 0.00% 
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.93% 1.93% 1.93% 
IT 1.11% 6.74% 0.00% 3.60% 10.57% 0.80% 
LT 2.21% 2.21% 2.21% 3.51% 3.51% 3.51% 
LV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.51% 3.51% 3.51% 
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.13% 1.13% 1.13% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.11% 2.67% 0.00% 
PT 1.18% 1.18% 1.18% 3.22% 3.22% 3.22% 
SI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.14% 2.14% 2.14% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.18% 2.18% 2.18% 
Europe 0.53% 6.74% 0.00% 2.14% 10.57% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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Table 38. Premium rates (%) for potato (premiums calculated at FADN-region level) 
 Trigger 30% Trigger 15% 
 Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
AT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.47% 1.47% 1.47% 
BE 1.18% 1.18% 1.18% 2.36% 2.36% 2.36% 
CY 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.21% 3.21% 3.21% 
CZ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
DE 0.39% 3.80% 0.00% 2.93% 6.05% 1.09% 
DK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.83% 0.83% 0.83% 
EE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 
ES 2.44% 4.97% 0.00% 3.59% 6.59% 0.66% 
FI 1.72% 1.72% 1.72% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 
FR 1.29% 3.65% 0.00% 2.34% 5.02% 0.00% 
GR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
HU 1.16% 3.49% 0.00% 3.47% 5.15% 2.02% 
IE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.03% 3.03% 3.03% 
IT 1.42% 12.36% 0.00% 3.49% 14.30% 0.63% 
LT 4.08% 4.08% 4.08% 5.70% 5.70% 5.70% 
LU 2.87% 2.87% 2.87% 4.71% 4.71% 4.71% 
LV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.39% 2.39% 2.39% 
NL 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.84% 1.73% 0.00% 
PT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.05% 2.05% 2.05% 
SE 2.61% 5.44% 0.00% 3.90% 6.65% 1.18% 
SI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.30% 3.30% 3.30% 
SK 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.64% 4.64% 4.64% 
UK 6.10% 7.41% 4.47% 6.54% 7.41% 5.15% 
Europe 0.96% 12.36% 0.00% 2.93% 14.30% 0.00% 
Source: Authors calculations from Eurostat data 
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9.10. Annex 5A: The “2-year constant sample” method. 
 
We consider a generic farm i in a year t. Farm i belongs to a class of farms k. The class k can be 
defined as a FADN region or as the set of farms in the region of a certain-size or a certain-farm type. 
Farm i has a weight tiW for extrapolation in FADN.  
Our target variable (yield, income/AWU, Farm net value added) is noted tiZ  for farm i  and tkZ  for 
category k . tkZ  can be estimated as } kititk ZZ ∈=ˆ  
We call tkg  the trend of tkZ . The computation of the trend, selecting a constant, linear, quadratic or 
logarithmic function, is described in section 9.12. The trend for farm i is called tig . We assume it is 
proportional to the trend for the class to which it belongs: tkiti gAg = . The coefficient 1>iA  if the 
farm generally performs better than the average in the region. 1<iA  if it performs worse. Some type 
of assumption is necessary to make up for the absence of a time series long enough to compute 
directly the trend tig . 
The actual value of tiZ  differs from the trend tig  for several reasons: the general goodness/badness 
of the year for that region, that we represent by tkδ  and a specific variation for to the farm i  for year t  
due to a variety of reasons, that we collect in a residual term tiε . We assume that tiε  and it 'ε  are 
independent for 'tt ≠ .  
titktititkititktkiti gZAgAZ εδεεδ ===      
tkδ  indicates if the year t has been better or worse than the trend in region k. It can be estimated from 
the time series of the average data for the region k. tktktk gZ δ=   
The attempt now is exploiting the data of a farm as soon as we have two consecutive observations for 
that farm. The ratio of the observations for consecutive years will give us an indication on the 
tendency to fluctuation represented by the terms tkδ  and tiε  
Thus we will use as data for the estimation of the risk: 
itkt
titk
kt
tk
it
ti
ti g
g
Z
ZZ
,1,1,1,1 −−−−
==Δ εδ
εδ
. Using 
these ratios has the advantage of eliminating the term iA , that we are unable to estimate properly due 
to scarce data for farm i .  
We use a loss function:               ( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
−−
−>=
otherwiseZgd
gdZif
Zh
titi
titi
ti 1
10
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This corresponds to the loss compensated by an insurance with a straight deductible d.  
We can write ( ) ( )( )titktititi dgZgd εδ−−×=−− 11  
Therefore we want to estimate the risk ( )[ ]tiZhE , we need to estimate the distribution of titkεδ , more 
specifically the part of the distribution with values below ( )d−1 .  
The term titkti εδγ =  measures the ratio between the yield tiZ  obtained in a farm and the expected 
yield tig  . It has two components: the general deviation in the region and the specific deviation of farm 
i in year t, excluding the long term difference iA  between the farm i and the class k. 
From the data we can compute 
ti
it
it
ti
it
ti
g
g
Z
Z ,1
,1,1
−
−−
=γ
γ
 and hence derive an estimate of the distribution 
of ( ) ( )1loglog −−= ttt γγϕ , that we can call ϕ  for a generic year, assuming a stationary behaviour of 
risk. Under the hypothesis of stationary behaviour we can put together all the observed values for 
different years to estimate the distribution of ϕ . 
The histograms of ϕ  look approximately like a normal distribution, with means close to 0, but the 
Kolmogorov test rejects in most cases the normality. The main reason is that queues can be very 
long, compared to Gaussian densities (thicker than Gaussian far from the mean); this can be checked 
because the values of the kurtosis are often very high (see Figure 57 and Table 39).    
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 57. Histogram of ( ) ( )1loglog −− tt γγ  for the region of Bavaria 
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Table 39. Descriptive parameters of the distribution of ( ) ( )1loglog −− tt γγ  for the region Bavaria, 
showing that the apparently Gaussian distribution does not fit. 
Distribution analysis 
Min 0.2664
1st Qu. 0.8850
Median 0.9923
3rd Qu. 1.1070
Max 3.7720
Mean 1.0145
Sd 0.2386
cv 0.2352
skewness 1.7134
kurtosis 9.1231
Normality test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  p-value<0.001
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
 
If ϕ  had followed a gaussian distribution ( )2,0 sN , it would have been reasonable to assume that 
( )tγlog  and ( )1log −tγ  are independent random variables with a ( )2,0 2sN  distribution, i.e. they have 
the same distribution as 
2
ϕ
.   
We now consider if it is reasonable to assume that ( )tγlog  and ( )1log −tγ  have the same distribution 
as 
2
ϕ
 even if ϕ  does not follow exactly a normal distribution. The question is: it is approximately 
true that ϕ  follows the same probability distribution as the sum (or the difference) of two independent 
variables distributed as 
2
ϕ
? If so, we can estimate the distribution of ( )tγlog   as the distribution 
of  
2
ϕ
. 
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For the empirical application, once the regional trend tkg  has been calculated, to estimate the density 
of tϕ  we have used the Kernel density estimator (Tapia and Thompson, 1978) with a bandwidth 05.0  
and “triangular” smoothing. 
The distribution function was estimated as:  
( )
( )
( )∑
∑
≤=
it
it
f
f
F it ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕϕ  
The distribution function of titkti εδγ =  was derived from ( )ϕF  by simple change of variable. As an 
example, the estimated functions for wheat yields in Lorraine are shown in Figure 58.  
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 58. Density and distribution functions for wheat yields in Lorraine 
 
 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
Cumulative Distribution Function 

  201 
 
9.11. Annex 5B: Description of the FADN data 
 
FADN was launched in 1965. It is an annual survey carried out by the Member States of the European 
Union. The network collects every year accountancy data from a sample of the agricultural holdings in 
the European Union. Derived from national surveys, the FADN provides harmonised micro-economic 
data; the bookkeeping principles are the same in all countries. The survey does not cover all the 
agricultural holdings in the Union but only those that are large enough to be considered commercial. 
Too small farms are excluded (hobby or semi-subsistence farming).  
The aim of the network is to gather accountancy data from farms for the determination of incomes and 
business analysis of agricultural holdings. Currently, the annual sample has approximately 80.000 
holdings. They represent a population of about 5.000.000 farms in the 25 Member States, which cover 
approximately 90% of the total utilized agricultural area (UAA) and account for more than 90% of the 
total agricultural production of the Union. The information collected, for each sample farm, concerns 
approximately 1000 variables and is transmitted by National Liaison Agencies. These variables 
described in a Farm Return refer to:  
• Physical and structural data, such as location, crop areas, livestock amount, labour force, etc. 
• Economic and financial data, such as the value of production of the different crops, stocks, 
sales and purchases, production costs, assets, liabilities, production quotas and subsidies, including 
those connected with the application of CAP measures.  
All individual data relating to individual farms received by the Commission are highly confidential. Only 
aggregated results for groups of farms are published.  
To ensure that this sample reflects the heterogeneity of farming before the sample of farms, the field 
of observation is stratified according to 3 criteria: region, economic size and type of farming. A certain 
number of farms are selected in each stratum and an individual weight is applied to each farm in the 
sample, this corresponding to the number of farms in the 3-way stratification cell of the field of 
observations divided by the number of farms in the corresponding cell in the sample. This weighting 
system is used in the calculation of standard results and generally also for the estimations in specific 
studies. 
The standard results are a set of statistics, calculated from the Farm Returns, which are periodically 
produced and published by the Commission. They describe in considerable detail the economic 
situation of farmers by different groups. The FADN survey covers the entire range of agricultural 
activities on farms. It also collects data on non-agricultural farming activities (such as tourism and 
forestry). 
FADN provides in fact a unique source of data to analyse the income of farmers making the difference 
between different types of farms, size of the holding and regions. The data would allow simulating to a 
certain extent what would have happened without insurances; in particular the costs of insurances are 
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collected for each farm of the sample. Unfortunately the compensations received by farmers in case of 
crisis are insufficiently detailed for a proper analysis. 
 
Description of the data used for developing our analysis:  
• Period:  
For EU-12, data are available for years 1989-2004; for Austria, Sweden and Finland, the data 
set starts in 1995, giving still a 10-year series that allows computing a trend. For new member 
states, only 2004 is available so it is not possible to use FADN data in the computation of risk 
indexes.  
Income indicators based on FADN data are analysed since 1994. 
• Variables available for each farm:  
General information about the farm: 
- Less Favoured Area (LFA) 
- Altitude class 
- size in European Size Units (ESU),  
Classification of the farm: region, type of farm, size class, weight of the farm for extrapolation 
(number of farms in the population for each stratum divided number of farms in the sample). 
Productivity-related variables of main crops: Common wheat, Durum wheat, Barley, Grain 
maize, Sunflower, Rapeseed, Soya, Olives for oil: 
- Area 
- Production 
- production value  
Additional information:  
- expenditures in insurances 
- subsidies for insurances.  
• Subset:  
Only farms with some area in one of the major crops mentioned above.  
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Table 40. Size sample of FADN yield data per country and year 
ctry 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
BEL 708 683 656 664 671 677 691 690 667 674 633 692 663 708 715 713 10905 
CYP                322 322 
CZE                1128 1128 
DAN 1934 2004 2006 1823 1835 1818 1852 1882 1811 1552 1537 1613 1637 1654 1574 1543 28075 
DEU 3963 4063 3985 4021 4131 4033 4302 4265 4533 4238 4555 4703 4902 5032 4999 5005 70730 
ELL 5440 5160 5120 5179 5076 4578 4382 4099 4033 3963 3819 3870 3598 3359 3547 3607 68830 
ESP 4284 4081 3678 3567 3148 3359 3146 4391 4723 4569 4482 4771 4813 4402 4306 3962 65682 
EST                371 371 
FRA 5715 5698 5590 5790 5775 5871 5607 5680 5651 5741 5763 5696 5571 5619 5264 5234 90265 
HUN                1611 1611 
IRE 368 335 323 324 324 258 239 235 257 242 205 208 235 250 234 233 4270 
ITA 14259 13864 13335 13227 12724 11407 10493 11396 10851 10508 10814 10313 11338 11561 9414 9079 184583 
LTU                932 932 
LUX 274 275 259 251 248 257 246 235 243 288 297 307 364 427 404 386 4761 
LVA                572 572 
NED 341 342 318 305 304 345 303 312 308 282 278 278 352 363 345 347 5123 
OST       1556 1550 1520 1497 1451 1380 1338 1294 1247 1276 14109 
POL                8867 8867 
POR 1420 1375 1473 1515 1565 1500 1441 1338 1242 1162 1117 1046 908 906 895 907 19810 
SUO       745 737 759 686 621 603 578 551 571 597 6448 
SVE       517 586 677 767 758 786 770 722 718 756 7057 
SVK                549 549 
SVN                247 247 
UKI 1857 1624 1625 1617 1514 1626 1669 1499 1812 1831 1747 1404 1188 1256 1472 1343 25084 
Total 40563 39504 38368 38283 37315 35729 37189 38895 39087 38000 38077 37670 38255 38104 35705 49587 620331 
Source: FADN data 
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Table 41. Size sample average for pairs of consecutive years 
from 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
to 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
BEL 696 670 660 668 674 684 691 679 671 654 663 678 686 712 714 10195 
DAN 1969 2005 1915 1829 1827 1835 1867 1847 1682 1545 1575 1625 1646 1614 1559 26337 
DEU 4013 4024 4003 4076 4082 4168 4284 4399 4386 4397 4629 4803 4967 5016 5002 66246 
ELL 5300 5140 5150 5128 4827 4480 4241 4066 3998 3891 3845 3734 3479 3453 3577 64307 
ESP 4183 3880 3623 3358 3254 3253 3769 4557 4646 4526 4627 4792 4608 4354 4134 61559 
FRA 5707 5644 5690 5783 5823 5739 5644 5666 5696 5752 5730 5634 5595 5442 5249 84791 
IRE 352 329 324 324 291 249 237 246 250 224 207 222 243 242 234 3970 
ITA 14062 13600 13281 12976 12066 10950 10945 11124 10680 10661 10564 10826 11450 10488 9247 172914 
LUX 275 267 255 250 253 252 241 239 266 293 302 336 396 416 395 4431 
NED 342 330 312 305 325 324 308 310 295 280 278 315 358 354 346 4779 
OST       1553 1535 1509 1474 1416 1359 1316 1271 1262 12693 
POR 1398 1424 1494 1540 1533 1471 1390 1290 1202 1140 1082 977 907 901 901 18647 
SUO       741 748 723 654 612 591 565 561 584 5777 
SVE       552 632 722 763 772 778 746 720 737 6421 
UKI 1741 1625 1621 1566 1570 1648 1584 1656 1822 1789 1576 1296 1222 1364 1408 23484 
Total 40034 38936 38326 37799 36522 35050 38042 38991 38544 38039 37874 37963 38180 36905 35347 566548 
Source: FADN data 
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Table 42. Number of observations that remain in the sample in consequent years 
from 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
to 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
BEL 593 581 559 570 589 599 618 612 616 589 592 598 596 639  8351 
DAN 1449 1544 1382 1330 1289 1302 1334 1370 1186 1033 960 1128 1187 1145 1126 18765 
DEU 3317 3248 2830 3395 3451 2583 2952 3179 3727 2233 3635 3816 4030 4422 4322 51140 
ELL 4490 4455 4638 4399 3721 2802 3361 3539 3446 3379 3414 3122 2950 2816 3080 53612 
ESP 2661 2910 2164 2494 2006 2050 2493 3837 3695 3604 3956 4360 4018 3738 3599 47585 
FRA 4629 4520 4515 4757 4840 4729 4700 4744 4890 4968 5006 4822 4843 4706 4614 71283 
IRE 282 267 270 236 210 193 180 152 177 95 167 173 195 197 197 2991 
ITA 10295 10033 9332 8982 8455 7725 7373 7740 7661 8093 8166 7820 7784 1912 6825 118196 
LUX 253 252 239 237 233 240 199 216 107 272 273 285 334 352 357 3849 
NED 256 251 241 243 249 249 230 236 257 223 278 143 296 270 275 3697 
OST       1433 1422 1392 1346 1302 1251 1196 1165 1122 11629 
POR 1109 1169 1199 1234 1224 1137 1068 1016 984 917 897 781 728 676 735 14874 
SUO       655 647 611 568 527 526 498 503 521 5056 
SVE       444 483 583 521 677 698 652 640 627 5325 
UKI 1315 1246 1297 1192 1188 1299 1232 1257 1552 1555 1241 233 842 1033 1016 17498 
Total 30649 30476 28666 29069 27455 24908 28272 30450 30884 29396 31091 29756 30149 24214 28416 433851 
Source: FADN data 
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Table 43. Observations that remain in consecutive years expressed as the percentage of the average number of observations in the pairs of 
consecutive years 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
ctry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
BEL 85.3 86.8 84.7 85.4 87.4 87.6 89.5 90.2 91.9 90.1 89.4 88.3 86.9 89.8 0.0 81.9 
DAN 73.6 77.0 72.2 72.7 70.6 71.0 71.5 74.2 70.5 66.9 61.0 69.4 72.1 70.9 72.2 71.3 
DEU 82.7 80.7 70.7 83.3 84.5 62.0 68.9 72.3 85.0 50.8 78.5 79.5 81.1 88.2 86.4 77.2 
ELL 84.7 86.7 90.1 85.8 77.1 62.5 79.3 87.0 86.2 86.8 88.8 83.6 84.8 81.6 86.1 83.4 
ESP 63.6 75.0 59.7 74.3 61.7 63.0 66.2 84.2 79.5 79.6 85.5 91.0 87.2 85.9 87.1 77.3 
FRA 81.1 80.1 79.3 82.3 83.1 82.4 83.3 83.7 85.8 86.4 87.4 85.6 86.6 86.5 87.9 84.1 
IRE 80.2 81.2 83.5 72.8 72.2 77.7 75.9 61.8 70.9 42.5 80.9 78.1 80.4 81.4 84.4 75.3 
ITA 73.2 73.8 70.3 69.2 70.1 70.5 67.4 69.6 71.7 75.9 77.3 72.2 68.0 18.2 73.8 68.4 
LUX 92.2 94.4 93.7 95.0 92.3 95.4 82.7 90.4 40.3 93.0 90.4 84.9 84.5 84.7 90.4 86.9 
NED 75.0 76.1 77.4 79.8 76.7 76.9 74.8 76.1 87.1 79.6 100.0 45.4 82.8 76.3 79.5 77.4 
OST       92.3 92.6 92.3 91.3 92.0 92.1 90.9 91.7 88.9 91.6 
POR 79.4 82.1 80.3 80.1 79.9 77.3 76.9 78.8 81.9 80.5 82.9 79.9 80.3 75.1 81.6 79.8 
SUO       88.4 86.5 84.6 86.9 86.1 89.1 88.2 89.7 89.2 87.5 
SVE       80.5 76.5 80.7 68.3 87.7 89.7 87.4 88.9 85.1 82.9 
UKI 75.6 76.7 80.0 76.1 75.7 78.8 77.8 75.9 85.2 86.9 78.8 18.0 68.9 75.7 72.2 74.5 
Total 76.6 78.3 74.8 76.9 75.2 71.1 74.3 78.1 80.1 77.3 82.1 78.4 79.0 65.6 80.4 76.6 
Source: FADN data 
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Table 44. Percentage of farms which have data for the prior 3 years (4-year constant sample) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
BEL 67.9% 67.2% 66.5% 67.3% 70.7% 74.1% 78.5% 81.4% 75.4% 76.5% 71.0% 70.9%  
DAN 47.3% 47.0% 44.0% 42.1% 41.2% 44.0% 45.1% 44.8% 35.0% 31.5% 33.6% 40.0% 44.3% 
DEU 51.5% 50.3% 51.2% 43.9% 42.9% 35.8% 47.9% 32.7% 36.0% 32.1% 50.9% 59.2% 65.6% 
ELL 69.5% 68.7% 61.9% 36.4% 32.8% 40.8% 61.4% 67.4% 68.1% 68.8% 68.2% 60.5% 60.2% 
ESP 36.5% 48.8% 35.2% 38.6% 28.5% 34.7% 43.0% 56.5% 56.4% 63.3% 74.2% 75.7% 76.2% 
FRA 53.2% 53.3% 55.1% 59.3% 59.2% 59.6% 60.0% 62.8% 66.5% 67.2% 67.0% 68.0% 69.5% 
IRE 63.9% 54.6% 56.6% 59.0% 54.9% 40.5% 37.2% 31.2% 34.1% 30.2% 54.4% 56.8% 62.7% 
ITA 37.3% 37.2% 34.8% 36.8% 32.6% 36.7% 33.9% 36.3% 41.9% 41.7% 38.1% 10.3% 5.7% 
LUX 86.5% 89.9% 83.7% 85.8% 76.6% 75.3% 31.3% 32.3% 29.6% 65.4% 56.2% 58.7% 73.1% 
NED 46.2% 49.3% 45.5% 48.2% 43.3% 45.8% 49.6% 56.8% 74.1% 31.0% 35.5% 32.8% 57.3% 
OST       83.3% 83.8% 85.0% 85.2% 84.5% 84.4% 78.5% 
POR 54.7% 54.1% 55.3% 55.9% 57.6% 57.4% 60.9% 64.9% 67.1% 66.3% 64.5% 56.6% 52.3% 
SUO       74.1% 75.5% 75.1% 76.8% 76.8% 75.3% 71.7% 
SVE       44.9% 43.3% 50.5% 55.8% 74.2% 76.3% 69.7% 
UKI 50.6% 51.3% 49.8% 48.8% 50.2% 46.8% 50.8% 54.8% 68.8% 16.5% 14.3% 12.0% 38.9% 
All 48.3% 49.3% 46.7% 41.0% 37.9% 39.8% 49.3% 50.8% 53.8% 51.8% 54.3% 48.3% 34.1% 
Source: FADN data 
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Table 45. Percentage of farms which have data for the prior 5 years (6-year constant sample) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
BEL 54.4% 54.6% 55.4% 58.9% 62.8% 66.0% 65.5% 67.7% 64.1% 62.7%  
DAN 28.9% 28.3% 27.1% 27.4% 27.3% 25.5% 21.6% 21.5% 20.0% 19.6% 22.4% 
DEU 38.1% 27.5% 24.9% 26.1% 30.5% 17.5% 20.1% 21.7% 24.1% 24.5% 42.9% 
ELL 45.6% 25.8% 18.4% 16.7% 19.2% 28.1% 46.7% 51.4% 52.5% 48.7% 46.2% 
ESP 25.1% 25.1% 17.9% 21.6% 22.7% 28.4% 33.6% 45.4% 51.5% 58.0% 65.7% 
FRA 38.5% 38.9% 39.4% 42.0% 42.6% 44.6% 47.0% 49.0% 50.6% 52.3% 53.5% 
IRE 45.3% 47.7% 43.4% 33.9% 27.7% 26.3% 25.5% 21.7% 22.8% 23.5% 47.6% 
ITA 19.4% 17.5% 18.5% 18.4% 19.3% 17.9% 19.5% 21.6% 19.6% 6.6% 3.3% 
LUX 76.3% 80.5% 70.6% 68.7% 27.4% 27.6% 25.1% 22.8% 18.7% 48.8% 53.1% 
NED 22.3% 22.4% 20.8% 20.8% 22.0% 30.6% 38.8% 19.9% 24.5% 24.1% 30.5% 
OST       77.7% 78.6% 77.9% 78.0% 73.1% 
POR 38.9% 39.1% 40.1% 42.0% 46.0% 47.4% 51.6% 55.8% 53.0% 45.7% 44.0% 
SUO       64.0% 64.7% 66.1% 64.6% 62.3% 
SVE       28.4% 35.6% 44.5% 48.3% 58.7% 
UKI 32.8% 33.6% 35.7% 30.2% 32.2% 37.9% 43.9% 11.5% 11.1% 10.3% 11.2% 
All 31.7% 25.6% 23.8% 24.4% 25.6% 25.9% 34.3% 35.6% 35.9% 34.1% 25.4% 
Source: FADN data 
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9.12. Annex 5C: Trend estimation 
 
The trend estimation process is described for a generic regional variable Ztk  which can represent 
either regional yield, either regional Farm Net Value Added or regional Value of Production. In the 
case of yields, the regional trend has been estimated from Eurostat REGIO data for regional yields, 
because they can be considered more reliable. Instead, in the other two cases, FADN regional 
averages have been used to estimate the regional trends. 
The trend gtkof the variable Ztk  is estimated as ( )tktk ZEg =  with a simple model that can be 
logarithmic, quadratic, linear, or constant.  
A logarithmic trend is given by a linear regression of Ztk  with the expression: 
( )1logˆˆ *log1log0 ++= ktk tg ββ  
where min
*
kkk ttt −= , if the significance level of ˆ β 1log  is less then 20% and ˆ β 1log > 0; 
 a quadratic trend is given by: 
   gtk = ˆ β 0quad + ˆ β 1quad xk + ˆ β 2quad xk2 
where xtk = tk − t k( ) and t k  is the average of the years in which we have data for the region k . The 
quadratic trend is settled by a quadratic regression with restrictions if the conditions for a logarithmic 
trend are not satisfied, and the significance level of ˆ β 2quad is less than 20%, ˆ β 2quad < 0 and 
ˆ β 1quad > 0 ; 
a linear trend is given by: 
gtk = ˆ β 0lin + ˆ β 1lin xk  
calculated by a linear regression if the conditions for a quadratic trend are not satisfied and the 
significance level of ˆ β 1lin  is less than 20% and ˆ β 1lin > 0 ; 
a constant trend is given by: 
gtk = Z tk  
calculated by the average of Ztk  if the conditions for a logarithmic, quadratic and a linear model are 
not satisfied. 
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Figure 59 shows some examples of the different types of trends found for yield in European FADN 
regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant Trend  
(Wheat - Andalucia) 
Linear Trend  
(Wheat – Castilla Leon) 
Logarithmic Trend  
(Wheat - Bourgogne) 
Quadratic Trend  
(Wheat - Haute-Normandie) 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat data on FADN regions 
Figure 59. Examples of types of trends for wheat yields in different European regions 
 
This analysis has been performed for several crops yields for all FADN regions in Europe. The types 
of trends that have been found are shown in Figure 61 and Figure 60. A similar analysis has been 
performed with FADN regional averages, for Farm Net Value Added and Value of Production. The 
types of trends found are shown in Figure 62 and Figure 63 respectively. In the calculation of the 
FNVA trend, we have encountered cases with negative values of this variable. These are reported in 
Table 46. 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat-REGIO data 
Figure 60. Types of trends for the yields of wheat 
Negative Linear Trend  
(Wheat - Makedonia-Thraki)
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Source: Elaborated by authors from Eurostat-REGIO data 
Figure 61. Types of trends for the yields of barley, grain maize, soybean and sunflower 
respectively 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 62. Types of trend FADN Farm Net Value Added (FNVA) for specialists field crop, 
specialists horticulture, specialists permanent crops and mixed crops respectively 
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Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 63. Types of trend FADN production value (VP) for specialists field crop, specialists 
horticulture, specialists permanent crops and mixed crops respectively 
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Table 46. Special cases with negative FNVA values 
Region Type of farm Year Mean value 
Number of 
farms 
Limousin Specialist field crops 2003 -10166.0 2 
Limousin Specialist field crops 2005 -5949.3 2 
Languedoc-Roussillon Specialist field crops 1992 -1595.7 27 
Luxembourg Specialist field crops 1997 -1134.1 1 
Galicia Specialist field crops 1989 -705.3 33 
Madrid Specialist field crops 1991 -876.0 2 
Canarias Specialist field crops 1999 -1265.6 1 
Canarias Specialist field crops 2002 -9304.1 21 
Tras-os-Montes/Beira Specialist field crops 1997 -3080.7 7 
Tras-os-Montes/Beira Specialist field crops 2000 -2009.7 4 
Azores e da Madeira Specialist field crops 1991 -2790.3 1 
Azores e da Madeira Specialist field crops 1995 -82.7 8 
Azores e da Madeira Specialist field crops 1997 -52.5 6 
Lan i norra Specialist field crops 1995 -20614.5 1 
Lan i norra Specialist field crops 1996 -15919.4 1 
Lan i norra Specialist field crops 2000 -4205.5 12 
Sachsen-Anhalt Specialist horticulture 1996 -6473.9 5 
Picardie Specialist horticulture 1990 -214.8 1 
Alsace Specialist horticulture 1991 -2032.5 1 
Auvergne Specialist horticulture 1993 -3332.2 1 
Auvergne Specialist horticulture 2003 -1118.0 1 
Marche Specialist horticulture 2005 -22432.0 6 
Scotland Specialist horticulture 2004 -3340.2 1 
Pais Vasco Specialist horticulture 1996 -3607.7 1 
Tras-os-Montes/Beira Specialist horticulture 1995 -133.4 9 
Tras-os-Montes/Beira Specialist horticulture 1996 -129.0 14 
Tras-os-Montes/Beira Specialist horticulture 2005 -1180.9 44 
Hessen Specialist permanent crops 1995 -119823.2 2 
Brandenburg Specialist permanent crops 2000 -3652.8 1 
Valle d'Aoste Specialist permanent crops 1994 -133.2 7 
Galicia Specialist permanent crops 1989 -2145.6 12 
Madrid Specialist permanent crops 1990 -11267.2 3 
Murcia Specialist permanent crops 1992 -1115.9 15 
Extremadura Specialist permanent crops 1992 -2880.1 5 
Pohjois-Suomi Specialist permanent crops 2004 -34005.0 1 
Pohjois-Suomi Specialist permanent crops 2005 -8002.0 1 
Saarland Mixed cropping 2000 -5666.1 1 
Corse Mixed cropping 2001 -11718.0 1 
Galicia Mixed cropping 1989 -185.5 6 
Galicia Mixed cropping 2001 -933.9 12 
Pais Vasco Mixed cropping 2000 -9527.8 1 
Extremadura Mixed cropping 1992 -10787.1 13 
Slattbygdslan Specialist field crops 2004 -3870.2 5 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN Farm Net Value Added data 
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9.13. Annex 5D: Farm yield risk (FADN data) 
 
9.13.1. Farm yield risk with “2-year constant sample” method 
 
The map for wheat and barley and the table summarising the average results per country are shown 
in section 5.2.1.1 
 
  
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 64. Risks of yield reduction (trend -30% deductible) for grain maize and sunflower with 
“2-year constant sample” method 
 
 218 
9.13.2. Farm yield risk with “WTO moving average” method 
The maps for wheat and barley and the table summarising the average results per country are shown 
in section 5.2.1.2 
  
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 65. Risks of yield reduction (‘3 year’ moving average-30% trigger) for grain maize and 
sunflower 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors from FADN data 
Figure 66. Risks of yield reduction (‘5 year –minmax’ moving average - 30% trigger) for grain 
maize and sunflower 
  219
European Commission 
 
EUR 23392 EN/2 – Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of the 
Citizen 
Title: Agricultural Insurance Schemes II 
Author(s): Maria Bielza Diaz-Caneja, Costanza Giulia Conte, Remo Catenaro, Javier Gallego Pinilla 
 
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Index insurances, diversely from traditional agricultural insurances, do not refer to the actual farm 
losses but to the losses evaluated from an index. The study evaluates the feasibility of index 
insurances for EU and makes a cross-validation based on the yield loss risk calculated from FADN 
data. Premiums have been estimated for a Regional Yield Insurance (RYI) for FADN regions and a 
number of arable crops. Some meteorological, agro-meteorological and NDVI indicators were also 
analysed according to the model of the area yield-tailored insurance. From the statistical analysis the 
indicators do not explain yields optimally. Due to the strong heterogeneity within the EU regions, a 
meteorological yield-tailored index could have a better explanation capacity at a more disaggregated 
level. 
FADN data are used to compute and map the risk of yield reduction for major field crops and of 
income reduction by farm type. The cross validation of area yield insurance consisted on the 
calculation of the risk with FADN data with and without insurance. Results show that the risk reduction 
capacity of yield area index for the case analysed is not very high, but in some regions the risk can be 
reduced up to a 68%. The risk reduction capacity of other indexes is expected to be lower than the 
yield area index.  
Finally, the study shows that index products efficiency is relatively low at farm level due to the 
European heterogeneity of climates and geography and to the large geographical scale that had to be 
used in the study. So, index products could be more efficient for reinsurance that works at aggregated 
level. 
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